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“Ci sono giorni in cui ogni cosa che vedo mi sembra carica di significati: 
messaggi che mi sembra difficile comunicare ad altri, definire, tradurre in parole, ma che 
appunto perciò mi si presentano come decisivi. Sono annunci o presagi che riguardano me 
e il mondo insieme: e di me non gli avvenimenti esteriori dell’esistenza ma ciò che accade 
dentro, nel fondo; e del mondo non qualche fatto particolare ma il modo d’essere generale 
di tutto. Comprenderete dunque la mia difficoltà a parlarne, se non per accenni”  
(Italo Calvino, Se una notte d’inverno un viaggiatore) 
 
“There are days in which everything that I see seems to me full of meanings: 
but, just for this reason, they are to me decisive. They are announcements or presages that 
concern me and the world together: and about me not the exterior events of the existence 
but what happens inside, in my deepest part; and about the world not some particular 
events but the essence of the whole. Therefore, you will understand my difficulty to speak 
about them, if not only for hints” 
(Italo Calvino, Se una notte d’inverno un viaggiatore) 
 
messages that seem to me difficult to communicate to others, define, translate into words, 
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PART I 
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
THE PROCESS OF TRUST CREATION BETWEEN LOCAL 
AND GLOBAL SYSTEMS 

 1 THE PROBLEM OF SUSTAINING THE CREATION OF 
TRUST BETWEEN LOCAL AND GLOBAL SYSTEMS 
Giddens (1990) argues that the development of modernity have been 
characterized by the progressive time-space distanciation of social activities. This does not 
simply mean that social activities take place between parties located into physically distant 
places, but also that local interactions are ever more mediated by non-local factors. For 
instance, paying   by credit card involves a third party, the credit card system, which is not 
a local interaction between the customer and the shopkeeper.  
The origin of this time-space distanciation process can be traced back, according 
to Giddens, to two major factors or innovations that have characterized the development of 
the modern society. The first is the invention of the mechanic clock, which has provide a 
common standard to measure time.1 It should be noted, however, that the standardization 
of time across regions, with the introduction of a global calendar and a global system of 
time zones, is only an innovation of the last century. The major consequence of the global 
standardization of time is the separation between time and place. Time does not depend 
anymore on the place, but it is defined with respect to a global benchmark (Greenwich). 
The global standardization of time enables the coordination of activities between time 
zones. 
                                                           
1 It should be noted that the standardization of time is a precondition for the industrialization of production 
activities. The tylorist model of production, for instance, is based on the standardization of time and motion. 
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The second aspect that has contributed to expanding of the social capacity to 
coordinate activities across time and space has been the standardization of space. The 
origin of this process can be traced back to the invention of topography. The development 
of topography, in fact, has enabled us to represent space independently from the place. A 
topographic map does not have perspective. It represents space independently from the 
location of the observer. This enables, for instance, two individuals to set up a meeting and 
to locate a place in a city that they both do not know. 
Giddens, from this perspective, argues that the terms space and place are often 
used interchangeably. However, they have a different meaning. The term space refers to 
the physical dimension of social interaction instead the term place refers to the social 
setting where social interaction is embedded. In the traditional society, place and space 
coincide, as long as social interaction takes place mainly between co-located parties.2 The 
development of modernity has been characterized by the progressive separation between 
these two dimensions. This does not simply mean, as we explained above, that social 
interaction takes place at a distance, but also that local interaction is ever  more mediated 
by non-local factors.3 
The progressive time-space distanciation, which has characterized the 
development of modern society, has required the invention of new “ social infrastructures” 
to integrate social activities across time and space, which Giddens calls disembedding 
mechanisms. These mechanisms, according to Giddens, remove social relations from the 
immediacies of context and re-construct them into an artificial or virtual context. Giddens 
distinguishes between two categories of disembedding mechanisms: symbolic tokens and 
expert system. 
Giddens defines symbolic tokens as a “media of interchange which can be passed 
around without regard to the specific characteristics of individuals or groups that handle 
them at any particular juncture (pg. 22)”. Giddens, in order to characterize the concept of 
symbolic tokens, refers to the example of money. Money is a symbol, a piece of 
information, whose value is guaranteed by a trusted third party, the national-state. The 
value of money “permits the exchange of anything for anything, regardless of whether the 
                                                           
2 Co-located, as we explained before, does not simply mean that they are physically close (same time and same 
place), but also that their interaction is mediated by local factors, such as a local culture.  
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goods involved share any substantive qualities in common with one another (Giddens, 
1990; pg. 22). The value of money, therefore, enables the coordination between an 
indefinite number of transactions across time and space. 
Expert systems are defined as “systems of technical accomplishment or 
professional expertise that organize large areas of the material and social environments in 
which we live today (pg. 27)”. Walsham (2001), in order to characterize Giddens’ notion 
of expert systems, uses the example of computerized credit-scoring systems, which bank 
managers use to evaluate applications for loans. The function of these systems is to 
organize and structure the interaction between the bank manager and the customer needing 
a loan according to abstract, global and average parameters of reliability. The specific 
relationship of mutual knowledge, which may exist between the bank manager and the 
customer, does not play any role in the decision to grant a loan. The decision to grant a 
loan is taken by a third “party”, which is not local to the relation between the manager and 
the customer. Giddens, however, argues the presence of expert systems in day-to-day life 
is more pervasive than the example in itself suggests. He argues that when we are driving a 
car we are embedded into an expert system. We know very little about how cars work, but 
we place our trust in the expert system of auto-engineers, designers, workers and robots -, 
which have produced the vehicle. 
Giddens argues that the problem of trust in modern society is the problem of 
creating a dynamic and evolutionary link between local and global/abstract systems of 
trust. He uses two terms to characterize this problem: disembedding and reembedding. 
Disembedding, as we alredy explained, is the process through which social relations are 
exported from the immediacy of context and imported within abstract and virtual systems 
of trust. Reembedding, on the contrary, is the process through which disembedded social 
relations are exported from abstract systems of trust and re-imported in the intimacy and 
immediacy of local contexts. In other words, these are the two processes through which 
faceless commitments are translated into faceworking commitments and vice versa. 
Faceless commitments concern trust in symbolic tokes or expert systems (abstract 
systems). Faceworking commitments, instead, concern trusted relations established and 
developed in condition of intimacy and immediacy (co-presence). 
                                                                                                                                                   
3 In the next section we present two case studies of the local adoption of global systems of trust. Therefore, 
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Giddens, from this perspective, argues “my overall thesis is that disembedded 
mechanisms or abstrct system interact with reembedded context of action, which may act 
either to support them or undermine them; and that faceless commitments are similarly 
linked in an ambiguous way with those demanding facework (pg. 80)”. A key role, 
according to Giddens, in sustaining the creation of trust between these systems is played 
by the access points of abstract systems. It is in these points, in fact, that the interaction 
between local experiences of trust and abstract commitments take place and merge with 
one another. 
The main objective of this thesis is to explore the problem of sustaining the 
creation of trust between local and global systems of trust. Our use of the term sustainable, 
as we shall see in this chapter, emphasizes the need to define a dynamic equilibrium 
between these two dimensions of social interaction and trust creation. The solution to this 
problem is not given by the progressive standardization of trust across cultures and social 
contexts, but by stimulating the cross-fertilization of trust between cultures and 
communities. The different forms of trust and social relations that characterize different 
cultures and societies/communities around the world represents a value for contemporary 
society, even only for the fact that the costs of local trust creation are already embedded in 
the history and tradition of local systems. The solution to this problem requires defining 
appropriate forms of mediation to make these two dimensions of trust creation compatible. 
In other words, we need to identify the solutions that enable the two systems, local and 
global, to learn from each other however allowing them to maintain their own identity. 
The aim of this chapter is twofold. The first is to further explore the problem of 
trust creation. From this perspective, in the following section, we discuss two case studies 
of local systems that have failed to convert to the codification of trust. In section 1.2 we 
define the terms of the problem: we characterize the distinction between local and global, 
we address the concept of trust creation and we define the meaning of sustainable.  
Once we have defined the problem, in section 1.3 we address the research 
approach. From this perspective we have chosen an interpretative approach. This approach 
belongs to the family of qualitative research. Therefore, we explain why we decide to 
apply a qualitative approach rather than a quantitative one. Furthermore, we also explain 
                                                                                                                                                   
interaction takes mainly place between local people. However, it is mediated by non-local rules. 
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why we choose an interpretative approach rather than other qualitative approaches 
available.  
1.1 Two instances of the problem of trust creation between local and global 
systems  
The previous section briefly introduced the problem of trust creation between 
local and global places. This section proposes two case studies, which emphasize the 
problem of integrating a local culture within a codified system of trust. These two case 
studies are taken from the literature. They focus on the failure of two computerized 
systems designed to support cooperation not only between local firms, which belong to the 
community, but also with their external partners and competitors. The aim of this section is 
twofold. The first is to characterize the problem of sustaining the creation of trust between 
local and global systems. The second is to show that this problem is not confined within a 
specific culture.  
1.1.1 The case of Sprintel in the textile district of Prato 
The case of Sprintel, an inter-organizational information system for the industrial 
district of Prato, is a cornerstone of the literature on the role of IS in the virtual 
organization (Malone et.al, 1987; Johnston and Lawerence, 1988; Johnston and Vitale, 
1988). The initial success of Sprintel has been highlighted to show the competitive role of 
IS within networks of firms (Malone et.al, 1987; Johnston and Lawrence, 1988; Johnston 
and Vitale, 1988). Kumar et.al. (1998), instead, investigates the consequent failure of 
Sprintel to highlight how the utility of the system is influenced by the specific relationships 
of mutual trust between the members of a community.  
An industrial district is a peculiar model of production based on the flexible 
integration between a large number of small- and medium-sized firms that are spatially 
clustered within a specific geographic area.4 The main characteristic of this model is that 
firms are flexibly integrated on the basis of mutual trust rather than contracts. The 
production of trust in these communities is based on the combination of two factors: 
culture and reputation. The common culture shared between the members of the 
                                                           
4 See section 5.1. 
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community defines a common initial base of cooperation between firms. The value of this 
common culture is integrated with individual investments in reputation and mutual trust. 
The closed nature of this community, in fact, stimulates the repetitiveness of the 
transactions between a small numbers of players.5 
The district of Prato is one of the many districts that characterize the industrial 
backbone of the North East and Central part of Italy, the so-called Third Italy. It is situated 
in Tuscany, 20 miles East of Florence (Tuscany). It specializes in the manufacture of wool. 
The origin of this specialization can be traced back to the Middle Ages. In the eighties one 
third of the world production of wool was manufactured in Prato and over 50% of it was 
exported. In 1986 the district contained almost 15,000 firms with an average of four 
employers.  
The structure of the district is characterized by the distinction between 
commercial firms (impannatori) and production firms (Becattini, 1987; Johnston and 
Lawrence, 1988; Inzerilli, 1990; Casson and Pannicia, 1995; Dei Ottanti, 1995). The 
impannatori are the modern version of the medieval merchant. They specialize in the 
marketing of the local production capacity. The second, instead, are suppliers of 
production capacity. The impannatori contract out a large part of their production to local 
networks of subcontractors. The relationships with these subcontractors are stable and 
long-term in nature. The aim of Sprintel, from this perspective, was to automate the 
activities of coordination and control between firms.  
The project was financed by a number of public institutions – including the 
European Commission, ENEA (the state owned network for innovation), the regional and 
local municipality together with private associations and institutions – such as the local 
industrial and artisan associations and the local saving bank.  
The project was structured in three major phases: feasibility, pilot and then market 
release. The feasibility study showed that the district was characterized by an intense 
exchange of information between local firms. Therefore, Sprintel was expected to produce 
a drastic reduction in the local transaction costs and, indeed, to improve the 
competitiveness of the community. Therefore, the consortium decided to finance a pilot 
scheme (September, 1984).  
                                                           
5 For a complete treatment of the process of trust creation within industrial district see chapter 5.  
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The consortia, in order to stimulate the initial adoption, offered the equipment and 
service free of charge. The pilot scheme started in June 1987 with 300 firms and 450 
terminals connected. By the end of the pilot scheme, there were already 500 firms on the 
waiting list. It was in this phase that scholars from different countries started to refer to the 
case of Prato emphasizing the competitive role played by IS in sustaining the cooperation 
between local firms.  
The success of the pilot scheme convinced the consortia to move further. In this 
phase the consortia took two major decisions. The first was to invest in the development of 
additional services and improving the telecommunication infrastructure. It should be noted 
that among the new services developed there was the accessibility to national and 
international databases of customers, which also contain information about their relative 
reliability. The second was billing the service. The service was billed at around US$ 6 per 
month, which was still lower than the marginal cost of providing the service. This second 
decision was taken mainly as a consequence of the cut in European funds. Thereafter the 
number of subscribers started to decline, from 500 at the end of the pilot scheme, to 400 in 
1992 and 70 in 1993. Despite the attempt made by the Sprintel consortium to revitalize the 
project, through the development of additional services, in October 1994 the project was 
formally terminated.  
The failure of Sprintel, according to Kumar et.al.(1998), can not be explained by 
referring to the technical and economic perspectives on IS, which currently dominate the 
field. This perspective argues that there are three major reasons for the failure of a 
technology. The first is that it does not serve a valid purpose. However, the conditions in 
Prato were ideal for the introduction of Sprintel. The diffused nature of the local 
production system, in fact, should generate high transaction costs. Therefore, Sprintel 
should have produced a reduction in these costs. The second reason is that the main 
stakeholders have not adequately sponsored the introduction of Sprintel in the district. 
However, the main institutional and private leaders in the district have actively participated 
in the project. Furthermore, no major conflicts have been registered between the main 
stakeholders. The third factor is that the project has not been adequately financed. 
However, the project, at least in the initial phase, has benefited from the generous funding 
by national and international institutions and the local private bank. Furthermore, there are 
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three other major factors that should have contributed to the success of the project. The 
first is the attitude of the local entrepreneurs to invest in innovation. The second is the 
selection of pre-tested technologies, such as Videotext technology, in order to minimize 
the risk of technological failure. Finally, the Sprintel consortium has strongly invested in 
users’ training to facilitate the adoption and comprehension of the strategic and 
organizational opportunities attached to the project. 
The failure of Sprintel, according to Kumar et.al., is a consequence of the high 
level of mutual trust shared between the members of the community. The nature of trust 
within the community is mainly tacit, shared on the basis of common norms and values 
that are socially and historically inherited. The evaluation of the strategic and 
organizational impact of Sprintel has been conducted on the basis of transaction cost 
theory. This theory, as we shall see, is based on the assumption of opportunism as a 
prevalent characteristic of human nature. Therefore, the costs of transacting in the market 
are mainly the costs of structuring a control system to monitor transacting parties’ mutual 
behavior. Information and communication technologies reduce the costs of information 
and control. In the district of Prato, however, trust rather than opportunism is the prevalent 
characteristic of the community. Therefore, the improved capacity to search and process 
information had no value for the local firms.  
Furthermore, the introduction of an electronic media reduces the need to meet 
face-to-face. Face-to-face encounters, as we shall see, are the major way of sustaining the 
process of social creation of trust. Therefore, Sprintel may have had a negative impact on 
the local mechanisms of trust creation, based on the direct face-to-face interaction between 
individuals. Sprintel failed because of the lack of consideration about the influence of trust 
and relationships between individuals on the way firms do business within the community 
and with their external partners. 
1.1.2 The case of electronic trading in the London insurance market 
It could be argued that the failure of Sprintel is peculiar to the specific social 
atmosphere that characterizes the community of Prato. The specific Italian culture, which 
relies heavily upon personal relationships and face-to face interactions, may have inhibited 
the adoption of this technology. Furthermore, the nature of the transactions characterizing 
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the industrial district of Prato may not have been compatible with the adoption of this 
technology. For instance, the quality of cloth manufacturing is difficult to codify and, 
therefore, to monitor on the basis of computerized machines and information systems. This 
second case, however, shows that the problem of sustaining the creation of trust between 
local and global can be generalized in other contexts. This case, in fact, focuses on the 
failure of a computerized system to support the placement of insurance coverage in the 
London insurance market (Barrett 1996; 1999; Walsham, 2001).  
The London Insurance Market is an important part of the UK insurance sector, 
built up around Lloyd’s of London. This market includes hundreds of semi-autonomous 
players. In the late eighties and early nineties, the Market suffered huge losses as a 
consequence of the combined effect of two major factors: a bad run of natural disasters and 
increasing global competition. In order to regain its competitiveness, in the early nineties, 
the Market started a project to develop an electronic trading system. The expected benefits 
were a reduction of the local transaction costs and an improvement in the quality of the 
services provided. The introduction of LIMNET (London Insurance Market Network) 
produced significant improvements in a number of working areas, such as claims’ 
management, settlement and accounting. However, it failed within a strategic area of the 
market, namely the placement of insurance coverage.  
The process of placement is structured as follows. The process is initiated by a 
client who contacts a local broker to request insurance or reinsurance coverage. The local 
broker, in this phase, investigates the details of the risk and collects the relevant 
information to conclude the negotiation. In the second phase the broker negotiates with a 
“lead” underwriter, who defines the legal and financial terms and conditions of the policy. 
Usually, the risks placed in this market are complex. Therefore, it is necessary to spread 
the risk between several “following” underwriters, who subscribe to part of the risk placed 
by the “lead” underwriter in the market. The negotiation usually takes place in the local 
market. However, there are cases where “following” underwriters belonging to the global 
community subscribe to part of the risk.  
The traditional placement system was based mainly on face-to-face negotiation. 
The negotiation between underwriters and brokers took place in the underwriters’ office. 
The brokers carried a file of papers containing the details of the risk instrument. The 
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negotiations between brokers and underwriters were recorded in this file. The aim of the 
Electronic Placement System (EPS) was to replace this complex and costly process. In the 
new system the broker is responsible for inputting an electronic record of the risk, called 
the common core record, at the start of the placement process. This record is sent to the 
“lead” underwriter, who adds the terms and conditions for the subscription of the risk, and 
then transmits it across the network to a number of “following” underwriters. Finally, once 
the placement has been successfully closed, the data recorded in the electronic document 
can be used to initiate the subsequent processes, such as accounting. 
Walsham (2001) highlights three major reasons for the failure of EPS. The first is 
the lack of consensus. In networks of semi-autonomous parties the diffusion of common 
standards and technologies is based on consensus rather than on power. Therefore, EPS 
failed to achieve the critical level of consensus. The second is the lack of communication 
richness. Both brokers and underwriters sensed that the “communication bandwidth” was 
insufficient to sustain negotiations and the development of mutual trust. For instance, 
brokers argued that through face-to-face negotiations they could better influence the 
underwriters’ perceptions of the risk to be insured. Furthermore, there were also 
complaints that the system did not comply with the Lloyd’s rule, Utmost Good Faith, 
which states that the broker must provide all the relevant information about the client and 
the risk. From this perspective the argument was that the technology limited the possibility 
to provide full information about the case. 
The third reason is the changes on work practices and worker status induced by 
the system. The users pointed out the changes that the system imposed on the traditional 
working practices, which had been developed over three centuries in the London Insurance 
Market. Furthermore, they were also uneasy about the potential changes imposed on their 
relative negotiation power. The underwriters feared that the effect of EPS would be to shift 
the competitive nature of the market from reputation- to price-based. The electronic 
placement market, for instance, could be accessed by a larger number of underwriters per 
unit of time. The brokers, on the other hand, feared that the underwriters could use EPS to 
deal directly with clients.  
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1.2 Definitions and perspective proposed  
In the previous section we addressed two case studies emphasizing the failure of 
an inter-organizational information system to support cooperation between local firms and 
between local firms and their clients and suppliers. In both cases the computerized systems 
had not been able to replace the efficiency of existing local practices of trust. The aim of 
this section is to develop a conceptualization of the problem of sustaining trust creation 
between local and global systems. We start by characterizing the distinction between local 
and global systems. Then, we introduce the concept of trust creation. We conclude with the 
introduction of the concept of sustainability. This section is only a guideline of concepts 
and arguments that are developed in the following sections of this thesis. Therefore, these 
concepts and arguments may not appear fully clear in this phase. 
1.2.1 Local and global systems 
We can distinguish between two phases that have characterized the development 
of the concept of space in the economic literature (Rullani, Micelli and Di Maria, 2000). In 
the first phase space is accounted for simply in terms of transportation costs. Therefore, the 
localization of the firms depends mainly on the distance from the markets of supply and 
distribution. In a second phase the concept of distance has been extended in order to 
include the transaction costs between firms.6 These are the costs of accessing, sharing and 
enforcing the value of information between firms. The more complex and specific 
transactions are, the more information tends to be asymmetrically distributed between 
transacting parties and the more efficient it is to control these transactions directly, that is 
“face-to-face”.  
Therefore, the development of information and communication technologies tends 
to relax the bond between spatial proximity and the cost of coordination and control 
between firms. Information and communication technologies have already internalized 
most of the competences and procedures required to integrate activities between places. 
Procurement systems, for instance, embed all the knowledge required to select new 
suppliers, and coordinate and control their performance over distance. Therefore, being 
physically close does not produce any more advantages in terms of searching, coordination 
                                                                                                                                                   
6 See next chapter for a review of transaction cost theory. 
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and control costs. Firms are footloose. They move to exploit local and temporary cost-
advantages, such as low labor costs and fiscal incentives.  
However, measuring distance in terms of costs of sharing information between 
transacting parties has a major disadvantage. It does not take into account the costs of 
creating and understanding the meaning of that information. The existence of a piece of 
information is taken for granted. The major problem is to localize it and make sure that it is 
shared between transacting parties. Transacting parties negotiate common procedures to 
share information, but they do not negotiate the meaning of that information. 
A more accurate way of measuring distance is based on the costs of creating and 
sharing knowledge (Becattini and Rullani, 1993; Rullani, 1995). From this perspective 
information, which is knowledge that can be transferred in words and numbers, is only a 
small part of what we know (Polanyi, 1962; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). Most of the 
knowledge is embedded within our daily experience of the world. Polanyi (1962) uses 
respectively the term explicit or codified and tacit to characterize the distinction between 
these two dimensions of knowledge. Codified knowledge can be expressed and transmitted 
into formal and systematic languages. The meaning of codified knowledge is self-
contained within their logical frameworks, which has been constructed to transfer it. A 
production machine, for instance, is the framework/infrastructure, which is used to transfer 
the engineer’s knowledge about a specific production process.  
Tacit knowledge refers to specific mental or physical skills and competences, 
which have been developed on the basis of training and experience, such as a sprinter 
running 100 meters in less than ten seconds. This knowledge is not easy to replicate or 
reproduce. Reproducing tacit knowledge is a time-consuming activity. Therefore, the value 
and meaning of tacit knowledge is tied to a single person, a group or a community, in 
general within a specific context. The experience, which is embedded within routines 
developed between team-members, is hard to replicate and transfer. Therefore, the value 
and meaning of that experience is codified only within the relationships between team-
members. 
The distinction between tacit and codified knowledge is useful to characterize the 
concept of local and global systems (Becattini and Rullani, 1993). Local is the context of 
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tacit knowledge. The value of tacit knowledge is codified and, indeed, transferable only 
within a specific context. It should be noted that local does not necessarily mean physically 
close. However, physical proximity reduces the cost of sharing experiences between 
individuals and firms. Therefore, it may facilitate the development of common norms and 
practices. This is not always the case. The physical proximity between Israelis and 
Palestinians has not stimulated the socialization of common experience; on the contrary it 
has been a ground for the development of conflicts between these two cultures. 
Global is the context of codified knowledge. The value and the meaning of 
codified knowledge can easily be reproduced form place to place. For instance, the 
knowledge that is contained within a software program can be transferred from computer 
to computer, independent on the specific localization of the computer and the specific 
experience of the user. Computers, without any human intervention, can elaborate the 
knowledge contained in an EDI7 document, which is formatted according to an 
international standard. On the other hand, the knowledge that is contained in an e-mail is 
only partially codified. Its interpretation requires human intervention and experience. It is 
the reader that covers the gap between written knowledge, which is contained in the 
document, and contextual knowledge, which is embedded in the context. Therefore, 
codified knowledge is characterized by different degrees of codification and globalization. 
There is only a small part of knowledge that is global, which means that its meaning and 
value is completely independent from the specific characteristics of the context.  
The aim of this thesis is to show that trust can also be divided into tacit and 
explicit. Therefore, it is possible to distinguish between trust as a local resource and trust 
as a global resource. In order to achieve this aim in chapter two we develop a review of the 
literature on the basis of a categorization proposed by Granovetter (1985; 1992). This 
categorization distinguishes between three perspectives of trust: under-socialized, over-
socialized and embedded. The aim is to show that in the under-socialized perspective trust 
is mainly codified. In the other two categories trust is tacit and they differ mainly in terms 
of degree of explicitness. 
                                                           
7 EDI stands for Electronic Data Interchange. This a technology/standard used to exchange commercial 
documents between firms in an electronic format.   
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1.2.2 Trust creation 
We derive the concept of trust creation from the theory of knowledge creation 
developed by Nonaka and his group (Nonaka, 1993; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Nonaka 
and Konno, 1998). This theory is based on the idea that knowledge is not simply learned, 
but socially created. In the theory of learning, knowledge is developed through a process of 
trial and error. From this perspective knowledge is created in two phases: codification and 
testing. In the first phase, codification, knowledge is codified on the basis of a set of 
hypotheses about its possible meanings and uses. For instance, a product engineer, in order 
to develop a product, has to make a number of hypotheses about clients’ needs. In the 
second phase, testing, the quality of the representation is tested against reality. For 
instance, the correspondence of the product to the consumers’ needs is tested only ex-post, 
once the product has already been produced and released to the market. If the product 
receives a good response in the market, it means that our engineers have been able to 
interpret correctly the needs of our clients. If the product does not receive a good response, 
we learn that our interpretation of the consumers’ needs was incorrect. Therefore, we 
exclude only one of the hypotheses, but we still do not know what the consumers want. 
Nonaka’s theory starts from the hypothesis that there is not a unique and objective 
reality against which it is possible to measure the quality of our representation. Reality is, 
in itself, a social construction. Therefore, the value of knowledge is not independent from 
the social context where this knowledge is experienced and embedded. The knowledge 
codified within a corkscrew makes sense and, therefore, it is valuable only within a context 
where corks are used to preserve the quality of drinkable liquid. In other contexts the same 
knowledge may not have any value or advantage.  
Therefore, the creation of codified knowledge is stimulated by the interaction 
between tacit and codified knowledge. Codified knowledge incorporates part of the context 
(tacit knowledge). For instance, the development of domestic appliances has incorporated 
part of the experience of being a housewife. However, codified knowledge is also 
incorporated in the context. It becomes part of the background (Winograd and Flores, 
1986). Domestic appliances did not only substitute the housewife, but they have also 
contributed to changing social structure. Nowadays, the category of housewife does not 
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make sense anymore. The changes in social structure have also changed the customers’ 
needs, such as domestic appliances that can be controlled and programmed over distance. 
Nonaka and Takeuchi, as we shall see in the third chapter, argue that knowledge 
is created in four phases: socialization, externalization, combination and internalization. In 
the socialization phase, individuals’ experiences are socialized within a context and 
become shared experiences. In the externalization phase, the meanings of these 
experiences are negotiated between the members of a group or a community. In this phase, 
therefore, knowledge that is mainly local, shared within the community, is translated into 
codified knowledge, which can be transferred outside a community. In the combination 
phase, the codified knowledge created within a specific context interacts and combines 
with the codified knowledge created in other contexts. In the final phase, internalization, 
this combination of knowledge is internalized locally, which changes the basis and 
structure of social interaction and, therefore, stimulates the development of new 
experiences. 
Our aim is to show that trust is the product of interaction between tacit and 
codified components. The first are embedded within a specific social and cultural context. 
The second are engineered within trans-contextual infrastructures and institutions. The aim 
is to show that trust is initially socialized within a specific community and then negotiated 
and codified between its members. Codified trust is combined between communities and it 
embeds new meanings, which are consequently internalized within the specific context. 
The internalization of codified trust changes the structure of the social context and creates 
ground for the development of new contextual experiences.  
1.2.3 Sustainability 
The concept of sustainable development has recently received much attention 
from economists and politicians. The economic development is sustainable if it is not an 
end in itself. The economic development is sustainable, if and only if, it can be reproduced 
over time. The sustainability of the economic development depends on the possibility to 
reproduce the economic, social and cultural factors that have contributed to that 
development. The process of industrialization has produced economic development and 
wealth. However, it is not sustainable. In fact, it has also produced environmental 
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deterioration and urban decay. Natural resources that were infinite, such as air and water, 
are becoming scarce and, therefore, liable to taxation. 
Researchers, in the field of sustainable development, have mainly confined their 
interest to the definition of technological, institutional and economical solutions to sustain 
the reproduction of natural resources. More recently, however, their range of activities has 
expanded to comprise the reproduction of specific cultural and social resources, which 
characterize a community, The current process of globalization of markets and firms 
undermines the environment, defined not only as a collection of natural resources, but also 
as a collection of specific cultural and social resources.  
The drama of September 11th has emphasized all the implications associated with 
the cultural diversities between countries and populations. However, this is only the last 
event in a long history of intercultural conflicts between the so-called Western and Eastern 
cultures. Chomsky (2001) argues that the meaning behind September 11th can not be 
understood outside of its context, which comprises of colonialism, exploitation of natural 
resources and labor forces in the Third World by Western multinational companies and so 
forth. In this work we abstain from investigating this problem any further. However, recent 
events have made clear to the so-called Western World that globalization based on the 
rules of the market is not sustainable and it is necessary to define forms of cooperation and 
collaboration between countries and populations that do not share common norms and 
values. Globalization does not necessarily mean domination of a single culture over others. 
Globalization should mean living and cooperating together in mutual respect of diversities.  
In the following sections of this work we argue that trust is a cultural value, which 
is embedded in specific norms, values and experiences of a community. The value of 
specific practices of mutual trust, which are embedded within the specific social and 
cultural fabric of a community, is not only a value for the community itself, but for society 
as a whole. The development of common standards of trust, such as the Euro, should not 
negate local practices of trust and cooperation, but it should stimulate their integration in a 
larger society. This thesis has two major purposes. The first is to define which are the 
major forms of mediation adopted to support the creation of trust between local and global 
systems. The second is to identify the one that better sustain the creation of trust between 
these two systems. 
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1.3 Research approach 
The first part of this chapter has been devoted to the characterization and 
definition of the research problem. The aim of this second part is to characterize the 
research approach that we have followed in order to investigate this problem. We have 
chosen an interpretative approach. This approach belongs to the family of qualitative 
research. Our first task, therefore, is to justify why we have chosen a qualitative rather than 
a quantitative approach. The second, instead, is to justify our choice to rely on an 
interpretative method. In the final part of this section we develop an interpretation of the 
principles that should guide an interpretative researcher. The aim of this final part of the 
section is to define how our contributions should be evaluated. 
1.3.1 Qualitative versus quantitative research methods 
Interpretative methods of inquiry belong to the family of qualitative research 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). The purpose of this section is to justify our choice to rely on 
qualitative methods rather than quantitative methods of analysis. The structure of this 
section is as follows: we develop a comparison between qualitative and quantitative 
methods of analysis, we compare their applicability and usefulness in the case of trust, and, 
finally, we explain our decision to rely on qualitative rather than quantitative methods of 
analysis.  
Qualitative and quantitative methods of analysis share a common root in the 
positivistic and post-positivistic tradition. The two differ on the basic assumptions 
underlying the interpretation of social phenomena. The quantitative tradition emphasizes 
the objective nature of reality and the measurability of social phenomena. The qualitative 
tradition, on the contrary, emphasizes the subjective nature of reality. The qualitative 
tradition focuses mainly on the process through which social meanings are constructed. 
The work of researchers is to construct the contextual (local) foundations of social 
meanings. It follows that the quantitative approach aims to discover the existence of global 
truths, which do not depend on specific social and cultural factors (local factors). The 
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qualitative approach, instead, aims to reveal local truths and make them understandable 
and accessible to the others. 
These two alternative perspectives about the true nature of the world have major 
implications on the way researchers from the two different fields conduct research. The 
first major distinction is the concept of validation. Quantitative methods, coherently with 
their perspective of reality, emphasize the objective value of a theory. The value of a 
theory depends on its internal consistency, which is the extent a theory explains the sample 
of cases selected, and external consistency, which is the extent findings can be generalized 
to other cases. Furthermore, quantitative methods are based on a set of formal procedures 
to objectify findings. Qualitative methods, on the contrary, leave higher degrees of 
freedom on the conduct and evaluation of findings. A good theory is a theory that makes 
sense within a specific social context. A valuable qualitative theory is based on a sound 
description of the social context and of the relative social constraints that shape the 
meaning of specific findings. From this perspective quantitative methods are but one of the 
methods to enforce truths.  
The second major distinction between quantitative and qualitative methodologies 
is in terms of accountability of individuals’ points of view. Both these two perspectives 
attempt to give an account of the existence of different perspectives in societies. However, 
they differ in the way they account for these differences. In the quantitative perspective 
these are synthesized in the form of deviation from the average. Qualitative researchers, on 
the contrary, believe that the existence of differences can not be reduced to a simple 
deviation from an average truth. The existence of differences in society is the engine for 
the construction and evolution of social meanings. A full understanding of the different 
facets that characterize a specific point of view is required in order to understand its social 
implications. Understanding individuals’ points of view, therefore, requires direct 
interaction with the subject of that point of view. For this purpose, qualitative researchers 
have developed specific techniques, such as interview and observation protocols, to collect 
data and information about societies. 
Our position is very pragmatic. We think that the choice between qualitative and 
quantitative methods is a matter of subject and scope of the research. In our perspective 
there are two major motivations for relying on a qualitative approach. The first is that trust 
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can not be measured. Game theorists strongly argue in favor of the measurability of trust. 
However, the application of their techniques is limited to simple game, based on a large 
number of assumptions about the nature and character of the social context. The second 
motivation is that, in our theory, trust is created through the interaction between tacit and 
explicit components of trust. Capturing the complexity of the social environment, 
therefore, is a necessary condition to explain how the meaning of trust changes as a 
consequence of the interaction between local and global contexts and it cannot be reduced 
to a number of highly artificial assumptions of a game theory kind.  
1.3.2 Alternative qualitative approaches: positivist, interpretative and critical 
In the previous section we justified our decision to rely on qualitative methods of 
analysis. Our second purpose in this section is to explain our decision to rely on 
interpretative methods. Qualitative methods, in fact, can be further categorized into 
positivistic, interpretative and critical (Orlikowski and Baroundi, 1991). The structure of 
the section is as follows: we compare the three methodologies and then we justify our 
reasoning for relying on an interpretative method. It should be noted that we do not address 
the positivistic tradition because it is largely based on quantitative methodology.  
The critical perspective is based on the assumption that reality is historically 
constructed and it is produced and reproduced by people. This perspective focuses on the 
identification of social, economic and cultural constraints, conflicts and domination that 
prevent a society from evolving. The major aim is to identify the negative consequences of 
these constraints and propose solutions to overcome them. 
The interpretative perspective is based on the assumption that reality, either given 
or socially constructed, can be understood only through social construction, such as 
language and shared meaning. From a methodological point of view this perspective is 
based on the principle of a hermeneutic cycle. A full understanding of the concept is 
addressed in the next section. The basic idea, however, is that our initial understanding of a 
complex phenomenon shapes our perceptions about the meaning of its single parts and 
their interrelationships. These perceptions, on the other hand, modify our initial 
understanding of the phenomenon. Therefore, we come to know better reality through 
concentric cycles of deduction and abstraction. It follows that interpretative research does 
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not predefine dependent and independent variables. Doing interpretative research is a 
process of discovery. Meanings and interpretations are discovered during this process. 
In the previous section we justified why a positivistic perspective does not apply 
to our research. Therefore, we now confine our discussion to the choice between 
interpretative and critical approaches. The aim of critical research is to criticize the 
existing status quo as negative for society in general. Our purpose is to understand how the 
interaction between local and global contexts changes the nature and the structure of trust 
within a community. Our aim, therefore, is to capture the creative nature of the 
socioeconomic process of trust creation between local and global contexts rather than the 
negative outcomes of this process, which may be only an output of the research itself. The 
adoption of an interpretative method of inquiry is indeed more consistent with the 
objectives of this research than a critical approach. 
1.3.3 Conducting interpretative research 
In the previous section we justified our decision to rely on an interpretative 
methodology of inquiry. The aim of this section is to explain and justify the specific 
methodology that we have implemented to conduct this research. In order to develop our 
research methodology we rely mainly on the recent contribution of Klein and Myers 
(1999), which defines seven principles to guide the conduct of interpretative research in 
the field of Management Information System (MIS). The MIS community gave this article 
the best MIS quarterly paper award of 1999. The intention of the authors is that these seven 
principles should not be seen as prescriptive, but as a set of guidelines, which should be 
interpreted themselves. The purpose of this section is to provide our interpretation of the 
seven principles.  
Hermeneutic cycle: This is the most fundamental principle that should guide 
interpretative researchers. This is defined as a concentric process of interpretation. The 
idea behind it is that our understanding of the single parts of a phenomenon and their 
interaction change our perception of it and, in reverse, our improved understanding of the 
phenomenon as a whole changes our perception of its components and their interaction. 
Thus, the capacity to explain social phenomena can be improved through the development 
of cyclical processes of interpretation, which move from the precursory understanding of 
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the components to the whole and vice versa from the understanding of the whole context 
back to its single components. The overall process aims to provide a coherent and 
harmonic interpretation of the components in relation to the whole and of the whole in 
relation to its components. 
The meaning of the sentence “they are playing football” depends on the context of 
the sentence itself. The meaning of the sentence may change depending on the shape of the 
ball that the subjects of the sentence (the players) are using. Furthermore, if there is anyone 
playing football at all the sentence is used metaphorically. Therefore, the capacity to 
interpret the meaning of the sentence depends on the capacity to interactively construct 
inferences about the meaning of the sentence in the context and vice versa from the context 
to the sentence. 
Three major phases characterize the development of this thesis: theory 
development, case studies’ development and theory refinement. In the first phase, we 
develop a specific language to interpret the problem of integrating the local and global 
process of trust creation. This phase is based on literature review. We focus initially on the 
literature on trust. We use the categorization proposed by Granovetter (1992) of the trust 
literature. We choose Granovetter’s categorization because, as opposed to others, it is 
based on the different assumptions scholars make on the nature of human rationality rather 
than on the conceptualization of trust in different disciplines and fields. Therefore, the 
categorization proposed by Granovetter facilitates the integration between contributions 
from different fields. 
The second literature we consider focuses on local production systems. This field 
has recently been influenced by the literature on knowledge management and specifically 
the contribution of Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995). The spatial clustering of an industry is 
mainly explained as a consequence of the superior capacity to process and combine tacit 
components of knowledge, which are specific to local production systems, and codified 
knowledge, which is specific to global ones. Our contribution, in this phase, has been to 
develop a bridge between trust and knowledge and to show that the process of trust 
creation between local and global contexts can be read as a process of knowledge creation 
between local and global contexts. 
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In the second phase, case studies’ development, we construct a base to better 
frame our initial theoretical intuition. Our purpose was to improve understanding of the 
process of trust creation as a process of knowledge creation between local and global 
contexts. Being able to draw a theory from case studies is necessary to select case studies 
that can be compared both for their similarities and differences. The selection of the case 
studies has taken place in two major phases: short-listing and selection. In order to develop 
a short-list of the case studies we interviewed scholars, who are recognized experts in the 
field of Italian local production systems. In these interviews we defined a list of cases 
characterized by different models of intermediation between local and global and then 
defined a short-list of similarities and differences. 
It should be noted, however, that the selection of the case studies has been 
restricted only to the context of Italy. There are two major reasons for this. The first is that 
we decided to limit the scope of the research to a single culture. The second is that there is 
extensive literature, also in English, covering the case of Italian local production systems. 
The large availability of already published literature minimized the risk associated with the 
empirical work.  
Contextualization: The principle of contextualization requires critically reflecting 
on the historical and social background of the research setting. It is based on the 
consideration that there is an inevitable difference in understanding between researchers 
and participants, which is a consequence of the historical distance between them. The 
interpreter’s task is not to cover up this distance, but to consciously investigate and bring it 
out. The aim is to set the subject of investigation in its historical and social context. 
Different from the positivistic understanding of history, which is based on the idea that 
historical patterns repeat over time, interpretive research seeks to clarify how the past 
shapes and influences the future. The future is not a repetition of the past. People, events 
and facts are unique instances of unique historical and social processes. Interpretative 
researchers, therefore, should see people as the interpreters and protagonists of their 
history and not as products of history. The description of the historical and social context 
should reflect the active nature of the people embedded in it. 
We interpret this principle at two different levels. First, we give an historical 
account of the development of local production systems in Italy. This also comprises the 
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historical factors that have shaped the development of the practice of mutual trust in these 
systems. Second, for each of the case studies we give an historical and social account of 
the factors that have contribute to their specific development. 
Interaction between the researchers and the participants: The basic idea is that 
data is not simply collected, but is the product of social interaction between researchers 
and participants. This means that participants are not simply providers of information, but 
interpreters and analysts themselves. The interpretation of data should not be 
unidirectional, from the investigator to the data, but a result of triangulation between 
investigator, participants and data.  
In our case it has not been possible to perform multiple visits and conduct more 
than one interview. Therefore, we attempted to share and discuss our vision with the 
interviewee from the very beginning. The style of the interview was as follows: we 
presented our point of view on the case study and then we asked whether they agree and 
why. In this way we have been able to confront and collect different visions and opinions.  
Abstraction and generalization: Interpretative researchers do not interpret 
abstraction and generalization in a positivistic sense. From this point of view 
generalization and abstraction mean to what extent specific findings can be extended to 
other related cases and situations. From an interpretative point of view abstraction and 
generalization mean being able to relate peculiarities of a specific context to general and 
abstract categories and concepts. According to Walsham (1993) the validity of the 
inferences drawn from one or more cases does not depend on the representativeness in a 
statistical sense, but on the plausibility and cogency of the logical reasoning used in 
describing the results form the cases. Walsham argues that there are four types of 
generalization that can be drawn form interpretative case studies: the development of 
concepts, the generation of theory, the drawing of specific implications and the creation of 
deep insight. To generalize from case studies to theory, as we have explained above, we 
focus on two variables: power distribution and industry advancement. We choose these 
two dimensions for the following reasons. The first is that power is a “substitute” for trust 
(Luhmann, 1979; Williamson, 1975). For instance, a company that has monopolistic 
position within a market may use its power to “trust” its counterparts to behave in a certain 
way. The type of industry, between low-tech and high-tech, has been considered in order to 
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take into account the potential influence that the industry itself may exercise on the 
individuals’ attitude to adopt computerized languages and systems of trust. 
Dialogic reasoning: The fifth principle is the one of dialogic reasoning. This 
principle requires researchers to confront their prejudices, which guided the original 
research design, with the data that emerges in the process of empirical investigation. The 
fundamental point is that the researcher should make the historical intellectual basis of the 
research as transparent as possible to the readers and to themselves. In positivist social 
science prejudices are considered to be misguiding when developing objective knowledge. 
In interpretative research prejudices are considered the basis of understanding. Our initial 
understanding of a subject is guided by our prejudices on the subject. The task of the 
interpreter is to distinguish between true and false prejudices. This principle can be applied 
several times in sequence so that the improved understanding of one stage becomes the 
prejudice for the next stage.  
This principle requires researchers to continuously confront their prejudices 
against empirical evidence. The interpretation of this principle is implicit in the way we 
construct the interaction with the participants of the case studies. We always questioned 
our prejudices both in interaction with others and at the end of any case studies with 
ourselves. For us developing the case studies has been a learning process. The final 
generalization and abstraction we develop is to a large extent the consequence of a process 
of interaction between construction of prejudices and findings.  
Multiple interpretations: The sixth principle is the one of multiple interpretations. 
The previous principles are applicable only to text-like information provided by a single 
source. This would ignore the fact that human actions are conditioned by social context. 
This principle, therefore, suggests the necessity to seek and document the multiple 
perspectives and their specific rationale characterizing the social context and their 
interdependencies. This principle is similar to the one of dialogic reasoning. The major 
difference, however, is that the confrontation does not take place between the researcher’s 
prejudices and contextual data, but between conflicting interpretations of the participants 
in the field. 
In order to achieve this purpose we attempted for each case to interview 
companies that play different roles in the local system. For instance, companies in local 
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systems may roughly be distinguished as leaders, followers and sub-contractors. The 
leaders are the drivers of the local system. They tend to provide an idyllic perspective of 
their role in the local system. Followers and sub-contractors, especially where this 
leadership is very strong, tend to criticize the role of the leader as restricting the 
development of the local system as a whole. Furthermore, strong leaders tend to convey a 
negative perspective on the role of public associations and institutions. The others instead, 
given their relatively small dimensions, tend to highlight the positive aspects associated 
with these common institutions and associations. 
It should be noted, however, that it has not always been possible to comply with 
this principle. In these cases we could not interview a sufficient number of representatives 
of the different social roles embedded in the local production system. In these instances we 
mainly relied on already published material to construct the case study. Our inferences 
based on already published material have been confronted and integrated with interviews 
with some of the leaders of the local production system, who have a global vision of the 
functionality of the system as a whole. In other cases we have only been able to rely on 
secondary data and published material to conduct the case study. 
Suspicion: The last principle is the one of suspicion. It is drawn from the critical 
perspective and it is not commonly accepted in the interpretative approach. This principle 
suggests that once a social interpretation of reality has been constructed, the researcher 
should highlight the distortions deriving from this representation. In other words it is the 
researchers’ task to show how specific social constructions of reality fail to achieve social 
welfare (Deetz, 1996). 
At the conclusion of each case study we attempted to develop a critical analysis of 
the results. For instance, we extensively highlighted the distortions linked to the 
development of strong leadership that restrict the compatible development of the local and 
global standards of trust. 
1.4 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was twofold. The first was to introduce the problem of 
sustaining the creation of trust between local and global. In order to characterize the 
problem we developed two case studies from the literature. Both these case studies show 
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the failure of two inter-organizational information systems as a consequence of the 
interaction with specific local practices of mutual trust. These case studies have been 
useful to introduce the different terms that characterize the problem. From this perspective 
we introduce the definition of local and global and the concepts of trust creation and 
sustainable development. The last part of the chapter was devoted to characterizing our 
research approach. From this perspective we defended our decision to rely on an 
interpretative research approach. In order to support our decision we first justified our 
decision to rely on a qualitative approach. We then explained why we chose an 
interpretative approach. Finally, in the last section, we addressed how we have interpreted 
the principles that should guide interpretative research. 
 
 2 TRUST, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION 
TECHNOLOGIES: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE  
In this second chapter we review the literature on trust and the relative roles of 
information and communication technologies as a media for trust. We do not focus on the 
definition of trust because there is agreement on defining trust as positive expectation 
(Rousseau et.al., 1998). We focus, instead, on the different perspectives on trust. As argued 
by Bigley and Pearce (1998), the issue of trust has received much attention in recent 
decades in the field of organizational science and related fields. This has meant a 
proliferation of the relative definitions and conceptualizations of trust. Consequently, 
scholars have recently proposed different typological systems intended to organize the vast 
literature on the subject.8  
In this chapter we rely on Granovetter’s categorization (1992), which 
distinguishes between three perspectives: under-socialized, over-socialized and embedded. 
Each of these perspectives is characterized by a different assumption about the nature of 
human rationality. The under-socialized perspective is based on the assumption of self-
interest seeking rationality. The over-socialized perspective is based on the assumption of 
normative or behavioral rationality. The embedded perspective is based on the assumption 
of network rationality. The assumption on human rationality, as we shall see, has major 
                                                           
8 See among others Bromiley and Cummings, 1995; Bigley and Pearce (1998); Hosmer (1995); Lewicki and 
Bunker, 1995a, b; Mishra, 1996; Sitkin and Roth, (1993). 
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implications on the way trust is conceptualized. We choose this categorization because it is 
consistent with our aim to show that trust, like knowledge, can also be divided into tacit 
and codified.  
In the first part of the chapter we review the three perspectives that Granovetter 
proposes. We highlight the specific assumption made on the nature of human rationality, 
the specific conceptualization of trust and the specific mechanisms proposed to support 
trust between individuals. In the second part of the chapter we review the literature about 
the roles of information and communication technologies as a media for trust. We 
reorganize this literature on the basis of Granovetter’s three categories. Finally, we briefly 
review the main technological solutions proposed to sustain trust between firms in open 
electronic commerce. We conclude by drawing a table that summarizes the major findings 
of this chapter.   
2.1 The under-socialized perspective 
This section reviews the under-socialized perspective on trust. This perspective is 
based on the assumption of self-interest seeking rationality, which suggests that individuals 
behave to maximize their own economic and social interest. We distinguish between three 
prevalent forms of rationality: full, bounded and strategic. In the second part of this section 
the different assumptions on human rationally are correlated with the specific 
conceptualization of trust.  
2.1.1 Self-interest seeking rationality
9
 
The term rational is generally used to characterize processes of decision-making 
based on the logic of the expected consequences of a specific decision. The setting of 
decision-making, from this perspective, is characterized in terms of available choices. Each 
of these choices produces a different result (expected consequences). The decision-maker 
is assumed to choose the alternative that maximizes his individual preferences. The 
outcome of the decision-making, therefore, depends on four major factors:  
1. The available information about the alternatives;  
2. The available information about the consequences of these alternatives;  
                                                           
9 For a review of the concept see March (1994) 
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3. The available information about the decision-maker’s preferences; 
4. The available information about the rules linking the input and output of the decision.  
Under the assumption of perfect rationality the information about the number of 
the available alternatives and their consequences are given. In other words, they are 
independent of the specific decision-makers’ identity. This means, on the one hand, that 
the information about the alternatives is part of the specific context of decision-making. 
Therefore, it is the job of the decision-maker to search for this information. On the other 
hand, it also means that preferences and their order are also given and shared between 
decision-makers. Decision-makers are perfectly rational if they have complete information 
about the alternatives and their expected consequences.10  
The same assumptions apply to the concept of bounded rationality. The only 
difference is that the decision-maker is assumed to operate/decide under conditions of 
environmental uncertainty/complexity. This means that the decision-maker does not have 
complete information about the alternatives and their consequences. Therefore, even if the 
decision-makers are intentionally rational, they aim to maximize their preferences, they are 
bounded by their limited capacity to search and process information. There are two major 
factors contributing to bounding the decision-makers’ rationality. The first, physical, refers 
to the limited human capacity to process and store information. The second, cognitive, 
refers to the limited capacity to develop consistent representations of reality. This means 
that, even if decision-makers hold all the relevant information to properly decide, they 
have a limited capacity to fully understand the implication of this information. 
The majority of economic theories are based on the assumption of self-interest 
rationality. Classical economic theory, moreover, is based on the assumption that 
economic agents are fully rational and behave ethically. Therefore, they have complete 
information about the available market alternatives and their relative price. Furthermore, it 
is based on the assumption that there are an infinite number of players in the market. 
Transacting parties, therefore, do not recognize each other and there is no probability that 
they will encounter each other again in the future. This implies that there is no dependence 
between transacting parties and that there are no costs of switching between market 
alternatives. Under these conditions the best mechanism of coordination between 
                                                           
10 See Simon (1981) for a full treatment of the concept of bounded rationality. 
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transacting parties is the invisible hand of the market. This is because, given that the 
transacting parties have perfect information about the distribution of the price, they are 
able to select the offer that maximizes their own profit. 
The assumption of strategic rationality extends the traditional assumption of self-
interest seeking rationality in order to comprise the opportunity for opportunistic behavior 
(Williamson, 1975; 1985). Opportunism is defined as self-interest seeking with guile. It 
refers to the possibility that one or more parties of a business transaction exploit temporary 
information and/or power advantages to realize unfair profits over counterparts.11It should 
be noted that opportunism does not imply fraud. Transacting parties may behave 
opportunistically without committing any fraud. For instance, a party exploiting 
contingencies, which is not contemplated in the contract negotiated by the transacting 
parties, behaves opportunistically, but not necessarily fraudulently. It should also be noted 
that opportunism might not be committed by a single transacting party, but also by a 
coalition, such as in the case of a cartel between the leading firms or suppliers of a specific 
resource. The typical example is the cartel between the main countries supplying oil, which 
control the price of the commodity.  
The relevance of the assumption of strategic rationality is constrained by two 
conditions. The first condition is the combination between bounded rationality and 
environmental complexity. The combination between these two factors implies, on the one 
hand, that the transacting parties are limited in their capacity to search for and process 
information and, on the other hand, that they are also limited in their capacity to foresee 
possible contingencies that may influence/change the outcome of transactions. 
Information, therefore, may be asymmetrically distributed between the transacting parties 
and be opportunistically exploited by one of them. The second condition is the case of 
asymmetric distribution of power between transacting parties. This is the case of specific 
transaction, where the number of available market alternatives is only limited. The extreme 
case, from this perspective, is the monopoly by a single firm within a specific market. The 
monopolist may exploit its market power to impose unfair prices on the supply of a 
specific resource/service. 
                                                           
11 A transacting party has a power advantage over his counterpart when the second is dependent on the first to 
achieve his goal. 
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This section has introduced the concept of self-interest rationality. We distinguish 
between three different forms of rationality: perfect, bounded and strategic. These three 
assumptions share a common origin, which is the idea that the rationality of individual 
behavior is based on the achievement of the individuals’ self-interest. They differ mainly 
for two reasons. The first reason is the individuals’ capacity to search for and process 
information. The second reason is the ethics of individuals’ behavior. In other words, to 
what extent individuals are willing to behave within the moral and ethical norms regulating 
a society. Having defined the concept of self-interest seeking rationality, in the next section 
we address the relationship between the different forms of self-interest rationality and the 
different conceptualizations of trust.   
2.1.2 Trust as rational choice 
In the previous section we argued that the assumption of self-interest rationality is 
based on the idea that individuals behave to maximize their self-interest. Trust, according 
to this perspective, is conceptualized as a rational choice.12 Therefore, it is defined as a 
function of the mutual self-interest to reciprocate trust. This section aims to define the 
specific relationship between each form of rationality, as defined in the section above, and 
the relative conceptualization of trust. Our starting point is the assumption of perfect 
rationality. We continue with the assumptions of bounded and strategic rationality.  
In classical economic theory, trust is defined as a positive externality (Arrow, 
1974). Externalities are costs or benefits generated, but not paid within specific business 
transactions (Coase. 1960). Externalities may be either positive or negative. They are 
negative in the case where a transaction creates costs for the collectivity. The typical 
example is the costs of pollution, which are not directly paid by the polluters. They are 
positive, instead, if they are benefits jointly shared within a collectivity. For instance, the 
users of a telephone network benefit from the dimension, in terms of number of users, of 
the telephone network. However, the users do not directly pay for this benefit.  
Arrow (1974) argues that when we go to a petrol station we do not question 
whether or not the attendant will fill our tank after we have paid or, vice versa, the 
attendant does not question whether we will run away before we have paid. We expect 
                                                                                                                                                   
12 See among others Axelrod (1984); Barber (1983); Chiles and McMackin (1996); Dasgupta (1988); Gambetta 
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each other to fulfill our obligations. In the classic model of the market, therefore, trust is 
conceptualized as a positive externality, which is shared between the market players. It is 
the minimum level of cooperation that is necessary for a business transaction to be 
completed.  
The assumption of bounded rationality suggests that individuals are bounded in 
their capacity to maximize their own self-interest because they do not have enough 
information about the alternatives and consequences of their actions. Luhmann (1979) 
distinguishes between trust and confidence. He argues that trust refers to risk. It means that 
in the case of trust individuals are aware of the potential risk associated with a given 
alternative. However, the outcome is known only in terms of probability. The function of 
trust, according to Luhmann, is to reduce the complexity of the process of decision-making 
to a limited number of feasible solutions. In the case of confidence risks are not known. 
Individuals, therefore, hope for the best, rather than being conscious of the potential risks 
existing.  
The difference between trust and confidence is important in terms of learning. In 
the case of trust, in fact, knowing the risks involved enables the opportunity to learn from 
the feedback of the action. In the case of confidence learning can not take place because 
individuals are not aware of the risks they are taking. Therefore, they can not evaluate the 
efficiency and effectiveness of their actions. Trust plays a key role in the process of 
learning as it reduces the complexity of the decision and enables the opportunity to learn 
from experience. Trust, indeed, is re-calculated, ex-post, on the basis of the outcome of the 
action (Luhmann, 1974). 
The assumption of strategic rationality belies the existence of mutual trust in the 
market (Williamson, 1975). Economic agents are pictured as astute calculators 
continuously looking for alternative ways to profit by, if necessary, cheating on their 
counterparts. Transacting parties can not expect their counterparts to behave in a 
trustworthy and fair manner. Therefore, trust can only be enforced through institutional 
mechanisms to prevent and/or punish opportunistic behavior.  
There are three major ways to sustain the development of trust between 
transacting parties: structural and procedural constraints, selection procedures and policing 
CREATING TRUST BETWEEN LOCAL AND GLOBAL SYSTEMS 
 45
mechanisms, risk spreading and insurance like arrangements (Shapiro, 1987). The first 
mechanism is based on the formalization of a set of behavioral rules and structural 
constraints. The second method is based on the formalization of trust-signals, such as a 
diploma or a certificate of quality. The third method is based on pooling individuals’ 
resources to create advance protection against deviant behavior, such as insurance 
companies do.  
The efficiency of these systems depends on four factors (Dasgupta, 1988):  
1. The existence of an appropriate system of rules that define trust and opportunism. 
2. The existence of an appropriate system of incentives, which reward trust and penalize 
opportunism;  
3. The credibility of the guardian of trust. From this perspective the process of trust 
creation is delegated to a system of authorities. Its function is to regulate and control 
trust within a society. The typical example of a guardian of trust is a judge. The 
function of a judge is to punish opportunistic behavior. If the judge is not credible the 
citizen will not be willing to recognize the judge’s authority and judgments. 
Therefore, judges loose their capacity to provide trust between citizens.  
4. The measurability of trust. The credibility of the guardian of trust requires that trust is 
measurable. This means that the rules to distinguish between trustworthiness and 
opportunism should be clear and objective. There should be no room for subjective 
interpretation. In other words the behavior of an authority should be evaluated on the 
basis of objective rules, which define whether the authority is performing correctly or 
is pursuing self-interest. If these rules are not available the performance of the 
authority may be the cause of conflicts.  
From this perspective market and hierarchy are at the opposite ends of a single 
continuum between trust and control (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992; Williamson, 1985; 
Chiles and McMackin, 1996; Macauley, 1963). The ideal market is not centrally regulated. 
The system of prices and competition is sufficient to guarantee trustworthiness and 
efficiency. If the number of market players is infinite, competition is sufficient to 
guarantee the convergence of the market price toward the marginal production costs. 
Parties that are not competitive will fail. The price, therefore, is an efficient mechanism to 
                                                                                                                                                   
(1988); Noteboom et.al. (1997) and Williamson (1993).  
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signal trustworthiness and efficiency. Hierarchical systems are based on the vertical 
integration of a number of adjacent transactions. Therefore, the trustworthiness of the 
entire process is guaranteed and enforced by a central authority.  
Williamson argues that there is a trade-off between market and hierarchy, which 
depends on the complexity and specificity of transactions. The complexity of a transaction 
is measured in terms of uncertainty. The uncertainty associated with a specific transaction 
restricts the capacity of transacting parties to set up a common system of rules to govern 
the transaction and, therefore, the risk of opportunism increases. Williamson argues that 
the more complex the transaction the more efficient it is to vertically integrate it. 
The idiosyncrasy of the transaction depends upon either the number of suppliers 
or buyers. The greater the number of suppliers or buyers of a specific resource the less 
their relative market power. The owner of a specific resource, therefore, can 
opportunistically exploit their relative market power. This problem is not relevant only in 
the case of a small number of suppliers or buyers, but also in the case of long-term 
contracts where the costs of re-selecting a new partner or terminating the transaction are 
high. Williamson argues that also in the case of specific transactions it is more efficient to 
vertically integrate them.  
Williamson (1985) has recently revised his initial theory in order to consider the 
influence of the transaction-repetitiveness on the efficiency of the governance structure. 
Axelrod (1984), in fact, has shown that the expectation of future transactions stimulates 
parties to invest in mutual trust and reputation (Hill, 1990; Gulati, 1995). Therefore, 
transaction repetition reduces the probability of opportunism. However, Granovetter 
(1992) argues that the repeated simulation of trustworthy behavior is one of the best 
fraudulent strategies because transacting parties tend to reduce the level of control over 
each other. The opportunistic party, therefore, exploits the low level of control to take 
advantage of his counterpart’s trust.  
Furthermore, the efficiency of vertical integration depends on the frequency of 
business transactions. If transactions are vertically integrated the fixed costs are prevalent 
over the variable ones. Therefore, the efficiency of vertical integration increases with the 
frequency of the transaction.  
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Williamson, as a consequence of the introduction of the concept of transaction-
frequency, has identified two intermediary forms of governance between market and 
hierarchy (see fig. 2.1). The first, bilateral, is based on mutual trust between the transacting 
parties. This first form of governance is applicable in the case of transactions 
characterized, on the one hand, by low levels of idiosyncrasy and, on the other, by high 
levels of frequency. The second, trilateral, is based on the mediation of a trusted third 
party, which is entrusted with solving potential disputes. This second form of governance 
is efficient in the case of transactions characterized by medium levels of idiosyncrasy, but 
low levels of frequency. The market is efficient in the case of transactions characterized by 
low levels of idiosyncrasy independent from the frequency of the transaction. The 
hierarchy is efficient in the case of highly specific transactions and independent from their 
frequency. 
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Fig. 2.1. Matching between governance structures and commercial transactions - Adapted from Williamson 
(1979). 
 
This section has focused on the concept of trust from an under-socialized 
perspective. We define the assumptions on the form of human rationality. For each of these 
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assumptions we derive the implications on the conceptualization of trust. The next section 
introduces the over-socialized perspective, which differs from the under-socialized one in 
that it is based on the assumption of behavioral rationality. Individuals, according to this 
assumption, interpret a set of cultural norms and values, which are shared within a 
community. The next section, therefore, derives the implications of this assumption on the 
conceptualization of trust. 
2.2 The over-socialized perspective 
In the previous section we introduced the concept of trust as a rational choice. The 
over-socialized perspective is based on the assumption of behavioral rationality. 
Individuals are expected to behave according to a specific set of cultural norms and values, 
which support the spontaneous cooperation between members of a community (Fukuyama, 
1995). There is a distinction between low and high trust communities. The members of the 
first are selfish. They aim to maximize their self-interest. The members of the second are 
characterized by collective orientation. In these communities, therefore, the interests of the 
collectivity prevail over the interests of individuals.   
This section is divided into two subsections. The first defines the assumption of 
behavioral rationality. From this perspective we introduce the notion of identity. Identity, 
as we shall see, plays a double role. The first is to stimulate the individuals’ identification 
with a set of norms and values characterizing a specific social role in the community. The 
second is to stimulate the creation of coherent expectations about the behavior of an 
individual playing a specific social role in the community. Once the concept of behavioral 
rationality has been defined, we derive the implication of this assumption on trust.  
2.2.1 Behavioral rationality
13
 
The concept of self-interest seeking rationality is based on the assumption that 
alternatives and their consequences are an integral part of the situation. The specific 
identity of the decision-maker, therefore, does not play any role in defining them. The 
concept of behavioral rationality, on the contrary, is based on the idea that the perception 
of the alternatives and their values depends on the specific identity of the decision-maker. 
                                                           
13 See March (1994) 
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There is not an efficient or optimal decision, but only an appropriate one. The 
appropriateness of the solution depends on the specific conjunction between the decision-
makers’ identity and the situations’ characteristics. Therefore, a key role in the 
understanding of human behavior is played by the concept of identity. 
Identity is defined as a set of norms and values characterized by a specific role 
within a community. The concept of identity plays a double role. On the one hand, it 
represents a set of behavioral guidelines for the members of a given community playing 
specific social roles. On the other hand, it represents a set of expectations about the 
behavior of their counterparts playing specific roles in the community. There is tension 
between these two dimensions of identity. On the one hand, individuals are stimulated to 
personalize their interpretation of a role as a way to differentiate themselves from others. 
On the other hand, individuals are stimulated to conform to a specific social role as the 
basis of social consensus. The prevalence of one component over the other is a matter of 
cultural preference (Hofstrede, 1980). Collectivist societies, such as Japan, show a strong 
preference toward conformity. Individualistic societies, such as the USA, on the other 
hand, show a strong preference toward the personalization of social roles. 
Social roles have three major functions. The first is to categorize and organize 
knowledge about the properties and characteristics of a specific role, such as how a police 
officer should behave or how to recognize a police officer. Secondly, it is a social contract 
between parties that belong to a specific group and/or community. From this perspective, 
there is not a third party that is explicitly entrusted to judge behavior and penalize 
opportunism rather it is the role of the community as a whole to judge. Community-
members, who do not behave morally and ethically, are “expelled”. Compensations and 
penalties are not necessarily monetary, but social, for example, loosing reputation. Thirdly, 
it is a statement about the morality and the value of an individual. Individuals do not 
follow social rules simply because they are forced to, but because they believe and identify 
with these rules. The motivation is more internal than external. It has more to do with self-
respect and honor than fear. 
In this section we focus on the notion of behavioral rationality. Individuals’ 
behavior is expected to be dependent on the specific identity of the decision-maker. Self-
interest is not defined as an intrinsic and objective character of the situation, but is a 
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function of the specific identity of the decision-maker. A member of Greenpeace and a 
director of a chemical plant have completely different perceptions and understandings of 
the problem of pollution. Therefore, their perception of what constitutes their self-interest 
differs completely. It follows that there is not an optimal choice, but the optimum depends 
on the decision-makers’ identity. In the next section we derive the impact of this 
assumption on the concept of trust. 
2.2.2 Trust as social capital
14
 
In the previous section we introduced the concept of behavioral rationality. In this 
section we aim to derive the implications of this assumption on the concept of trust.  
The over-socialized perspective is based on the concept of identity. Identity does 
not only have an individual meaning, it is also a social contract between community 
members. It is the basis for sharing expectations about reciprocal and mutual behavior and, 
therefore, trust between community members.  
Fukuyama (1995) argues that trust is a moral obligation, which arises within a 
community of regular, honest and cooperative members who behave on the basis of shared 
norms and values. He also argues that trust is culturally determined. Culture, according to 
Hofstede (1980), is a software program of the mind, which guides the behavior of 
individuals belonging to specific communities or groups. Culture, of course, does not 
predetermine the behavior of humans as a software program determines the “behavior” of a 
computer, but it influences their behavior. Therefore, culture is a common basis of 
interpretation.  
Cultures can be characterized by distinguishing between two components: norms 
and values. Norms are the behavior that is common between the members of a community. 
These can be observed. They are explicit characteristics of a community. Values are 
preferences toward certain states of affairs, such as clean versus dirty. These can not be 
directly observed. Therefore, they are tacit. Trust as a moral obligation has explicit 
components, which are the norms, and tacit components, which are the values. 
Fukuyama distinguishes between high trust societies and low trust societies. 
These societies differ mainly in terms of spontaneous sociability, which is the spontaneous 
                                                                                                                                                   
14 For a review on the concept of social capital see Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998); Coleman (1984; 
1987;1988;1990) and Putnam (1993a; b and 1995).  
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ability to form associations and cooperate within their terms of reference. Fukuyama uses 
the term spontaneous in order to emphasize the distinction between cooperation based on 
calculation and cooperation based on morality. The first, as we suggested in the previous 
section, is based on rational calculation of the economic and/or social returns in trusting 
the counterpart. Calculative trust is based on the power of external authorities, which 
guarantee the contractual terms of the transactions. Moral trust does not require external 
enforcement. Members of a high trust society spontaneously conform to the social and 
cultural norms and values that regulate their interactions. 
In characterizing the distinction between high and low trust societies, it is not 
sufficient to focus on the spontaneity of trust, but we must also focus on where trust is 
spontaneous. Fukuyama, from this perspective, argues about the paradox of family values. 
In low trust societies, such as China and Italy, the family is the basis of social order. 
Mutual trust, in these societies, is restricted to the closed network of kinship. There is little 
cooperation between non-relatives. This specific characteristic, for instance, makes the 
transition from family-business to managerial corporation very difficult. The development 
of large managerial corporations in these low trust communities has to be enforced and 
sponsored by the state. In Italy, for instance, the main large corporations are either state-
owned or strongly subsidized by the state. 
High trust societies, on the other hand, are characterized by the presence of 
several intermediaries, associations and institutions between the family and the state. The 
nature of these associations and institutions may have an economic purpose, such as an 
association between suppliers of a firm, or social, such as religious groups or civic 
communities. The function of these institutions is to continuously mediate between private 
and collective interests. The existence of several intermediaries and associations is more an 
output of trust than an input for its development. Therefore, why in these societies is 
mutual trust more diffused than in low trust societies? The answer is tied to the notion of 
extended-family or clan, which is present in high trust societies (Fukuyama, 1995, Ouchi, 
1980). Extended families or clans are not based on kinship, but on affiliation to a 
community. Therefore, trust crosses family boundaries within the community. From this 
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perspective, Fukuyama seems to suggest that the spontaneity of trust within a community 
depends on the degree of individualism and collectivism.15  
Doney et.al. (1998), drawing on the works of Hofstede and Fukuyama, have 
developed a model to interpret the influence of national culture on the development of 
trust. They distinguish between five categories of cognitive process underlying the 
development of mutual trust. These are respectively calculation, prediction, intentionality, 
capability and transference. We have already discussed calculative trust. Prediction-based 
trust is based on the parties’ ability to forecast behavior during a transaction. The forecast 
is mainly based on the accumulation of past experience and on the belief that there is 
continuity between individuals’ past and future behavior. Intentionality-based trust is based 
on the evaluation of the counterparts’ motivation to behave trustworthily. Therefore, trust 
is based on the belief that the counterpart is motivated enough to behave trustworthily. 
Capability-based trust is based on the evaluation of the counterparts’ capacity to keep 
promises. Transference-based trust, finally, is based on the transferal of trust from known 
people to unknown people, who are directly or indirectly related. In other words, it is based 
on the belief that if A trusts B and B trusts C, then A logically must trust C. 
Doney et.al. characterize culture by distinguishing between three categories: in 
relation to self, in relation to authority and in relation to risk. These categories characterize 
communities for their specific solutions to common basic social problems. The first 
category refers to the relationship between the self and others. This category can be further 
characterized by distinguishing between individualism versus collectivism and masculinity 
versus femininity. We have already explained the first sub-category. The second sub-
category concerns the dominant values in society between male and female values. 
Masculine cultures are characterized by the prevalence of tough values, such as 
assertiveness, success and competition. Feminine cultures, on the other hand, are 
characterized by tender values, such as solidarity (Hofstede, 1980).  
The second category, in relation to authority, reflects the emphasis a society puts 
on hierarchical relations. High power distance societies, such as France, show a strong 
preference toward hierarchical relationships. Low power distance societies prefer to 
distribute power.  
                                                           
15 See Hofstede (1980) for a definition of the concept individualistic versus collectivistic societies. 
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The third category, in relation to risk, refers to the perception of risk and 
strategies to cope with it. Doney et.al. refer to Hofstede’s distinction between high versus 
low uncertainty avoidance societies. It should be noted, however, that risk and uncertainty 
are not the same (Hofstede, 1980). The subject of risk is known and can be predicted in 
terms of probability. The subject of uncertainty is not known and can not be predicted. 
Uncertainty avoidance societies look for structure and rules, which make events clearly 
interpretable and predictable. Paradoxically, members of uncertainty avoiding cultures are 
willing to take more risks, which are known, in order to reduce ambiguities. Members of 
uncertainty avoiding countries, for instance, prefer to attack a potential opponent rather 
than wait. Therefore, they are willing to take the risks associated with attacking rather than 
patiently waiting for the counterpart’s first move. 
Intersecting cultural dimensions and trust-forms, Doney et.al. propose a matrix to 
interpret the different forms of trust in different cultures (see table 2.1). Table 2.1 links the 
different cultural dimensions to the specific norms and values that characterize each of 
these dimensions to the prevalent attitudes emerging in the process of building trust. For 
instance, in individualistic cultures trust is developed on the basis of calculation and the 
manifested ability of counterparts to keep their promises. The function of this taxonomy, 
therefore, is to define, on the basis of the cultural characteristics of a community, the 
specific strategy of trust creation that can be implemented to sustain the development of 
mutual trust between members. 
In the under-socialized perspective, market transactions fail as a consequence of 
the natural attitude of economic agents to behave opportunistically. Hierarchical systems 
of formal rules and authorities are developed to minimize the costs of opportunism under 
conditions of complexity and specificity. However, Ouchi (1980) argues that hierarchical 
systems fail under conditions of ambiguity. The functionality of hierarchical systems 
requires performance to be measurable. The lack of common standards to evaluate 
performances reduces the capacity of authorities to prevent and punish opportunism. 
Ouchi argues that under conditions of ambiguity the formation of clans better 
supports the organic development of congruent goals between their members.16 A clan is 
defined as the obverse of a market, since it achieves efficacy under the opposite conditions 
                                                           
16 See also Ciborra (1993). 
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of high performance ambiguity and low opportunism. Forming clans enables the 
socialization of common norms and values and the development of solidarity between 
members. Solidarity does not follow on from functional dependence (contractual alignment 
between individuals’ self-interest) between parties, but by their mutual recognition of 
sharing a common affiliation. It should be noted that Ouchi focuses only on the notion of 
clans where Fukuyama focuses on the relationships between family and clan and then clan 
and society. 
CULTURAL 
DIMENSIONS  
ASSOCIATED NORMS AND VALUES  INFLUENCE ON 
TRUST-BUILDING 
PROCESS 
Individualism 
Self-orientation 
Value individual accomplishment 
Tolerance toward individual behavior and opinions 
Low loyalty to other people and institutions 
Interaction based on self-interest and competition 
Loose interpersonal ties 
Individualism 
Calculative (+) 
Capability (+) 
Collectivism 
Group orientation 
Value joint effort and group rewards 
Conformity 
Loyalty to other people and institutions 
Interdependence and cooperation 
Strong interpersonal ties 
Collectivism 
Prediction (+) 
Intentionality (+) 
Transference (+) 
Relation to Self
Masculinity 
Individual achievement 
Confrontation 
Independence 
Action  
Masculinity 
Calculative (+) 
Capability (+) 
Relation to Self Femininity 
Solidarity 
Cooperation 
Honoring moral obligations  
Femininity 
Prediction (+) 
Intentionality (+) 
Transference (+) 
High power distance 
Prestige, power and wealth 
Conflict 
Authoritarian norms  
High power distance
Calculative (+) 
Prediction (+) 
Capability (+) 
Relation to 
authority 
Low power distance 
Egalitarian relationships 
Cooperation 
Interdependence, affiliation and solidarity 
Low power distance 
Intentionality (+) 
Transferability (+) 
Tab. 2.1. The influence of cross-cultural differences on the nature of trust. 
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CULTURAL 
DIMENSIONS  
ASSOCIATED NORMS AND VALUES  INFLUENCE ON 
TRUST-BUILDING 
PROCESS 
Relation to risk High uncertainty avoiding 
Formal rules and regulations 
Human behavior is purposive 
Compromise 
Faith in the institutions 
Belief in experts and their knowledge. 
High uncertainty 
avoidance 
Prediction (+) 
Intentionality (+) 
Capability (+) 
Transference (+)  
 Low uncertainty avoidance  
Tolerance for deviance 
Human behavior is unpredictable 
Conflicts 
Weak faith in people and institutions  
Low uncertainty 
avoidance 
Calculative (+) 
Tab. 2.1. The influence of cross-cultural differences on the nature of trust (continuation). 
 
In this section we have introduced the concept of trust in the over-socialized 
perspective. Trust is defined as a moral norm. We have distinguished between high and 
low trust societies. In high trust societies trust and cooperation are spontaneous between 
community members. These communities are characterized by the existence of a large 
number of intermediary associations of different natures that contribute to sustaining the 
socialization and collectivization of interests. Referring to the work of Doney et.al., we 
have expanded this initial categorization between high and low trust societies to comprise 
the specific relationship between cultural dimensions and specific strategies of trust 
creation implemented in different communities. The major limitation of this perspective, as 
we will argue in the following section, is the assumption that all members of a community 
automatically follow the cultural norms and values previously imprinted on their minds. 
2.3 The embedded perspective 
Granovetter (1992) argues that the under- and over-socialized perspectives share a 
common conceptualization of human behavior, which is based on the atomistic view of 
human action and decision. Individuals are assumed to decide and act in perfect isolation, 
within a social vacuum. There is no direct and mutual influence between individuals’ 
behaviors. The relationships between individuals are mediated either by a common 
institutional system (under-socialized perspective) or a common cultural system (over-
socialized perspective). 
In the under-socialized perspective atomization follows on from the assumption 
of self-interest seeking rationality. In the under-socialized perspective individuals act on 
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their own in order to maximize their self-interest and without regard for any relationships 
with others. Individuals are also expected to behave opportunistically. Individuals, 
therefore, do not only maximize their own self-interest, but they also exploit their 
counterparts. The institutional system, therefore, is designed to enforce convergence 
between interests, to prevent and/or detect opportunism, and stimulate “cooperation”.  
In the over-socialized perspective atomization follows on from the assumption 
that cultural rules are automatically executed. Behavior, in fact, is determined by culture as 
an operating media. Individuals behave independently from each other and on the basis of 
culture alone. Therefore, individuals follow the cultural norms as if they were programmed 
into their minds (Hofstede, 1980). That is, the individual executes the culture as if it were a 
mechanism or software of the mind.  
In the embedded perspective there is a meso level between the individual level 
(micro level) and the institutional system (macro level). This is the level of the network of 
social relationships. Individuals are embedded within networks of social relationships, 
which directly influence their expectations and behavior. For instance, two brothers doing 
business together behave differently from two businessmen doing business together for the 
first time. Human behavior, therefore, is no longer the product of mediation between self-
interests and institutional rules or the automatic application of norms and values. The way 
these norms, values and rules influence behavior depends on the specific nature and 
structure of the relationships between parties. The network, on the other hand, changes the 
nature and value of these norms. 
The embedded perspective, therefore, proposes an evolutionary conceptualization 
of trust. It is possible to distinguish between trust ex-ante and ex-post. Ex-ante, it is the 
product of experiences of interaction accumulated within networks of personal, 
institutional and cultural relationships. Ex-post, the specific experiences of interaction 
change and/or consolidate the specific nature, value and structure of trust shared within a 
network/community. 
This section is structured in two parts. In the first we address the concept of 
network rationality by distinguishing between three dimensions: structural, relational and 
cognitive. In the second we derive the implications of these concepts for the 
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conceptualization of trust. We focus on two aspects: the evolution of trust at relational 
level and the interdependence between relational and network levels.  
2.3.1 The concept of network rationality 
The concept of network rationality is based on the idea that individuals mutually 
influence each other’s expectations, behaviors and decisions through networks of social 
and economic relationships.17 This hypothesis sharply contrasts with that in the under-
socialized and over-socialized perspectives, which is based on the idea that individuals 
behave on their own either on the basis of a common culture or on the basis of their own 
self-interest. In both these perspectives parties are not capable of changing and modifying 
the nature and character of the context in which they are embedded; they can only choose 
given the context. In the embedded perspective the context is defined as a network of 
relationships between parties.  
A network is a model or metaphor that describes a number, usually large, of 
entities that are connected (Axelsson and Easton ,1992). These entities may either be 
individuals, firms or artifacts. A relationship is a bond of interdependence between two 
parties. There is interdependence between two parties if each of them depends on, or 
believes they depend on, the decisive contribution of the other to achieve their respective 
goals. Let us assume that A depends on B to achieve the goal c. The reliance of A on B 
depends on two factors. The first is the importance A places on c. The second is the 
number of alternatives available to B. If only B is able to do the task required to achieve c, 
then A is completely reliant on B to achieve the goal. The more reliant A is on B, the more 
B can exercise influence and power over A.  
There are three dimensions that can characterize the concept of relationship: 
content, scope and nature (Soda, 1998). Content refers to the type of “product” exchanged 
or shared within the relationship, such as information, norms and values (social), goods 
and services (economic) and association or membership and so forth. Scope refers to the 
goal of the relationship. Let us assume that the scope of a relationship between two firms is 
to cooperate on a research project. This goal can be achieved in different ways. It can be 
achieved through the simple exchange of information or through the formation of a joint 
                                                                                                                                                   
17 For a review on the concept of network rationality and networks in general see Axelsson and Easton (1992), 
Easton (1992), Ford (1990), Jarillo (1988), Nohria and Eccels (1992), Powell (1990). 
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research group. The third dimension is the nature of the relationship. This third dimension 
refers to the specific characteristics of the relationship, such as strength, intensity, 
longevity and so forth. 
Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) distinguish between three dimensions of the 
network: the structural, relational and cognitive. In making the separation between 
structural and relational dimensions of the network, they draw on Granovetter’s distinction 
between structural and relational embeddedness. The term embeddedness refers to the 
influence of the network on its members’ behavior. Granovetter distinguishes between two 
levels of embeddedness. The relational level describes the kind of personal relationships, 
which people have developed through a history of interaction, that influence their mutual 
behavior. Granovetter argues that the ways workers and supervisors interact do not simply 
follow on from the meaning of these categories in a technical division of labor, but also by 
the kind of personal relationships. 
The structural embeddedness concerns the properties of the social system and the 
network of relations as a whole. It refers to the social pressure that the network as a whole 
exercises on the development of a single relationship. For instance, it is easier for a worker 
to maintain a good relationship with his or her supervisor if the supervisor has good 
relationships with other workers. If good relationships are not shared by all, other workers 
might make life very difficult for the one who is close to the supervisor (Granovetter, 
1992). 
Granovetter argues that the influence exercised by the network structure as a 
whole is subtler than the one exercised by the network of personal relationships. The 
network of personal relationships directly influences individuals’ behavior. The influence 
of the structural dimension depends mainly on the configuration of the network as a whole 
and the position of the relationship within the network. The cohesiveness of the network, 
for instance, is important because, on the one hand, it determines the capacity and the 
relative efficiency of the network to share information.18. Therefore, individuals are better 
18 It should be noted that the cohesiveness of the network is effective to socialize information about other 
members’ behaviors, but it is ineffective to have access to external information. For instance, whether an 
individual leaves his job depends not only on his social attachments, but also whether he does have access to 
information about alternative opportunities. Cohesive networks are not appropriate to sustain accessibility to 
external source of information.    
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informed about the behavior of the others in the network and they can be mutually 
influential. The cohesiveness of the networks’ structure, on the other hand, defines the 
capacity and the efficiency of networks to create, socialize and share common behavior. In 
a cohesive group a worker may have absorbed from the group a set of behavioral principles 
that would make a close relationship with the supervisor unthinkable (Granovetter, 1992).  
The third dimension refers to those resources providing shared representations, 
interpretations and systems of meaning among parties. This third dimension is not yet 
widely accepted in the literature on social networks. It refers to norms, values, codes, 
languages and narratives, in other words to the common culture, shared between the 
members of a network. Sharing these norms, values and languages within a network 
positively influence and stimulate the capacity of the members to create and socialize 
knowledge and innovation. 
In summary, we can distinguish between two dimensions of a network. The first 
dimension is the relationship. The relationship between two parties directly influences their 
respective behavior at two different levels: social and personal. The social level refers to 
the relationship between two social roles, such as the relationship between a worker and a 
supervisor, or the relationship between a doctor and nurse. The personal level refers to the 
specific relationship that two parties have developed through a history of interactions. This 
last dimension of the relationship is the most important in understanding how the 
relationship between two parties influences their behavior. 
The relationship is embedded within a network structure. The structure of the 
network directly influences the relationship between two parties and, therefore, indirectly 
their behavior. We can distinguish between two dimensions of the network structure: 
structural and cognitive. The structural dimension of the network refers to the specific 
configuration of the network of relationships. The structural dimension defines, on the one 
hand, the capacity and efficiency of the network to diffuse information about the behavior 
of its members. Therefore, the structural dimension influences the capacity of parties 
within relationships to monitor their behavior. The structural dimension, on the other hand, 
defines the social pressure upon a relationship. Therefore, the structural dimension 
determines the capacity and the efficiency of the network as a whole to support the 
socialization and internalization of common behavior.  
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The network is embedded within a specific cultural context. The cultural context 
provides a class of blueprints/scenarios that can be triggered off for the development of 
specific relationships. It is a repository of norms, values and rules regulating the interaction 
between specific social roles. The relationship between father and child, for instance, 
changes from culture to culture. In high power distance cultures the father is authoritarian 
whereas in low power distance cultures father and child are on more equal terms. 
Furthermore, culture provides a common repository of basic frameworks, codes and 
languages, which are required to sustain the development of social and personal 
relationships. 
Up to this point we have proposed a top-down model of the network. The top 
layer is the cultural context, which is the context for the development of the network as a 
whole. The intermediary layer is the network, which influences the development of 
relationships. The bottom layer is the relationship, which influences the parties’ behavior 
within relationships.  
We can also move from the bottom to the top. The interaction between two parties 
modifies the nature of the relationship. For example, it may strengthen their specific 
relationship. Changes taking place at the relational level imply changes at the structural 
level. For instance, if two parties break their relationship the cohesiveness also changes. 
The structure of the network changes the cultural context. Members of governing bodies, 
for instance, are central to networks of political interests. Therefore, their votes can change 
the institutional and cultural structure and context.  
2.3.2 Trust in the embedded perspective 
In the embedded perspective, trust is defined as an evolutionary characteristic of 
relationships. It increases as a consequence of the accumulation of positive experiences. 
Blau (1964) suggests that parties initially test their mutual trustworthiness by starting with 
low risk transactions. Once they have evaluated mutual trustworthiness, they gradually 
expand the risk involved in their business relationships. Lewicki and Bunker (1995a;b) 
propose a model of the developmental process of trust within a relationship. They 
distinguish between three sequential stages. In the first, starting phase, trust is based 
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knowledge (mutual predictability). In the third, maturation phase, trust is based on mutual 
identification (shared norms and values). 
Executions of 
commitments 
through role 
interactions and 
personal 
interactions
Commitments for 
future action 
through formal legal 
contract and 
psychological 
contract
Negotiation of joint 
expectations 
through formal 
bargaining and 
informal sense 
making Assesments
based on 
efficiency 
and equity
Fig. 2.2 – The cycle of development of cooperative relationships - Adapted from Ring and Van de 
Ven (1994) 
 
Ring and Van de Ven (1994), similarly, distinguish between emergence, evolution and 
dissolution of cooperative inter-organizational relationships. The development of trust is 
sustained by repeated cyclical processes of negotiation, commitment and execution (see 
fig. 2.2). The interaction between formal and informal processes characterizes each of 
these phases: formal bargaining and informal sense making (negotiation), formal legal 
contract and psychological contract (commitment), roles and personal interaction 
(execution). The development of informal trust within cooperative inter-organizational 
relationships increasingly compensates or substitutes the formal basis of trust.  
Trust may dissolve or fail to evolve for multiple reasons, such as violation of 
trust, little interdependence, and/or lack of interaction. The consequence of violating trust 
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and the cost of rebuilding it are directly correlated to the level of development of trust in 
the relationship. Therefore, the higher the level of trust the graver the consequences and 
costs of violating it. On the other hand, the capacity to detect a violation of trust diminishes 
with the development of the relationship. The development of trust in a relationship, in 
fact, is coupled with a reduction in the level of attention and rational control applied within 
the relationship (Granovetter, 1992; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). It is for this reason that 
simulating the development of a relationship of mutual trust is one of the most successful 
strategies in defrauding a counterpart (Granovetter, 1992).  
More generally, Ring and Van de Ven (1992) suggest that any significant 
imbalance between formal and informal components of trust increases the likelihood of 
cooperative inter-organizational relationships dissolving. On the one hand, an excess of 
formalization is the basis for a proliferation of conflicts, which restricts the development of 
mutual trust. On the other hand, excesses of informality and mutual trust increase the risk 
of opportunistic exploitation of relationships (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992, Granovetter, 
1985; 1992). 
Up to this point we have considered the developmental process of trust within a 
relationship, but how does the structure of the network influence this process? Not much 
research has been carried out on this subject. Granovetter suggests that being embedded in 
cohesive networks accelerates the creation of trust. There are two reasons for this. The first 
is that information within dense and cohesive networks flows faster (Burt, Knez, 1996). 
Therefore, the costs of behaving opportunistically increase proportionally with the 
connectivity and cohesiveness of the network structure. For instance, the cost to A of 
behaving opportunistically with B, who is connected to C, is not only limited to the 
relationship between A and B, but it also affects the relationship between A and C (see also 
Hill, 1990). 
The second reason is that if one party is connected to a network of trustworthy 
parties, the possibility to behave opportunistically may not even cross his or her mind 
(Granovetter, 1992). The rationality behind this is that the prevalent characteristics of a 
network shape the behavior of its members. Therefore, if one person lives in a context 
where all the others behave opportunistically, he or she will not feel guilty about behaving 
opportunistically.  
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In this section we have introduced the concept of trust in the embedded 
perspective. Trust is defined as an evolutionary character of the relationship between two 
parties. Trust evolves through the accumulation of positive experiences of interaction. The 
development of mutual trust within a relationship substitutes formal and rational control. 
The development of significant imbalances between formal control and mutual trust, 
according to Ring and Van de Ven, reduce the likelihood of dissolution of the cooperative 
relationship. An excess of formal control reduces the opportunity of two parties getting to 
know each other personally. An excess of mutual trust exposes the relationship to 
opportunistic and fraudulent behavior. The density and cohesiveness of the network 
structure reduces the time and costs of developing mutual trust in a relationship. The 
motivations are twofold: the fast flow of information and the value of reputation. 
2.4 The role of information and communication technologies in supporting the 
development of trust 
In the previous sections we have analyzed the concept of trust by distinguishing 
between three perspectives. In this section we analyze the relation between trust and 
information and communication technologies. The key question is whether or not the 
development of information and communication technologies is able to sustain the 
development of mutual trust. We reorganize this literature according to Granovetter’s 
categorization. Therefore, we distinguish between three categories of contributions: under-
socialized, over-socialized and embedded. 
The three perspectives, as we shall see, propose different interpretations of the 
roles of information and communication technologies in sustaining the development of 
mutual trust. In the under-socialized perspective, information and communication 
technologies are a substitute for the lack of mutual trust. In the over-socialized perspective, 
trust is a moral norm. Therefore, information and communication technologies do not play 
any specific role in sustaining the development of mutual trust between individuals. In the 
embedded, trust is based on the accumulation of experiences within a relationship. 
Therefore, even if information and communication technologies improve the individuals’ 
capacity to create trust, implementing these technologies is not sufficient to sustain the 
development of mutual trust between individuals. 
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We start with the analysis of the under-socialized perspective, which is currently 
dominant in the field (Kumar et.al., 1998). Therefore, this category is rich in contributions. 
We then introduce the over-socialized and embedded perspectives. In these two 
subsections we highlight, on the one hand, the major criticism made of the under-
socialized perspective and, on the other hand, the main contributions to these two 
perspectives. 
2.4.1 The under-socialized perspective 
In the under-socialized perspective, trust is a rational choice. Therefore, trust is 
based on information and calculation. Information and communication technologies, as we 
shall see, reduce the costs of searching and processing information. Therefore, information 
and communication technologies reduce the cost of developing trust. Miles and Snow 
(1986)19 argue that information and communication technologies are substitutes for 
lengthy trust building processes based on mutual experience. Transacting parties mutually 
agree on a general structure of payment for value added and then integrate them in 
continuously updated IS so that contributions can be mutually and instantaneously verified. 
Therefore, the development of open digital infrastructures enables the formation of 
dynamic forms of networking. 
The under-socialized perspective on information and communication technologies 
is based on transaction cost theory20. This theory, as we have already explained, suggests 
that, under specific conditions, there are costs associated with market transactions. 
Transaction costs depend on a combination of four factors, which are divided into two 
pairs. The first pair is the combination of bounded rationality and environmental 
complexity. This combination implies that information may be asymmetrically distributed 
and opportunistically exploited. Therefore, the transaction costs are the sum of those that 
each party has to bear to prevent the risk of opportunism. The second pair is the 
combination of opportunism and transaction idiosyncrasy. This combination implies a lack 
of competition on the supply- or demand-side of a specific resource. Therefore, power is 
asymmetrically distributed and can be opportunistically exploited by the most powerful 
party.  
                                                           
19 See also Miles and Snow (1992) and Miles and Creed (1995). 
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Transaction cost theory is useful in deciding if it is efficient to govern a 
transaction internally (hierarchy) or externally (market). External transaction costs are the 
sum of searching, negotiation and control costs within the market. Searching costs are the 
costs of collecting and processing information about available suppliers or buyers, their 
prices and reputation. Negotiation costs are those transacting parties have to bear when 
negotiating contractual terms. Control costs are those transacting parties have to bear to 
prevent and detect opportunism or insure the transaction against such behavior. Internal 
transaction costs are given by the sum of internal production and control costs. The 
decision between market and hierarchy, therefore, depends on the comparison between 
internal and external transaction costs. 
The development of information and communication technologies changes the 
structure of transaction costs. The development of these technologies drastically reduces 
the costs of information and communication. They reduce searching costs, for example 
through the development of electronic markets and brokering systems. Furthermore, they 
reduce the cost of assessing the reputation of counterparts and, therefore, the advantages 
associated with opportunistic behavior. They reduce the cost of collecting and 
communicating information and, therefore, the cost of monitoring counterparts’ behavior. 
Finally, information and communication technologies may also reduce negotiation costs, 
for example through the development of electronic procurement systems. 
It should also be noted that the development of information and communication 
technologies reduces the transaction costs associated with power advantages. There are 
two motivations. The first is that the development of these technologies reduces the 
distance between markets. Firms, which were previously located in distant markets, 
compete with each other in a global electronic market. Therefore, there is increasing 
competition between firms. The second motivation is that this development reduces 
switching costs, which are the costs a party has to bear when switching buyers or suppliers. 
The development of these technologies, in fact, stimulates the standardization of business 
practices according to common standards. For instance, market places do not simply 
provide references to a large number of firms, but they also provide a common digital 
infrastructure through which to do business together. Therefore, the transacting parties can 
                                                                                                                                                   
20 See for instance Malone et.al. (1987); Clemons et.al. (1993); Gurbaxani and Wang (1991) and Ciborra (1993). 
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easily switch from one supplier or buyer to another. Malone et.al. (1987) claim, on the 
basis of these arguments, that the development of information and communication 
technologies leads to an increasing usage of markets as opposed to hierarchies.  
Clemons et.al. (1993), however, argue that in order to understand the effect of 
information and communication technologies on the trade-off between markets and 
hierarchies it is useful to separate coordination costs and transaction risks. Coordination 
costs are those incurred by the firm when coordinating activities between production units. 
Coordination is based on the exchange of information between units about price, 
production planning, scheduling, and delivery. Therefore, the development of these 
technologies dramatically reduces coordination costs. Transaction risks can be further 
separated into operational risks and opportunism. Operational risks are those caused by a 
misuse of information between transacting parties. Opportunism is a consequence of 
unforeseen changes in bargaining power. Clemons et.al. argue that the reduction of 
external coordination costs is not sufficient for a shift toward greater market coordination. 
In order for this shift to take place it is required that transaction risks do not increase 
proportionally. Clemons et.al. argue, on the basis of this analysis, that the development of 
information and communication technologies leads to intermediary forms of organization, 
between those of market and hierarchy . 
The previous two contributions focused mainly on the impact of information and 
communication technologies on the efficiency of market transactions. Gurbaxani and 
Wang (1991), however, argue that the transition toward more market coordination is not so 
obvious. The development of information and communication technologies does not only 
reduce external transaction costs, but also internal ones. For instance, the development of 
these technologies also improves the efficiency and effectiveness of internal processes of 
supervision and control. Therefore, even if these technologies improve the efficiency of the 
market they may also improve the efficiency of hierarchical systems. Gurbaxani and Wang 
conclude that the decision between market and hierarchy depends on other factors, such as 
culture and managerial style. 
This section has reviewed the under-socialized perspective on the role of information 
and communication technologies as trust media. Trust is the product of information and 
calculation of risks. The development of these technologies is expected to reduce the risk 
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of opportunism for two reasons. The first is that they reduce the unitary cost of accessing 
and processing information. Therefore, they reduce both coordination and control costs. 
The second reason is that they increase market competition by integrating previously 
separated market and by reducing switching costs. Therefore, information and 
communication technologies are a substitute for the lack of trust between individuals and 
for lengthy trust building processes based on mutual experience. The consequence is that 
the use of these technologies leads to more market coordination than hierarchical control. 
There are, however, scholars who argue that the development of these technologies also 
improves the efficiency of hierarchical control. Therefore, the choice between market and 
hierarchies is more a matter of cultural preference than economic efficiency. 
2.4.2 The over-socialized perspective 
In the over-socialized perspective, trust is a moral norm shared within 
communities. The nature of this norm is rather abstract. Therefore, it is difficult to translate 
it into a software program. The development of information and communication 
technologies, therefore, does not play any relevant role in the cost of developing trust.  
Fukuyama (1995) argues that trust is not reducible to information. A virtual firm 
can have abundant information about its suppliers and clients, but, if they are all 
fraudulent, dealing with them will remain a costly process involving complex contracts and 
time-consuming enforcement. Even if the development of information and communication 
technologies reduces costs of sharing information and coordinating activities, without trust 
there will still be a strong incentive to vertically integrate activities. The development of 
these technologies, therefore, does not automatically lead to the spontaneous formation of 
communities and networks of firms. High trust societies, such as Japan and the North East 
of Italy, created networks of firms well before the information revolution. Low-trust 
societies may never be able to take advantage of the efficiency that these technologies 
offer.  
Therefore, Fukuyama argues that only high trust societies will be able to 
internalize the advantages derived from the development of information and 
communication technologies. The wide accessibility to continuously updated information 
systems is not sufficient to lead to the formation of dynamic and flexible forms of 
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networking between specialized firms. The formation of these networks requires the pre-
existence of mutual trust. Therefore, only high trust societies will be able to exploit the 
new opportunities that the development of these technologies offer. In low trust societies 
the adoption of these technologies will be used to improve the efficiency of firms (internal 
organization). 
The case of Sprintel, which we introduced in the first chapter, shows two things. 
The first is that the formation of dynamic and flexible forms of networking is based, as 
argued by Fukuyama, on the prevalence of mutual trust. The second is, in contrast with 
Fukuyama, that the prevalence of mutual trust may inhibit the capacity of a community to 
exploit the efficiency and effectiveness of these new technologies. Kumar et.al. (1998), in 
fact, explain the failure of Sprintel as being a consequence of the prevalence of mutual 
trust on the basis of common norms and values.  
In our perspective, the capacity of high trust communities to internalize the 
efficiency and effectiveness derived from the adoption of common inter-organizational 
information systems depends on the nature of trust characterizing the community itself. 
Fukuyama, for instance, categorizes both Japan and North East Italy as high trust societies. 
However, there is a major difference between these two communities. Japan is a high-
power distance society whereas North East Italy is a low-power distance one. In Japan trust 
is based on social roles. In North East Italy trust is embedded in personal relationships.  
This distinction has major implications on the nature of communication processes. 
In high-power distance societies the structure and nature of communication processes and 
the meaning of information exchanged is largely codified.21 Therefore, the efficiency of 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) can be exploited to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of communication and coordination processes between firms. 
For example, in the USA, which is a high-power distance society, car manufacturers have 
extensively exploited the ICTs to improve communication and coordination with their first 
tier of suppliers. On the contrary, in low-power distance societies the meaning of 
information and the basis of trust have to be continuously negotiated. Therefore, 
improvements in terms of information processing and transferring do not have any specific 
                                                           
21 In collectivistic societies there is no need to enforce cooperation between individuals. The common interest, in 
fact, prevails over the individual one. In individualistic societies, where the individual interest prevail over the 
collective one,  cooperation has to be enforced through a system rules and authorities.  
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impact on the capacity of the community to create trust. The lack of richness of these types 
of media may reduce the capacity of the community to create mutual trust. Sprintel failed 
not only because of the prevalence of mutual trust within the community, as argued by 
Kumar et.al., but also because of the lack of media richness.  
In this section we have reviewed the main contributions from an over-socialized 
perspective about the roles of ICTs as trust media. In the over-socialized perspective ICTs 
do not improve the capacity of firms to create trust, as opposed to the under-socialized 
view. Trust, in fact, is not simply based on information, but also on culture. Fukuyama 
argues that only high trust societies will be able to internalize the advantages derived from 
the development of computerized information systems. We have argued, however, that the 
prevalence of mutual trust is not sufficient to internalize the advantages of ICTs on its 
own. It is also necessary to focus on the specific nature of trust. We have introduced the 
distinction between high versus low power distance societies. We have argued that the 
automation of the communication process improves the process of trust creation only in 
high-power distance societies. In low-power distance societies, the lack of communication 
richness and interaction, which characterize the new types of media, may restrict the 
efficiency of the process of trust creation.  
2.4.3 Embedded perspective  
In the previous two sections we have reviewed the literature on trust and ICTs 
distinguishing, respectively, between under- and over-socialized perspectives. Under- and 
over-socialized perspectives are at the two opposite extremes of a single continuum. In the 
under-socialized perspective, the wide access to continuously updated information systems 
drastically reduces the cost of lengthy trust building processes based on mutual experience. 
In the over-socialized perspective, on the other hand, the efficiency and effectiveness of 
computerized information systems depend on the trust-characteristics of the community.  
The embedded perspective lies between these two alternatives. It highlights that 
the development of computerized inter-organizational information systems strengthens the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the relationship between firms and, therefore, the 
development of mutual trust between them. However, it also highlights that the 
development of computerized information systems is not sufficient to sustain the 
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development of mutual trust between firms, which has to be supported on the basis of 
continuous and intense face-to-face interaction. Face-to-face interactions are required to 
sustain negotiations and developments of shared understandings and commitments within 
relationships. 
Nohria and Eccless (1992) argue that “network organizations are not the same as 
electronic networks, nor can they be built entirely on them (pag. 289)”. There is no doubt 
that information and communication technologies have played and continue to play a 
prominent role in the emergence of networks of firms. However, scholars that emphasize 
only the technological dimension of these networks share an information processing view 
of the organization, often ignoring its social dimension.  
The social dimension is crucial in networks of firms because the type of 
coordinated action that is required is rarely routine. This type of coordinated action 
requires the ability to operate under conditions of great ambiguity both in terms of purpose 
and means. The main activities characterizing daily life within networks of firms are 
negotiating and sharing the understanding of the context, discovering sources of 
information, selecting partners, developing new norms and rules for further action and 
monitoring progress toward common goals. The development of common inter-
organizational information systems may increase the efficiency of these activities, but their 
effectiveness depends crucially on face-to-face interactions, which are required to reinforce 
social commitments (Nohria and Eccless, 1992).  
Hart and Saunder (1998) focus on the factors supporting the development of 
electronic partnerships based on EDI between customers and suppliers. They focus on the 
interplay between two factors: trust and power. They distinguish between persuasive and 
coercive power. Persuasive power is the use of persuasion to convince counterparts about 
the mutual benefits that derive from jointly investing in EDI. Persuasive power also 
comprises of providing financial and technical support in the development phase or 
negotiating better conditions of access to the network infrastructure. Coercive power is the 
explicit use of bargaining power to impose the adoption of EDI. The contractual power of 
one party over a counterpart depends on the market share and the percentage of the annual 
turnover held by the party and the level of specific investments made within the 
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relationship. The party that makes explicit reference to his or her contractual power in 
order to impose EDI on his or her counterpart is exploiting coercive power. 
Hart and Sounder (1997) argue that the decision to enter an electronic partnership 
is mainly based on power. The decision to extend and continue the electronic partnership 
depends mainly on mutual trust, which is required to reduce the risk derived from sharing 
valuable information between buyers and suppliers. The development of an EDI 
partnership begins with the application of EDI to the order-cycle. It may expand to the 
payment-cycle. It may conclude with co-designing of products. The level of risk involved 
in each of these stages increases. Therefore, mutual trust is required in order to reduce the 
risk perceived.  
Hart and Sounder show that the development of the electronic partnership 
depends on the type of power adopted. Coercive power is negatively correlated with the 
development of the electronic partnership. Persuasive power, on the other hand, is 
positively correlated with the development of mutual trust and indeed with the further 
development of the electronic partnership. It should also be noted that the probability of 
success of an EDI project depends on the type of power adopted. The adoption of 
persuasive power increases the probability of the success of the project, which in turn 
strengthens the relationship of mutual trust between the parties. 
Hart and Saunder (1998) also highlight the positive influence exercised by the 
network firms in deciding to adopt EDI. For instance, the information that a competitor has 
already adopted EDI positively influences the decision of others to invest in EDI. The 
same effect is produced when a potential new customer decides to invest in EDI. The 
influence of the network on the decision to adopt a specific technology or standard is 
known as network externality. The concept of network externality refers to the observation 
that the diffusion of certain technologies, typically networking technologies, does not 
simply depend on the economic value of the technology itself, but also on the number of 
early adopters (Shapiro and Varian, 1999). The typical example is that of the telephone. 
The added value of the telephone does not simply depend on the quality of the service 
provided, but also on the number of people already connected.  
Therefore, the trust that users place on a specific technology does not simply 
depend on their knowledge of that technology, but also on the trust others place on it. Tan 
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and Thoen (2000) use the term commonality trust in order to emphasize the influence of 
others on the decision to trust a specific technology. Therefore, a technology is trusted 
simply because it is trusted by the majority. There are many examples that show the 
relevance of this phenomenon. People trust credit cards not only because they are fully 
conscious of their functionalities, but also because the majority do. 
In this section we have reviewed the embedded perspective on the role of 
information and communication technologies as a media for trust. This perspective 
proposes an intermediary position between under- and over-socialized perspectives. It 
recognizes the positive role played by information and communication technologies in 
sustaining the development of mutual trust within networks of firms. However, it 
emphasizes that information and communication technologies per se are insufficient to 
sustain the development of mutual trust based on personal relationships. Furthermore, the 
embedded perspective also highlights the key role played by the network in influencing the 
individual decision to trust a specific technology or standard. 
2.5 Trust media in open electronic commerce 
In the previous section we focused on the role of information and communication 
technologies as a media for trust. The aim of this section is to review some of the major 
technologies that are used to support trust between transacting parties in open electronic 
commerce. The term open electronic commerce refers to the opportunity to do business 
over digital networks between firms that do not know each other and do not have any 
previous experience of doing business together (Lee, 1999). We refer mainly to the case of 
business-to-business relationships. From this perspective we distinguish between two 
levels of analysis. The first is trust at the data level, which refers to the mechanisms that 
ensure the trustworthiness of the data exchanged between firms. The second is trust at the 
business level, which refers to the technological solutions proposed to prevent and detect 
opportunism and verify firms’ reputations. 
2.5.1 Trust at the data level  
The origin of the concept of trust in the field of information systems can be traced 
back to the problem of ensuring the interchange of strategic information between parties. 
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This problem is not new. The Romans made use of cryptographic techniques to protect the 
confidentiality of strategic messages. The novelty of the problem is linked to the drastic 
reduction in the costs of falsifying identity and manipulating information. The 
trustworthiness of the information exchanged over digital networks has been guaranteed, 
until recently, by global network service providers. With the development of the Internet, 
which is a network of networks, the issue of ensuring the trustworthiness of the 
information exchanged between firms has become a central issue. On the Internet there is 
not a central authority that guaranties the trustworthiness of the information exchanged. On 
the Internet information goes through several independent service providers, which do not 
know each other and, therefore, do not trust each other. This section, therefore, focuses on 
the mechanisms that are implemented to ensure the trustworthiness of information 
exchanged over the Internet. 
Ensuring the trustworthiness of information exchanged over the Internet means 
that the following seven requirements are satisfied: non-repudiation, authentication, 
integrity, confidentiality, uniqueness, time stamping and availability (Ford and Baum, 
1997). The first requirement (non-repudiation) states that both the content of information 
exchanged and the participation in a communication process should be irrefutable. 
Therefore, it should be possible to verify, on the one hand, the identities of the sender and 
receiver (authentication) and, on the other hand, that the information exchanged has not 
been intentionally or unintentionally modified during the transmission (integrity). 
Confidentiality refers to the protection of personal data from unauthorized disclosure and 
access. Uniqueness refers to ensuring the existence of a unique copy of specific 
documents. This requirement is compulsory only in the case of negotiable titles of 
ownership. Time stamping refers to the possibility of verifying the time of submission or 
receipt of a document. This is compulsory only in the case of documents that have to be 
received or sent within a given time and date. Finally, availability requires the guarantee of 
accessibility to a given set of data once the identity and the authorization of the party have 
been verified.  
The most important principle from a business perspective is the one of non-
repudiation. Non-repudiation is required in order to ensure the legal value of business 
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documents. Digital signature provides the solution.22 The digital signature is a data item 
enclosed with the document, which authenticates the identity of the sender and verifies the 
integrity of the document. It is based on an asymmetric algorithm of encryption, which is 
based on two keys: private and public. The sender, in order to generate his digital 
signature, encrypts the original document with his private key. The sender encloses the 
digital signature with the original message. The receiver, in order to verify the identity of 
the sender and the integrity of the document, applies the sender’s public key to the sender’s 
digital signature. The correspondence between the original message and the decrypted 
digital signature authenticate the sender’s identity and the integrity of the document.  
The functionality of the digital signature requires the sharing of information about 
the identity of the public key’s owner. If parties already know each other this operation can 
be easily done, for instance, through face-to-face or phone communication. However, 
between parties that do not know each other this operation becomes far more complex. 
This is not a problem of communication, but a problem of trust. In fact, two parties, who 
do not know each other, and exchange their respective public keys, have no means of 
verifying their respective identities. Therefore, developing a public-key infrastructure, 
which is commonly known as trust infrastructure, has solved this problem. The function of 
this infrastructure is to allow public-key users to verify not only the identity of the 
counterpart, but also the value of their public-key, such as when it was issued and if it is 
still valid. 
The public key infrastructure is a network of trusted relationships between a set of 
parties that provide information relative to the identity and the value of any public key 
(Ford and Baum, 1997). There are two models of public infrastructure: hierarchical-based 
and web-based. The hierarchical system is based on a hierarchy of certification authorities, 
which certify the public keys of their subordinates and users. In the web-based model the 
users directly certify the level of trustworthiness of their counterparts’ public key. The 
functionality of the system resembles the functionality of a network of individuals sharing 
information about their previous experiences of interaction with specific counterparts. 
                                                           
22 The digital signature in itself is not sufficient to validate all the requirements listed in the previous section. 
Additional trusted third parties services are required. These are mainly certification service for the time of 
submission, proof of delivery and uniqueness. Another important service is the one of notary, which plays the 
same function of a real notary. It previously verifies the state of ownership of the properties and than register the 
transaction.    
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Therefore, it is based on the principle of transferability of trust from one relationship to 
another. This system is based on a language that is used to classify each other’s level of 
trustworthiness.  
The major difference between the two systems is in terms of flexibility. In the 
hierarchical system the value of the digital signature is bureaucratically controlled.  
However, the major limitation is that power is centralized. Therefore, if the highest level of 
authority is compromised the trustworthiness of the entire system is corrupted. In the web-
based system each user can rely on others’ experience to develop trusted relationships. The 
major limitation, however, is that users may not share the same understanding of trust. 
Introducing a common standard to classify the level of trustworthiness experienced within 
relationships can solve this problem. 
2.5.2 Trust at the business level 
The recent development of open infrastructure for electronic commerce has triggered 
off a new set of problems linked to trust. It is clear, in fact, that the possibility of validating 
the identity of counterparts and non-repudiating business documents is insufficient to 
foster trust within business transactions. If the opportunity to do business over digital 
networks is limited within a community of familiar business partners there is no need to 
support the development of trust. The reputation of the participant is already known. 
However, if the business context is open to “strangers” than there are problems of 
managing reputation and ensuring the trustworthiness of business transactions. 
Trust at the business level refers to the formalization of mechanisms to support the 
development of trust within transactions. We have highlighted that there are three 
mechanisms that ensure trust within business transactions: structural and procedural 
constraints, standards of selection and control, and insurance-like arrangements.  
These mechanisms are already diffused within the electronic market. The proliferation 
of electronic business transactions between firms has strengthened the value of standards 
that certify the quality and financial trustworthiness of companies, such as ISO 9000. For 
instance, in order to enter the stock market companies are required, every three months, to 
provide a certified financial statement. From this perspective we can distinguish between 
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two categories of standards: public and private. The first are sponsored by public 
institutions, such as ISO. The second are sponsored by single firms, associations between 
firms or private agencies, such as Standards and Poor. In the latter case it is the market that 
determines the trustworthiness of the standard. The reputation of Standards and Poor, for 
instance, depends on its capacity to produce and sell reliable information about the 
reputation of firms and countries. There is no central authority certifying the 
trustworthiness of Standards and Poor. 
The development of the Internet has stimulated the diffusion of reputation systems 
(Resnick et.al. 2000). These are peculiar mechanisms of selection, which are based on the 
collection, distribution and aggregation of feedback about parties’ past behavior. This 
system is based on peer-to-peer reviewing. Each participant in a business transaction 
evaluates the performance of his counterpart. The information collected can be used in 
order to evaluate the trustworthiness of a specific counterpart and decide to do business 
with him or her. Furthermore, it should be noted that reputation systems are not only useful 
in detecting opportunism, but also in preventing it. Parties, knowing that their record of 
past behavior will be the basis of evaluating their trustworthiness in the future, are 
stimulated to behave trustworthily in order to increase the probability and value of future 
transactions. 
The efficiency of reputation systems depends on two factors. The first is that the 
future existence of the reputation system is guaranteed. In fact, if we expect that the system 
will fail in the near future we do not have any incentive to behave trustworthily in the 
present. The second is that the truthfulness and honesty of feedback must be guaranteed. 
For instance, a group of sellers may collaborate to provide false positive feedback about 
each other’s past performance in order to improve their reputation and value in the system. 
Consequently, they can use their false reputations to exploit other participants.  
Another mechanism to sustain trust between transacting parties at the business level is 
the designing of trustworthy trade procedures. The trustworthiness of electronic business 
procedures depends, according to Bons (1997), on the existence of a sufficient number of 
structural and procedural constraints to minimize, ex-ante, the risk of opportunism. Bons 
(1997) has developed a decision support system to audit the trustworthiness of electronic 
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business procedures. The utility of this system is to support designers and users of 
electronic business procedures in validating their trustworthiness. 
This system is based on the assumption that business transactions can be modeled 
as networks of speech-acts between inter-organizational roles, such as buyer and seller.23 
This theory is based on the fundamental observation that words are not only used to make 
claims about the world, but also to change the state of the world (Austin, 1962, Searle, 
1969). The typical example is the one of a priest pronouncing a marriage. The priest that 
marries a couple creates a new legal status. The validation of this state requires a set of 
preconditions to be true, such as the priest has to be entitled to pronounce a marriage.  
Speech-acts are common in the legal world (Dewitz 1992). For instance, a seller 
promising to deliver goods within fifteen days does not simply state that he or she will do 
it, but also that he or she is taking a legal obligation to do it. This means that if the seller 
does not do it, the buyer is legally entitled to seek compensation. Business procedures, 
therefore, can be represented as a network of legal speech-acts between two or more 
organizational roles, such as buyer and seller. Lee, for instance, has developed a formal 
language to model inter-organizational business procedures on a sequence of legal speech-
acts between multiple roles. Bons (1997), on the basis of these languages, has modeled five 
generic principles that, if satisfied, ensure the trustworthiness of business transactions.  
2.6 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to review the literature on trust and the role of 
information and communication technologies as trust-media. We have argued that in the 
literature there is agreement on the definition of trust. Therefore, we have focused on the 
alternative perspectives of trust. We have relied on a categorization proposed by 
Granovetter (1992). This categorization distinguishes between three perspectives: under-
socialized, over-socialized and embedded (see tab. 2.2). Each of these perspectives is 
characterized by a specific assumption on the nature of human rationality. The under-
socialized perspective is based on the assumption of self-interest seeking rationality. 
Therefore, individuals are assumed to behave in order to maximize their own self-interest. 
The over-socialized perspective is based on the assumption of normative rationality. 
                                                                                                                                                   
23 See among other papers available on the Euridis web site (www.euridis.fbk.eur.nl), Lee (1988) and Lee and                                                             
Bons (1996), and Lee (1999). 
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Therefore, individuals behave according to a set of norms and values individually 
internalized, but shared within a community. Finally, the embedded perspective is based on 
the assumption of network rationality. Therefore, there is mutual interdependence between 
individuals’ behavior and the behavior of the network as a whole. 
The distinction between these three assumptions has a major impact on the nature 
and conceptualization of trust within each of the perspectives. In the under-socialized 
perspective trust is based on information and calculation of the risk involved in trusting a 
counterpart. In the over-socialized perspective trust is a positive norm of behavior shared 
between the members of specific communities. In the embedded perspective trust is an 
evolving norm of behavior embedded within specific relationships. Therefore, trust is 
embedded on the basis of specific experiences of interaction between two parties. The 
cohesiveness of the network structure, where a specific relationship is embedded, 
facilitates the circulation of information about parties’ reputation and the socialization of 
common behavior. 
The three perspectives are also characterized by different strategies to sustain 
trust. In the under-socialized perspective, trust has to be enforced through a formal system 
of authorities. The function of this system is to prevent, detect and punish opportunism. In 
the over-socialized perspective, trust is based on the internalization of common norms and 
values. The internalization of these norms and values is based on the socialization within a 
community. In the embedded perspective trust is based on interaction and socialization 
within a network of social relationships. The function of the network is not only to 
stimulate the internalization of existing norms and values, but also to support their creation 
and evolution. 
The role of information and communication technologies as a media for trust also 
differs in each of the perspectives. In the under-socialized perspective, information and 
communication technologies reduce the cost of lengthy trust-building processes based on 
mutual experience. In the over-socialized perspective, trust is a norm of behavior based on 
culture and history. Therefore, information and communication technologies do not have 
any major impact in sustaining the development of mutual trust. The embedded perspective 
recognizes the efficacy and effectiveness of information and communication technologies 
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as a basis for trust. However, it also highlights that these technologies are currently 
insufficient in sustaining the socialization and internalization of common norms and values 
between individuals and firms. 
 
 RATIONALITY TRUST-BASE TRUST-
MECHANISMS 
THE ROLE OF ICT 
UNDER-
SOCIALIZED 
Self-interest 
seeking 
rationality 
Information and 
calculation of risk 
involved 
Formal rules and 
authorities to 
prevent, detect 
and punish 
opportunistic 
behavior  
Substitutes for length trust 
building process based on 
mutual experience  
OVER-SOCIALIZED Normative 
rationality  
Shared norms and 
values 
Internalization of 
common norms 
and values 
The impact of ICT depends 
on trust character of the 
community 
EMBEDDED Network 
Rationality  
Experience of 
interaction 
embedded with 
networks of social 
relationships 
Internalization 
and socialization 
of common norms 
and values within 
network social 
relationships 
ICTs improve the efficiency 
and effectiveness the process 
of trust creation, but are not 
sufficient to sustain the 
socialization and 
internalization of common 
norms and values within a 
community. 
Tab. 2.2 Summary of the main points of this chapter. 
 
                                                                                       
  
 3 THE PROCESS OF TRUST CREATION: THEORY 
DEVELOPMENT  
The first chapter focused on the problem of sustaining the creation of trust 
between local and global systems. Local and global have been defined in terms of 
cognitive distance between “places”. We distinguished between tacit and codified 
knowledge. Local was defined as the place where knowledge is mainly shared on a tacit 
basis. Global was defined as the place where knowledge is mainly shared on the basis of an 
explicit exchange of information. Solving the problem of sustaining the creation of trust 
between these two dimensions requires the understanding of how trust is created. The aim 
of this chapter is twofold. The first is to develop a model of the process of trust creation. 
The second is to interpret this model with respect to the case of the interaction between 
local and global. 
The starting point for our model of trust creation is the theory of knowledge 
creation proposed by Nonaka and his group. Nonaka’s theory, as we shall see, is based on 
the distinction between tacit and codified knowledge (Nonaka, 1993; Nonaka and 
Takeuchi, 1995; Nonaka and Konno, 1998). From this perspective, Nonaka argues that 
knowledge is the product of the interaction between tacit and codified components of 
knowledge. The capacity of an organization to create knowledge depends on the nature and 
structure of the process of interaction between these two sources of knowledge and, 
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therefore, between inside and outside. Inside and outside can be defined only in relative 
terms. Inside can refer to a single individual and the outside to his or her team. Inside can 
refer to a team and outside to the organizational context where the team is embedded. 
Inside can be a single firm and outside its relative network of firms. Inside can be a 
network of firms and outside the industry where this network is embedded.  
Nonaka argues that the process of knowledge creation is structured into four 
phases: socialization, externalization, combination and internalization. Socialization takes 
place inside. It refers to the process though which knowledge is socialized within a specific 
context. Combination takes place outside. It refers to the process though which different 
sources of codified knowledge are integrated and combined together. Externalization and 
internalization take place between inside and outside. Externalization refers to the process 
through which tacit knowledge is converted into codified knowledge and “exported” 
outside. Internalization, on the other hand, refers to the process through which codified 
knowledge is “imported” from outside and converted into tacit knowledge, which is 
appropriable within the organization. 
We aim to show that trust is a specific form of knowledge. Therefore, trust is the 
product of the interaction between tacit components, which are embedded within a specific 
context, and codified components, which are embedded within shared mental or physical 
artifacts. Therefore, the capacity of a system to create trust between inside and outside 
depends on the structure of the interface between these two dimensions. 
3.1 The process of knowledge creation 
The theory of knowledge creation is based on a constructivist approach (Nonaka 
and Takeuchi, 1995; Troilo, 2001). This approach contrasts with the rationalistic one. The 
rationalistic approach argues that true knowledge is only that which abstracts from the 
value of personal, social or cultural beliefs. It is based on the assumption that there is an 
objective truth (reality) against which the value of our beliefs (knowledge) can be 
measured. The constructivist approach, on the contrary, is based on the assumption that 
reality is in itself a social construction. It does not exist as an objective reality, which 
abstracts from individual and collective perceptions. Our perception of reality is influenced 
by pre-existing assumptions/beliefs embedded in the background (Winograd and Flores, 
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1986). Therefore, the truthfulness of knowledge can not be completely separated from its 
specific background context.  
The constructivist approach is based on the distinction between tacit knowledge, 
which is embedded within our individual or collective background, and codified 
knowledge, which is shared between contexts (see table 3.1) (Polanyi, 1962). The value of 
codified knowledge abstracts from the specificities of any context. Therefore, it is 
commonly and globally accepted. We can distinguish between different degrees of 
tacitness. Tacit knowledge can be routed on the value of personal beliefs and experiences 
(tacit knowledge). It can be embedded within systems of beliefs characterizing specific 
networks of interpersonal relationships (embedded knowledge). It can be based on systems 
of beliefs characterizing the members of specific communities (en-cultured knowledge). 
 
Tacit Knowledge 
(Subjective) 
Codified Knowledge 
(Objective) 
Knowledge of experience  
(Body) 
Knowledge of rationality/code 
(Mind) 
Simultaneous knowledge 
(Here and now) 
Sequential knowledge 
(There and then) 
Analog knowledge 
(Practice) 
Digital Knowledge 
(Theory) 
Table 3.1: Tacit versus Explicit knowledge (Adapted from Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995) 
 
The distinction between embedded and en-cultured knowledge is tied to the fact 
that the value of the first is embedded on specific relationships between a number of 
parties, whereas the value of the second is shared by community members. En-cultured 
knowledge, therefore, does not depend on the specific identity of the parties, but only on 
their affiliation. 
Tacit and codified knowledge are characterized by different degrees of 
transferability. Tacit knowledge is transferable only within the specific context where it 
has been created. Embedded knowledge, for instance, is transferable only within the 
specific network of interpersonal relationships where the value of the background 
assumptions is already shared. En-cultured knowledge, on the other hand, can be 
transferred only between members of a specific community. Codified knowledge, on the 
contrary, is globally accessible. Its value, in fact, is based on a set of explicit assumptions, 
which are commonly accepted independently form the specific membership of the parties. 
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Nonaka argues that the capacity of a firm to create value is tied to its capacity to 
transform the potential value of knowledge embedded inside the firm into external value, 
which is appropriable outside of the firm itself. Therefore, firms, in order to create value, 
are required to codify their embedded knowledge in a format that is appropriable outside of 
the firm. However, the capacity to translate internal value, which is embedded within the 
firm, into external value requires internalizing that part of the knowledge that is necessary 
to make that value explicit.  
For instance, the value of a mobile phone is tied to the existence of a common 
communication standard, which is diffused. A firm creating an innovative mobile phone, 
which does not comply with the standard, will not be able to internalize the value 
associated with that specific knowledge. In order to internalize the value associated with 
the new product, firstly the firm has to internalize the knowledge of the standard, which is 
located outside, and then design the new product according to the rules of the standard. 
The firm can take the risk of developing a new non-standard product (radical innovation), 
but it also has to bear the costs associated with the diffusion of the newly developed 
standard. However, if the newly developed standard is diffused the firm will realize higher 
profits than if it simply conformed to the existing standard, such as in the case of Microsoft 
(Shapiro and Varian, 1999).  
Therefore, there is a trade-off between openness and control (Shapiro and Varian, 
1999). The profits deriving from the diffusion of an open standard are shared between the 
sponsors of that standard according to their respective market shares. The profits deriving 
from the diffusion of a proprietary standard, on the contrary, are fully internalized by the 
firm that controls the standard. Therefore, a firm that wants to support the diffusion of a 
new standard has to decide between opening the standard to its competitors or controlling 
it directly. In the first case the firm aims to minimize the risk associated with the diffusion 
of the new standard. In the second case the firm aims to maximize its own profits. 
The process of knowledge creation, according to Nonaka, is structured in four 
phases: socialization, externalization, combination and internalization. Socialization takes 
place inside a team, firm or community. It is based on the direct interaction and 
cooperation between affiliates. Members, through their daily experience of being together, 
develop common perspectives about the world and common cooperative routines/behavior. 
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The key question is who should be allowed access to the standard. Linus Torvalds, in order 
to socialize his business idea, has “opened source” his first release of Linux to anyone who 
wants to contribute to its further development. He did not realize any profit out of his 
business idea, but he gained a reputation that enabled him to offer consultancy to firms. 
The process of combination takes place outside. In this phase different standards 
and technologies are integrated to strengthen compatibility between contexts, which are 
characterized by different technologies and standards. The outcome of this phase is the 
development of a new standard, which should abstract and integrate the specificities of any 
single standard. EDIFACT, which is a common standard in exchanging electronic business 
documents between firms, aims to develop a universal standard that will integrate the 
specificities and practices of each country and firm. The aim is to reduce switching costs 
and, therefore, the costs of integration between firms. 
Externalization and internalization take place between inside and outside. The 
process of externalization refers to how knowledge is exported from inside to outside. For 
instance, a firm may incorporate its knowledge within a product or it may simply provide a 
set of guidelines to develop a new product. Microsoft, for instance, incorporates its 
knowledge within software packages. Sun Microsystems, on the other hand, sells its Jini 
technology to a “gated community” of developers (Sawhney and Prandelli, 2000). Jini is a 
network standard that allows computers and other devices like televisions and printers to 
“federate” into a single distributed system. Sun invented the standard, but “closed 
sourced”, within a closed community, the development of its potential applications. 
Therefore, Sun controls the standard and compatibility between applications. However, it 
has “closed sourced” the development of applications to reduce costs and stimulate 
innovations on the application side. 
The process of internalization refers to how knowledge is imported from outside. 
For instance, a firm may incorporate knowledge through the acquisition of a new 
production machine or, alternatively, acquire the intellectual, human and social capital 
necessary to internally produce that machine. The two solutions differ in terms of 
flexibility. In the first case the firm has acquired a closed package of functionalities, which 
is hard to modify and adapt to the specific requirements of firms. It is the firm that has to 
adapt to the new technology and not vice versa. In the second case the company can fully 
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adapt that technology to firms’ requirements. Between these two extremes there are a 
number of alternative ways to structure the process of internalization between inside and 
outside. Knowledge can be internalized in the form of a modular package, which can be 
configured according to specific clients’ requirements. The development of that knowledge 
can be outsourced to a community of partners that can also sell on that knowledge to other 
parties. 
In this section we have reviewed the theory of knowledge creation proposed by 
Nonaka and his group. Figure 3.1 shows that the outcome of the process of knowledge 
creation is a spiral. Knowledge is the product of social interaction between individuals, 
firms, communities and so forth. In this process knowledge is converted from tacit to 
explicit and back to tacit again. This process is structured in four phases: socialization 
(from tacit to tacit), externalization (from tacit to explicit), combination (from explicit to 
explicit) and internalization. Socialization takes place mainly inside a team, firm or 
community. It is based on the direct self-involvement of the participants. Combination 
takes place outside. It is based on the integration of different components of codified 
knowledge. This integration is based on common codified standards, which abstract from 
the specificities of any local standards. 
Externalization and internalization take place between inside and outside. 
Externalization is the process through which inside knowledge is converted into codified 
knowledge, which is exportable outside. This phase is based on dialogic reasoning between 
team-members. Team-members negotiate the meaning of their experiences and translate 
them into codes, which is appropriable outside the team itself. Internalization is the process 
through which knowledge is converted into tacit knowledge, which is appropriable inside 
the system. This process is based on learning by doing. Team-members, through 
experience, develop a set of compatible practices, which are adapted to the new knowledge 
imported within the system. The capacity of a system to import, export and create 
knowledge depends on the specific structure of the interaction between inside and outside. 
The goal is to balance aperture and closure or, in other words, tacitness and codification in 
such a way that the system is able to learn from outside, but to maintain its specific 
characteristics. 
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Fig.3.1.: The process of knowledge creation (Nonaka and Konno, 1998). 
3.2 The model of trust creation 
In the previous section we introduced the theory of knowledge creation. In this 
section we show that trust is the product of a process of knowledge creation. Trust and 
knowledge are both based on beliefs. The two concepts differ mainly in terms of degree of 
certainty that we, as individual and society, assign to the value of these beliefs. We claim 
to know something, if we believe the we have enough evidences for the truthfulness of that 
something. We claim to trust something, if we expect (justified beliefs) that something to 
be true, but we do not have enough evidences for its truthfulness. Trust and knowledge, 
therefore, can be conceptualized as part of a single process of learning/knowledge creation, 
through which we create our beliefs about society.24  
Trust can also be divided into tacit and codified. Tacit trust is embedded within 
the background history of individuals, relationships or communities. The over-socialized 
                                                                                                                                                   
24 See Luhmann (1979). 
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perspective shows that trust is an internalized norm within a community. Trust is tacit 
because its value is based on the background history of a community. The embedded 
perspective argues that trust is a specific norm that develops within relationships and 
networks of interpersonal ties. Trust, from this perspective, is tacit because it is embedded 
in the background interaction between members of specific networks.  
There are different degrees of tacitness. In the over-socialized perspective trust is 
en-cultured. The basis of trust is affiliation. The value of trust does not depend on specific 
relationships or cohesiveness of the network. It is the standard basis of trust that is shared 
between two generic members of a specific community. In the embedded perspective, 
however, the value of trust depends on specific relationships and cohesiveness of the 
network structure. The identity of the members involved adds value to the generic base of 
trust that is normally shared between community members. 
Codified trust is integrated within formal rules governing interaction between 
parties, who may or may not belong to the same community. In the under-socialized 
perspective trust is based on self-interest. Therefore, individuals trust each other if they 
believe that it will be profitable for themselves and their counterparts. In order to structure 
trust and cooperation between individuals, institutions define a set of rules that should 
govern the interaction between members playing a certain role within the organization or 
in the society. The value of codified trust is not associated with the specific context or the 
identities of the parties involved, but it is based on the specific assumptions made on the 
nature and characteristics of the organizational roles involved. The value of codified trust 
has to be enforced. Institutions, in order to enforce the value of trust, define a set of 
penalties for those who do not behave as expected and design control systems to monitor 
trustworthiness and opportunism. 
Trust is created in four phases: socialization, externalization, combination and 
internalization.  
Socialization takes place inside a group or community. It is based on the direct 
interaction between members. The embedded perspective argues that it is the direct and 
interpersonal experience within a network or community that stimulates the formation and 
reproduction of norms and values. Individuals’ social capacity, however, is limited. 
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Therefore, the process of socialization is effective only within small groups or 
communities. When the number of members belonging to a community becomes too large, 
or there are numerous encounters between members of different communities, trust has to 
be codified. It must be converted into a set of impersonal rules.  
Zucker (1986) argues that the development of impersonal or institutional trust in 
the USA took off as a consequence of the mobility generated by the economic crisis of 
1929. Before then, US society was organized on the basis of “cultural clusters”, such as 
Chinatown and Little Italy. Even at the macro-level there were ethnic majorities in each 
state. This mobility produced a dramatic increase in the number of encounters between 
“strangers”. Therefore, communities were no longer sufficient to govern trust. This gave a 
stimulus for the development of a set of common and codified institutions and rules for 
governing trust between strangers.25 
Combination takes place outside the team or community. In this phase different 
standards of trust are combined and integrated to support cooperation between 
communities. This phase produces new standards, which should be abstracted and 
integrated into the specificities that are embedded within each local system. The European 
Union is an example of an integrator. Its function is to develop common standards and 
rules to support the interaction and cooperation between member states. Another example 
is the European Central Bank, which governs the value of the Euro. This integration can 
take place at different levels of abstraction. For instance, the national government 
integrates the activities of single regions and so forth. 
                                                           
25 It should be noted that Putnam (1995) highlights the unintended effects deriving from the institutionalization of 
trust within USA society. He shows that the institutionalization of trust has reduced the capacity of USA society 
to sustain the development of networks of social and civic engagements. In order to support his argument Putnam 
provides a number of statistics, which show the reduction in the number of USA citizens participating to local 
associations. He shows, for instance, that the number of citizen voting, which represents the basic element of 
civic engagement in modern society, has drastically reduced in the last quarter of the last century. Furthermore, he 
also highlights the progressive professionalization of the so called third sector as undermining the foundation of 
civic engagement. Members of these associations do not actively engage on and participate to the life of these 
associations. They simply send a check on an annual basis. Therefore, these associations do not play anymore the 
role of incubators for the creation of social networks of trust between citizens. The argument of Putnam is similar 
to the one of Giddens (1990). Giddens argues that the development of modern society has been characterized by 
the progressive rationalization and professionalization of trust. The progressive diffusion of these trust 
mechanisms has produced, on the one hand, a progressive reduction of the social distance between parties located 
into different palaces/social contexts, but, on the other hand, a progressive increment of the social distance 
between parties located into the same place.  
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Externalization and internalization take place between inside and outside. 
Externalization is the process through which local trust, which is embedded within a 
specific community, is exported outside the community. This process can be organized in 
different ways. The local basis of trust can be packaged within a product that has certain 
qualitative characteristics directly observable outside the system. For instance, a brand 
name enables a firm to differentiate its products from those of its competitors. Therefore, 
brand names are a system that enables clients to recognize and share experiences about the 
quality of a certain product.  
The value of the local basis of trust can be certified according to specific 
standards, which are accepted as a symbol of trust within the global system. For instance, 
the ISO 9000 standard certifies the quality of the internal processes within an organization. 
Therefore, a firm that provides an ISO 9000 certificate shows to its counterparts that its 
internal processes comply with the requirements of the standard. The guarantor for the 
value of this certificate is a trusted third party. The reputation of the third party adds value 
to the certificate itself. For instance, it makes a difference if we know that the certificate 
has been issued, for example, by Deloitte or Price Waterhouse Cooper rather than by an 
unknown consultancy firm. The reputations of Deloitte and Price are well known and, 
therefore, the quality of their standards is also known.  
Internalization refers to the process through which global and codified standards 
of trust are imported and converted into local practices. The question is how is it possible 
to make sure that the rules that are codified within a standard of trust are converted into 
appropriate behavior that conforms to the standard.  
3.3 Governing trust between local and global systems 
In the previous section we develop a model of trust creation. This model is based 
on the idea that trust is a kind of social knowledge. The creation of trust is based on the 
conversion of local practices of trust into codified standards of trust and, vice versa, the 
conversion of codified standards of trust into local practices. The key question, from this 
perspective, is how it is possible to sustain the development of this process. In the first 
chapter we argue that sustainability cannot be achieved through standardization, but only 
through the creation of compatibility between local practices and global standards of trust. 
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The goal, from this perspective, is to design an infrastructure that sustains the capacity of 
local systems to mutually learn from each other. In order to further develop this idea is 
useful to rely on Boisot’s conceptualization of codification and abstraction (Boisot, 1995, 
1998).  
Codification is the process through which the instances of a certain phenomenon 
are mapped into a number of categories, which are representatives of the phenomenon 
itself. For instance, the quality of a specific vegetable can be measured in terms of weight, 
size, color, shape and so forth. Abstraction, instead, is the process through which the 
number of these categories is reduced to a minimum. In the case of the vegetable for 
instance, size and weight are strongly correlated. Therefore, we may consider only one of 
these two categories in our definition of the vegetable’s quality.  
The process of codification, from this perspective, is mainly the product of the 
accumulation of experiences. Decision-makers, every time they are faced with a new 
instance of a specific phenomenon, create a new category representing that specific 
instance. Proliferation in the number of categories associated to a given phenomenon, 
however, increases the complexity of the decision-making process. The difference between 
categories, for instance, may become fuzzy. Therefore, the categorization is not anymore 
useful to decide, for instance, whether or not a vegetable is of good or bad quality. The 
process of abstraction, differently, is mainly a mental process. It acts on existing categories 
and it aims to reduce them to a number that is feasible to process for the decision-maker. 
The process of codification and abstraction has a major advantage. It reduces the 
costs associated to the elaboration of data and information. However, there is also a price 
to pay. Reducing the number of categories results in the reduction of the capacity to 
perceive the complexity of reality. The same argument applies to trust. Decision makers, 
for instance, may decide to use only two or three categories to evaluate the trustworthiness 
of counterparts. This simplifies enormously the process of decision-making. However, it 
reduces the capacity to learn from experience. If the counterpart does not satisfy the two 
decision-maker’s requirements, the decision-maker will never have the opportunity to learn 
whether or not the counterpart was really trustworthy because he will not have the 
opportunity to interact with him.  
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Therefore, there is a trade off between codification/abstraction and de-
codification/concreteness. This trade off depends on two factors: the cost of processing 
information and the cost of missed opportunities. If the decision-maker restricts too much 
the number of categories that he or she applies to evaluate counterparts’ trustworthiness, it 
might result in a situation where none of them does satisfy these requirements. Therefore, 
he or she does not have any opportunity to interact with others and establish trusted 
relationships.26 On the other hand, if the decision-maker enlarges to much the number of 
categories, he or she might be incapable in deciding whether counterparts are trustworthy. 
From this perspective, it is likelihood that the cost of opportunism, as consequence of 
adverse selection, is going to be high. 
The only way out from this trade off, as we shall see in the case of loosely 
coupling systems (chapter 8), is to create a network of local integrators, which are 
embedded into specific social contexts/communities. The major advantage of this solution 
is that enable decision-makers to save on the number of categories necessary to evaluate 
the trustworthiness of parties embedded within specific local systems. Local integrators, in 
fact, will use their experience of embeddedness to cover the distance between the abstract 
code adopted and the reality of the context of interaction. The sustainability of this model 
depends on two conditions. The first is that there should be competition between local 
integrators embedded in a community. The lack of competition, in fact, may stimulate 
local integrators to opportunistically exploit the loose specification of the global standard 
of trust. The second is that there should be a transnational organization between local 
integrators devoted to the codification of local experiences and rationalization of standards. 
The transnational network between local integrators, in other words, should be able to 
learn from local experiences of trust and opportunism in order to sustain the development 
of the code adopted to shared and transfer trust between communities. 
3.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have proposed a model of the process of trust creation. This 
model is based on the assumption that trust is a specific form of knowledge and, therefore, 
the product of a process of knowledge creation. From this perspective we have shown that 
                                                           
26 See also Luhmann (1979) 
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trust can be categorized into tacit and explicit. Furthermore, we have also shown that trust 
evolves as a consequence of four phases: socialization, externalization, combination and 
internalization. The capacity of creating trust between local and global is dependent upon 
the specific level of codification chosen to integrate the two systems. In the next section 
we will analyze five case studies of integration between local and global systems of trust, 
so that we can better understand what alternative solutions are available. 
  .
PART II  
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
THE CREATION OF TRUST BETWEEN LOCAL AND 
GLOBAL SYSTEMS: THE CASE OF ITALIAN INDUSTRIAL 
DISTRICTS

 4 THE CREATION OF TRUST BETWEEN LOCAL AND 
GLOBAL SYSTEMS: INTRODUCTION TO THE EMPIRICAL 
ANALYSIS 
In the first part of this thesis we developed a model of trust creation between local 
and global systems. This model makes a distinction between four phases: socialization, 
externalization, combination and internalization. We argued that local trust is created on 
the basis of socialization and internalization of common norms, values and experiences 
between members. Global trust is based on the externalization and combination of 
common rules and codes, which are appropriable by non-members. We argued that the 
sustainability of the model of trust creation between local and global systems depends on 
the level of coupling between local and global processes of trust creation. The higher the 
degree of decoupling between these two processes the more local and global systems are 
mutually inaccessible. The higher the degree of coupling between these processes the more 
local systems tend to lose their identities and conform to global standards. 
This second part of the thesis has two major aims. The first is to explore what are 
the alternative models of interfacing local and global creation of trust. The second is to 
evaluate their relative sustainability. In order to achieve these two aims we have developed 
five case studies of Italian industrial districts. Industrial districts, as we explained in the 
first chapter, are geographically collocated communities of individuals and firms sharing a 
INTRODUCTION TO THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 98
common industrial specialization. The local creation of trust, as we shall see, is based on 
socialization between community-members. The result of this process is personal 
reputation. The value of this reputation, however, is embedded within the local network of 
social relationships between members of the industrial district. Therefore, the question is 
how the local base of trust, which is embedded in the local system, is translated into codes, 
which are appropriable in the global system, and, vice versa, how these codes are 
translated into norms and values that are locally appropriable. 
This second part of the thesis is structured in four chapters. The next chapter 
analyses the process of trust creation within Italian industrial districts. It is structured in 
two parts. The first part provides a brief review of the literature on industrial districts and 
local production systems. We show that trust is an enabling factor for the development of 
industrial districts. The second part of this chapter is devoted to the analysis of the process 
of trust creation within industrial districts. We show that trust is rooted on a set of 
cooperative norms and values, which are historically inherited within a community. The 
reproduction of trust within industrial districts is based on competition. The structure of the 
local market, in fact, stimulates personal investments in reputation and mutual trust. We 
conclude by arguing that the value of local reputation is attached to the collective 
experience of interaction within the district. Therefore, it is not exportable outside the local 
system. 
In the following three chapters we address the case studies. Each chapter refers to 
a specific model of trust creation between local and global systems. Chapter 6 addresses 
the de-coupling model of trust creation. This model, as we shall see, is based on the 
complete separation between local and global processes of trust creation. The creation of 
trust between local and global systems is entrusted to a small number of large companies. 
Chapter 7 refers to the coupling model. This model is based on the local adoption of global 
standards of trust. The common community membership, therefore, no longer sustains the 
mutual identification and cooperation between members. Each member of these 
communities competes on their own within a global system. Chapter 8 refers to the loosely 
coupling model. This model is based on the loose integration between local and global 
creations of trust. The translation of trust between local and global is entrusted to a large 
number of small- and medium-sized firms, which compete on their capacity to sustain the 
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interaction and the mutual accessibility between the local and the global systems. This 
model is based on the local adoption of global standards of trust. However, the adoption of 
these standards is interpreted as an opportunity to consolidate existing relationships of 
mutual trust between local firms. Table 4.1 provides a map of the case studies discussed in 
each of the chapter. 
Chapter Model Case studies 
Chapter 6 De-coupling Benetton system 
The eyewear district 
Chapter 7 Coupling Fiat 
Chapter 8 Loosely coupling The district of packaging 
The footwear district of Riviera del Brenta.  
Tab. 4.1 Map of the case studies chapters 
 
  
5 THE LOCAL CREATION OF TRUST 
In our model of trust creation between local and global systems we distinguish 
between two processes of trust creation: local and global. The objective of this chapter is to 
analyze the local process of trust creation in industrial districts. This chapter is structured 
in two parts. The first part reviews the literature on industrial districts and local production 
systems. We show that trust is an enabling factor in the development of industrial districts. 
The second part is devoted to the analysis of how trust is created and reproduced within 
local production systems. We show that trust is rooted on a set of cooperative norms and 
values, which are historically inherited. However, the socialization and internalization of 
trust within local systems is based on competition. The specific structure of the local 
market, in fact, stimulates its members to invest in mutual trust in order to gain reputation 
within the local system. The value of this reputation is attached to the collective experience 
of interaction in the local network. Therefore, it is not exportable outside local systems.  
5.1 The concept of industrial districts 
The term “industrial district” was coined by the English economist, Marshal 
(1920), in order to characterize geographical clusters of a large number of small- and 
medium-sized enterprises belonging to a common industry. These firms cooperate on a 
temporary basis to satisfy the requirements of specific clients. This model, according to 
Marshall, is an alternative to the accumulation of knowledge and capital under a small 
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number of large and vertically integrated corporations. There are two conditions that 
enable the development of industrial districts. The first is the possibility of technically 
decomposing the production process into activities that can be performed autonomously in 
small-scale production plants. The second is a peculiar atmosphere of mutual trust between 
the members of an industrial district. The prevalence of mutual trust between them is 
necessary in order to reduce the costs of integration and cooperation between independent 
local firms.  
The work of Piore and Sabel (1984) focuses mainly on the technical dimension of 
an industrial district. They explain that the renewed competitiveness of flexible forms of 
production based on networking between firms, such as an industrial district, is mainly a 
consequence of the development of flexible forms of automation. The development of 
these machines, in fact, allows for the opportunity to technically decompose the production 
process into a number of autonomous activities, which can be carried out within small-
scale firms or teams. Furthermore, the development of information and communication 
technologies reduces the costs of coordination and control between firms or teams (see also 
Ciborra, 1993).  
The recent literature, however, has mainly focused on the social dimension of 
industrial districts. We can distinguish between three major schools of thought (Bramanti 
and Maggioni, 1997). The first school, known as milieu innovateur, focuses on how the 
structure of the social context, defined as a network of relationships between firms and 
individuals, influences the individual and collective innovative capacity of firms 
(Camagni, 1991). This perspective is proposed by the GERMI group (Groupe de 
Recherche Eropeen sur les Milieux Innovateurs). It is based on the concept of milieu. A 
milieu is a system of territorial relationships between different social actors forming both a 
complete production system and a community of individuals. The strong interdependence 
between market and community enables the development of a market where not only 
prices and quantities are exchanged, but also information, codes, languages and routines 
(best practices). 
The second perspective, which we can call the Italian school, is mainly based on 
the theory of knowledge creation (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). The local system is 
defined as a local cognitive network between firms, which share specific languages, norms 
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and values (Becattini and Rullani, 1993; Rullani, 1997; Albertini, Pilotti, 1996). The 
efficiency and effectiveness of being locally embedded is associated with the reduction in 
costs of socializing and internalizing experiences. The competitiveness of local systems is 
tied with the capacity of balancing local experiences and global accessibility. The 
competitiveness of the local system depends on the presence of a large number of 
integrators or meta-organizers, which are able, on the one hand, to transform their 
experiences in the local system into products, services and codes that are appropriable in 
the global market and, on the other hand, to transform codified knowledge, which is useful 
for the development of the local system, into local experiences and practices (Becattini and 
Rullani, 1993; Albertini and Pilotti, 1996).  
The third perspective, known as the Californian school, is based on the theory of 
transaction costs. The efficiency and effectiveness of local production systems depends on 
the existence of “un-traded independences”. These are resources genetically tied to a 
specific location, such as the labor market and historically consolidated routines of 
coordination and cooperation between firms. These interdependencies can not be exported 
and traded. The accessibility to these resources, therefore, depends on being embedded 
within a specific social and cultural context.  
These three perspectives, despite their differences, have many common aspects. 
The first commonality is that they all recognize the strategic relevance of the local 
dimension. The spatial proximity between individuals and firms facilitates the socialization 
of experience and the development of common practices and routines between firms. The 
value of these routines is not completely transferable because it is strongly tied to the 
specific cultural and social experiences shared between parties.  
The second aspect is that they share a common conceptualization of space as a 
network of social and personal relationships between individuals and firms. The possibility 
of sharing experiences, routines and practices is not primarily dependent on the physical 
proximity between parties, but mainly on their social and cultural proximity. Physical 
proximity, however, may facilitate the development of mutual knowledge and relationships 
between individuals and firms.  
The third aspect is that all three perspectives recognize the role of spatial 
proximity, local public institutions and associations made between companies in sustaining 
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the cooperation between local firms. The role of these institutions and associations is to 
provide common services and to sustain the development of common policies between 
companies.  
Finally, these three perspectives agree on the idea that the sustainable 
development of local production systems is tied to the interdependence and interaction 
between local and global dimensions. Grabher (1992) argues that too little embeddedness 
may expose the local production system to the erosion of the supportive network of 
relationships between firms. Too much embeddedness, however, may promote the 
petrification of this network and, hence, hinder its capacity to produce and adopt radical 
innovations. 
5.2 The foundation of trust within industrial districts  
In the previous section we argued that a peculiar atmosphere of mutual trust 
between the members of an industrial district is a fundamental factor characterizing this 
specific model of production. The question, however, is how trust is created and renovated 
within industrial districts. There are two major factors that contribute to sustaining the 
creation of trust within an industrial district: culture and reputation. The objective of this 
section is to investigate the cultural dimension of trust within Italian industrial districts.  
Italian districts are not homogenously distributed over Italian territory. They are 
mainly clustered in the North East and Central parts of Italy, which is commonly known as 
Third Italy. This region of Italy, according to the sociologist Putnam (1993a; Putnam et.al. 
1993; Fukuyama, 1995), is endowed with a high level of social capital. Putnam argues that 
the origin of social capital in this region can be traced back to the tradition of civic 
community in the Middle Ages. In fact, most of the cities located in Third Italy developed 
an innovative model of governance, as an alternative to the feudalistic one, based on 
voluntary associations between citizens. These associations had a different scope, such as 
neighbors’ associations and craftsmen and tradesmen guilds and so forth, but a common 
purpose: protecting common interests and sustaining mutual cooperation between 
members.  
Putnam, in order to support his argument, shows that most striking institutional 
innovations of the Middle Ages, which required an abundant level of mutual trust between 
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citizens, originated in Third Italy. The first example is the institution of credit. The 
etymology of the term credit is credere, which in Italian means to believe. Another 
example is the institution of contracting. The introduction of these innovations has enabled 
these communities to extend their commerce far beyond their geographical boundaries. For 
example, the Venetian Republic was mainly an economic and not a territorial empire. For 
instance, the Venetian merchant, Marco Polo, traveled to China and in so doing opened up 
the “silk route”. As a result of developing commerce, the welfare of these communities 
increased and, consequently, the basis for mutual trust was consolidated.  
Associations still play an important role in sustaining the development of trust 
within industrial districts. In the textile district of Prato, for instance, artisan and industrial 
associations, together with the local municipality, negotiate a fair price for subcontracting. 
This agreement does not have any legal value. However, the names of companies found in 
violation of the agreement are made public. The function of this agreement is not to 
regulate the local market, but to shift local competition from price to quality. Furthermore, 
local associations and public institutions directly support the formation of consortia 
between firms to stimulate the diffusion of innovations, quality and the accessibility to 
financial resources. 
5.3 The socialization and internalization of trust within industrial districts 
In the previous section we investigated the cultural dimension of trust in industrial 
districts. The argument of culture, however, is not sufficient to explain cooperation 
between firms within industrial districts. Culture provides only generic information about 
the potential behavior of a counterpart within a district. In the case of complex and specific 
transactions knowing that the counterpart is, on average, reliable is not sufficient alone. 
Specific knowledge about his or her competencies and attitudes is required in order to 
make sure that the transactions will be completed successfully. The objective of this 
section, therefore, is to investigate how trust is established and developed within industrial 
districts. 
The socialization of trust within districts is the product of competition between 
members. This competition takes place within a closed context, where members know each 
other. Members, from this perspective, are stimulated to invest in mutual trust in order to 
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gain reputation in the community. Furthermore, the cost of behaving opportunistically 
within the community is not limited to a single relationship, but spans along the local 
network (Dei Ottanti, 1995; 1996).  
In industrial districts there are two major strategies that are usually applied to 
stimulate individuals’ investment in reputation. The first is the strategy of dual sourcing. In 
a district we can distinguish between two major categories of firms: commercial and 
manufacturing. The first specializes in the marketing of the product. The second 
specializes in the different phases of the supply chain. Therefore, the first contracts out a 
large part of its production to local networks of specialized firms. Commercial firms have 
two categories of subcontractors: long-term and short-term. Long-term subcontractors have 
a long history of cooperation with the firm. Short-term subcontractors are used to absorb 
potential peaks of demand or low quality productions. This strategy of contracting has two 
major advantages. The first is the possibility of comparing the performance of each 
supplier in the network. The second is to stimulate competition between alternative sources 
of supply. The suppliers belonging to the first category are stimulated to invest in 
reputation in order to maintain their privileged status. The suppliers belonging to the 
second category, on the other hand, are stimulated to invest in reputation in order to 
improve their status. The capacity of commercial firms to attract local suppliers, on the 
other hand, depends on their capacity to market the final product and, therefore, on their 
reputation in the global market. It follows that each member of the district is stimulated to 
invest in reputation in order to maintain or acquire status in the local system.  
The second is the strategic management of financial credit. These two strategies 
are strongly inter-linked. Gaining access to lines of credit is one of the main problems for 
most of the firms in the district because they are mainly of small- and medium-scale. In 
order to solve this problem industrial districts have developed a complex financial system, 
based on the development of chains of credit. These chains of credit function as follows. 
The local banks open lines of credit to local commercial firms. These lines of credit exceed 
the needs of these firms. Therefore, local commercial firms finance their leading suppliers 
with this excess. There are two major reasons for this. The first is to buy the loyalty of 
their suppliers and subcontractors. The second is to acquire better information about the 
quality of their investments. The suppliers, on the other hand, are stimulated to reciprocate 
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trust and invest in reputation in order to ensure themselves of the future accessibility to 
lines of credits.  
Local banks, on the other hand, have two major reasons for according excessive 
credit to local commercial firms. The first is that commercial firms strongly depend on 
local banks for finance and for the ensuring of their activities of import/export. Therefore, 
they are required to reciprocate trust in order to have access to future lines of credit. The 
second is that commercial companies have better knowledge in order to evaluate the 
quality of the investments made by their partners. Therefore, the risks and the costs of 
directly financing those small companies are much higher than entrusting the local 
commercial companies with excess credit. 
However, the value of firms’ reputations is embedded within their network of 
interaction. Therefore, it can not be transferred outside the industrial district. There are 
many ways to make reputation accessible, such as developing a brand, offering a guarantee 
or insuring the quality of performance or products. Establishing a brand, for instance, 
enables the transferability and socialization of clients’ experiences. Brands, in fact, are 
categories that enable customers to organize and share experiences about the quality of a 
specific product. Offering a guarantee on the quality of a product enables the seller to take 
full responsibility of the quality of the product itself and this shows good faith and 
goodwill to counterparts. Providing a certificate that qualifies the quality of a specific 
product is another way of making trust accessible. However, these reputation mechanisms 
are costly. Therefore, most of the firms in an industrial district do not have the financial 
resources to bear such huge investments. 
5.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter we focus on the local process of trust creation within Italian 
industrial districts. We show that the process of trust creation within these systems is 
rooted within a common culture of mutual trust. The origin of this culture can be traced 
back to the tradition of civic communities, which characterized the North and Central part 
of Italy in the Middle Ages. The argument of culture, however, is not sufficient to explain 
the process of trust creation within these systems. In order to explain it we need to take 
into account also the social interaction that takes place between community-members. 
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From this perspective, we show that trust is the product of fair competition between 
members. The peculiar structure of industrial districts, in fact, stimulates its members to 
invest on and reciprocate trust to gain reputation within the community. The value of this 
reputation, however, is embedded within the local network and it can not be exported 
outside of it. The next three chapters, therefore, explore three alternative strategies of 
externalization and internalization of trust between local and global systems. 
 
 6 THE DE-COUPLING MODEL OF TRUST CREATION 
In the previous chapter we investigate the local process of trust creation within 
Italian industrial districts. We show that the trust produced within these systems is not 
directly exportable to parties located outside of these systems. In this chapter we address a 
first model of trust creation between local and global systems. We name this model de-
coupling. The use of the term de-coupling emphasizes the separation between local and 
global processes of trust creation (see Fig. 6.1). The connectivity between these two 
dimensions of trust creation is governed by a limited number of large companies. These 
companies hold a quasi-monopolistic position on the accessibility to the local system. The 
major limit of this model, as we shall see, is that local firms develop a sort of dependence 
on these connectors in order to get access to the global system. 
To characterize this model we use two case studies. The first is the case of the 
Benetton system. Benetton is one of the leading companies in the clothing and sportswear 
industries. Its annual turnover, in the year 2000, was two thousand million Euro. Benetton, 
as we shall see, is the strategic core of a “glocal” network of firms. The local dimension is 
composed of more than four hundreds small and medium textile laboratories, which 
produce about 80% of Benetton’s annual production. The global one is characterized by 
almost 7000 franchises distributed in 120 countries. 
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Fig. 6.1: The de-coupling model of trust creation 
 
The second case study refers to the eyewear district of Cadore. This district, as we 
shall see, is dominated by four leaders, which are leaders also in the global market. The 
business model of these four leaders is similar to the one of Benetton. The major 
difference, however, is that they have vertically integrated large part of the production 
process. Local small and medium sized firms, as a consequence of this decision, are 
confronted with the major problem of developing new trusted relationships within the 
global system.  
The structure of this chapter is the following. We first address the case of 
Benetton. The case of Benetton is structured in three parts. The first part provides a little of 
background. The second part analyzes the structure of the global network. The third part, 
analyzes the structure of the local one. The structure of the second case study is similar. 
However, we distinguish between the business model adopted by the leaders and the one 
adopted by the others local companies. We make this distinction in order to emphasize the 
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reasons behind the failing of local small- and medium-sized enterprises to develop new 
relationships with the outside. 
6.1 The case of Benetton
27
  
The company is located in the province of Treviso, 20 km north of Venice. It was 
founded in 1955 as a small textile laboratory. It should be noted that the area was already 
characterized by the presence of a large number of small textile laboratories, which worked 
as subcontractors for large textile companies. These laboratories were mainly managed by 
women, as a complementary source of income. The area, in fact, was mainly agricultural. 
The initial success of Benetton was mainly based on two major factors: the design 
of colorful jumpers and the development of a global franchising network of retailers. In the 
sixties men used to dress in black and white. The first innovation of Benetton was to 
design colorful jumpers, which quickly became one of the distinctive symbols of the 
sixties. The second innovation was to develop a franchising network of retailers. It is 
interesting to note that Benetton did not have in mind the development of such a network. 
It was only by chance that the first Benetton shop was founded in Belluno, which is a small 
city 100 km north of Venice in the Alps. The success of this shop convinced Benetton of 
the advantages of this mode of selling. Nowadays, Benetton consists of more than 7000 
stores, in the form of franchises, all over the world. 
6.1.1 The global network 
The global distribution network of Benetton is structured into two levels. The first 
level is the one of agents. These are in the number of 90 distributed all over the world. 
They work exclusivity for Benetton and control a specific geographical area. The major 
function of these agents is to mediate the relation between Benetton and the franchisees. 
Agents play two major functions. The first is to show new collections and collect orders. 
The second is to stimulate the development of the franchising network in their 
geographical market. They are shareholders in most of the stores in their areas. There are 
                                                           
27 This case study is based on Ganzaroli (1994). The original contribution has been integrated with two interviews 
with the responsible of the IS department and one of the managers of the human resources department. For the 
historical part we referred to the bibliography of the Benetton family (Mantle, 1999). 
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two aspects that should be noted. The first is that most of the owners of these agencies are 
either long-term friends of the Benetton family or ex-employees of the commercial and 
marketing departments, who have been awarded with the opportunity of opening an 
agency. The second aspect is that product orders are directly between Benetton and its 
franchisees. Therefore, the agents do not have any direct responsibility on the insolvency 
of the two counterparts.  
The second level is that of franchisees. These are almost 7000 distributed in 120 
countries. The contract of franchising proposed by Benetton has some peculiarities. The 
first is that Benetton does not invest any money in opening new shops The local 
entrepreneur bears all the costs of the initial investment. The opening of stores in strategic 
cities is an exception, such as the first Benetton shop in Moscow.  
The second peculiarity is that the contract of franchising does not provide any 
guarantee on the exclusiveness within a specific area. Another entrepreneur can decide to 
open another Benetton shop just on the opposite side of the street to an existing one. These 
two factors have strongly contributed to the stunted growth of Benetton in the US market, 
which still only account for less than 5% of annual turnover.28 However, it should also be 
noted that Benetton does not require the payment of any royalties on its brand. 
The characteristics of the contract of franchising are relevant in understanding 
how Benetton produces trust between the local and global systems. If it is true that 
Benetton does not take any risk in the opening of a new store, then it is also true that its 
capacity for attracting new franchisees depends completely on its capacity to stimulate 
trust in, and knowledge of, the brand in the market. Local entrepreneurs, in fact, will open 
new stores if, and only if, they expect that it will be profitable. In other words, only if they 
believe there is a demand for Benetton clothes in their city. It should be noted, however, 
that recently the retailing strategy of Benetton has changed. The new retailing strategy is 
based on mega stores, which are directly controlled by Benetton (Camuffo et.al. 2002). 
                                                           
28 It should be noted that the low market penetration of Benetton in USA is also consequence of the advertising 
strategy implemented by the firm in the last two decades. This was based on a number of shocking images, such 
as the one of the blood of a young man killed in the Balkans. This kind of images has been considered really 
offensive in USA.  
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6.1.2 The local network 
The local network of Benetton’s subcontractors counts almost four hundred small 
and medium laboratories, which produce 80% of Benetton’s annual production. These 
laboratories specialize in different phases of the production process. They work 
exclusively for Benetton. Until recently, there was not any written contract binding 
Benetton to its local subcontracts. Business was made on the promise of a handshake. This 
practice has changed recently as a consequence of the introduction of the national low on 
subcontracting. This is a legal framework imposed by the national government in order to 
regulate the process of subcontracting. The Benetton system, which also comprises its 
subcontractors, adopted this contract in order to comply with the law. However, there was 
no need for such a contract. 
It should be noted, however, that Benetton subcontracts only the phases of the 
production process that are not strategic. For instance, the design of the product, which is 
one of the most strategic phases of the value chain, is performed internally. The 
procurement of raw materials, production planning, cutting of clothes, packaging and 
distribution of the final products are all activities that are performed internally. Therefore, 
it is Benetton that guarantees the quality of the products produced in the local system. The 
local system is only a means of reducing production costs and increasing flexibility. 
6.1.3 The role of information and communication technologies 
Information and communication technologies do not play any relevant role in 
sustaining the creation of trust between local and global systems. These technologies are 
mainly used to improve the capacity of Benetton to collect and process information from 
the market. The two main software applications are the order entry system, which is used 
by local agents to enter the order, and the bar code application, which enables the firm to 
collect information about daily selling trends. The access to these applications is based on 
an Extranet. Benetton maintains a standard EDI-relationship with the suppliers of raw 
material and logistic services. The development of digital networks to support coordination 
and cooperation between Benetton and its subcontractors has only been recently 
implemented in order to de-localize labor intensive activities into developing countries. In 
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the traditional production site the communication between Benetton and its subcontractors 
takes place mainly face-to-face, via telephone or fax and through the exchange of floppy 
disks. 
6.1.4 Discussion 
Benetton is the typical example of a de-coupling model of trust creation between 
local and global systems. Local and global are two separated dimensions of trust creation. 
There are not direct contacts between local and global players. The creation of trust 
between the local and the global system is entrusted to Benetton. The strategy of de-
localization that Benetton has recently activated raises some questions about the 
reproducibility and sustainability of the local system. The model of de-localization 
developed by Benetton is based on the development of local production subsidiaries, which 
are in charge of coordinating and controlling the activities of local networks of 
subcontractors. It should be noted that these new production sites have already been 
digitally integrated. However, the standard of communication is not public, but proprietary. 
Therefore, it is not accessible to other parties. 
6.2 The eyewear district of Cadore
29
 
The eyewear district is located in the valleys of Cadore, which is an area of the 
Alpine Dolomites 100 km north of Venice in the province of Belluno. Its origin can be 
traced back to the golden age of the Venetian Republic, when lenses were produced in 
Murano, which is still famous worldwide for glass production, and frames were produced 
in Cadore. Its real origin, however, can be traced back to 1878, when two local 
entrepreneurs founded the first Italian optical firm. A number of other firms resulted from 
this first firm. In the 1930s the number of optical firms already numbered 7, in 1951 81, 
and in 1991, the date of the last census, 733, most of them being of small- and medium- 
size (Albertini and Pilotti, 1996). Currently, the district counts 1.500 enterprises, which 
                                                           
29 This case study is based on Ganzaroli and Pilotti (1996), Albertini and Pilotti (1996) and Anfao (2001) and the 
European project proposal “Cittadella dell’Occhiale”. These contributions have been integrated on the basis of 
twenty interviews to local entrepreneurs and public officers.  
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produce 25% of the global production of frames and 50% of the one of high quality 
(Camuffo, 2001). 
There have been many factors that have contributed to sustaining the development 
of this district: the relative isolation of the area, the insufficiency of the local agriculture to 
sustain the community, the small dimensions of the production plans, the availability of 
energy, the high rate of unemployment, the entrepreneurial character of people from the 
mountains and so forth (Albertini and Pilotti, 1996). The district, until 1960, was 
characterized by the prevalence of firms of small and medium dimensions, which worked 
as subcontractors for large industrial companies and wholesalers located outside the 
district.  
It was from 1960s that the morphology of the district started to change. This period 
was characterized by an important change. Eyewear changed its connotation from being a 
therapeutic to a fashion product. This change provoked a shock. It was no longer sufficient 
to know how to produce frames, but it was also necessary to know how to market the 
product. In other words, it was necessary to open up the district and to develop efficient 
systems of intermediation between local and global. Only a few companies understood the 
consequences of this change at the time. Therefore, these companies have been able to 
fully exploit the opportunities created by this change. The others did not.  
The current structure of the district can be characterized as following. The district 
is dominated by four leaders (Luxottica, Safilo, Marcolin and De Rigo), which are also 
leaders of the global market. It should be noted, however, that the dimension of these four 
leaders is very different. The annual turnover of Luxottica (2.300 million Euro) is four 
times the one of Safilo (550 million Euro) and De Rigo (400 million Euro), and twenty 
times the one of Marcolin (around 100 million Euro) (Camuffo, 2001). These leaders are 
“surrounded” by a large number of small and medium sized producers. These produces are 
structured according to the traditional business model of the district. On the one hand, they 
contract out large part of their production to local network of small and medium 
enterprises, which specialize on specific phases of the production process. On the other 
hand, they produce mainly for external dealers and wholesalers. 
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6.2.1 The business model of the leader 
The four leaders have adopted a common business model. The first adopter, from 
this perspective, has been Luxottica. Two major aspects characterize this model: the 
vertical integration of the supply chain; and the purchasing of royalties from leading 
designers of the fashion system. The process of vertical integration started in Luxottica 
from the beginning of the eighties. In a decade the percentage of the production contracted 
out decreased from 70-80% to 10%. In the nineties this percentage decreased to 1%.  
There are two major factors behind this development: the development of flexible 
and computerized machines and the necessity to improve and certify quality (Camuffo, 
2001). The development of flexible machines enabled the four leaders to achieve high 
levels of efficiency, productivity and flexibility without the need to relay on external 
production capacity. On the other hand, the traditional model, based on the distribution of 
the production process among a large number of small and medium firms, did not 
guarantee the possibility to achieve the level of quality and time-to-market required to be 
competitive in the global market. 
In the same period the four leaders started to expand their control over the 
distribution chain. This process took place in two phases. In the first phase, the four leaders 
invested on the development of their own private and global network of subsidiaries. In a 
second phase, which started only recently, these four leaders have started to expand their 
control over retail chains. Luxottica, for instance, took over LensesCrafters, which is the 
largest retail chain in USA, and Sun Glass Hut, which is one of the largest in Europe, and 
it becomes also the largest glass retailer in the world.  
The second aspect that characterizes the model of the four leaders is the payment 
of royalties to leading designers of the fashion industry. The four leaders spend, on 
average, 7% of their annual turnover in royalties. Luxottica is an exception because it pays 
only 1.7% of its annual turnover. It should be noted, however, that the frame design is 
made by the producer and not by these designers. Therefore, Valentino, Calvin Klein and 
so forth only sell their reputation and not their design. The acquisition of the brand is a 
strategic move for these companies. The mark-up that the producer can apply to a frame 
depends mainly on the brand. Producing a frame of high quality costs around 15 €. The 
CREATING TRUST BETWEEN LOCAL AND GLOBAL SYSTEMS 
 117
same frame is sold to the final consumer for 150 €, if it is branded (see also Camuffo, 
2001). 
6.2.2 The disruption of trust within the district 
The decision of the four leaders to vertically integrate the production process had 
a major impact on the district. Local firms, as consequence of this decision, lost their 
protection barrier against market fluctuations and global competitiveness. The four leaders, 
in fact, do not absorb anymore the largest part of the production capacity available in the 
district. The growth of the district in the second part of the nineties has been of the 5%. 
However, this is mainly explained by the increase of the four leaders. In the same period 
the number of firms in the district has decreased of the 25% and the number of employees 
has increased of 14%. However, the four leaders have mainly employed these employees 
(Camuffo, 2001). 
There are two main reasons behind this crisis. The first is structural, which is the 
competition of Far East countries and mainly China. Chinese companies are ever more 
competitive also in the high segments of the eyewear market. There are companies of the 
fashion system that have started to contract out their production to Chinese companies. 
Furthermore, the largest retail chains in USA have contracts out 80% of their demand for 
glasses to Chinese companies. Finally, many small and medium producers located in 
Cadore have started to de-localize part of their production in China (Camuffo, 2001). 
The second factor is endogenous. Local firms are incapable to establish any form 
of cooperation to joint their effort to improve their capacity to compete in the global 
market. It should be highlighted, from this perspective, that local public institutions have 
lunched many initiatives to sustain collaboration between local entrepreneurs.  
In 1995, the local industrial associations, together with a local bank, tried to 
sponsor the development of a common EDI infrastructure to virtually integrate local and 
global firms. The project failed because of the lack of consensus. Last year, the local 
Chamber of Commerce, together with most of the local associations and municipalities of 
the area, launched a European project, which is called the “Eyewear Village” (La cittadella 
dell’occhiale). In this project there are two important sub-projects. The aim of the first is 
the development of a common brand that guarantees the quality of frames produced in 
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Cadore. The aim of the second is the development of an electronic procurement system to 
improve accessibility to the local system. Both these projects have encountered some 
difficulties in taking off. In the case of the quality brand, for instance, there is a conflict 
between two groups of firms. The first group supports the idea that the brand should 
guarantee the quality of the product. The second group, on the other hand, supports the 
idea that the brand should only guarantee the origin of the product. 
There are two major reasons behind these failures. The first is the individualistic 
and egoistic character of local entrepreneurs. Local entrepreneurs prefer to die alone rather 
than to loose their independence and freedom. The second reason is that local public 
institutions are not able to substitute the four leaders. In the past the four leaders stimulated 
cooperation within the local system. The local public institutions seem to not have enough 
power and tools to play the same function.  
6.2.3 Discussion 
We decided to include the case of Cadore for one main reason. It shows the 
negative consequences that a de-coupling model of trust creation may produce. This case, 
in fact, has many points in common with the one of Benetton. In both cases there is a 
leader or a group of leaders, which function as strategic connectors between local and 
global systems. In both cases their role is based on two major factors: the progressive 
expansion of their control over retail chains and large investments on brand recognition.  
There is, however, a major difference between these two cases. Benetton did not 
vertically integrate the entire production chain, but only the most strategic phases. The four 
leaders in the eyewear district, differently, have vertically integrated the entire production 
process. The consequences of this decision have been dramatic for the district. Local firms, 
in fact, are not capable to develop alternative connections with the outside market. There 
are two reasons that explain the different strategy implemented by the leaders in the two 
cases. The first is that the level automation that can be achieved in the two production 
process, which is higher in the case of the production of glasses. The second reasons, 
however, is that the four leaders in the eyewear district did not trust their local counterparts 
to be able to guarantee high quality products and time-to-market. The time to market, for 
instance, could be improved by adopting a common inter-organization information system 
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to improve the level of coordination and control within the local system. The four leaders, 
however, did not show any interest for the proposal of the local industrial associations to 
develop such an infrastructure.  
The subcontractors of Benetton are currently running the same risk. Benetton, in 
fact, has launched a strategy of de-localization of labor-intensive activities in developing 
countries. The strategic orientation of Benetton, however, seems to be different. Benetton 
intends to contract out to local firms strategic phases of the production process, which are 
currently performed internally (Camuffo et.al., 2002). Therefore, Benetton intends to 
sustain the development of the local system by transferring part of its competences to the 
firms that are embedded within the local system.  
6.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter we analyzed a de-coupling model of trust creation between local 
and global systems. In order to develop this model we relay on two case studies: Benetton 
and the eyewear district of Cadore. In these cases we show that the creation of trust 
between local and global is entrusted to a small group of leading companies, which 
guarantee the quality of the connectivity between these two dimensions. Their role of 
guarantors for the trustworthiness of the glocal system is based on three major factors: 
their knowledge of the local system, their control over the distribution and retail chains, 
their investment in brand reputation. Furthermore, in the case of Cadore we showed the 
negative consequences that may derive from the adoption of the de-coupling model of trust 
creation. Local firms may remain locked in as consequence of their incapacity to create 
trust with potential partners located outside the local system. 

 7 THE COUPLING MODEL OF TRUST CREATION
30
 
In the previous chapter we addressed the de-coupling model of trust creation. This 
model is based on the strong separation between local and global mechanisms and 
institutions of trust creation. The objective of this chapter is to address an alternative model 
of trust creation, which we have named coupling. This model is based on the codification 
of trust along the entire value chain. In this model, as we shall see, the distinction between 
local and global does not make sense. Business relations are embedded within a global 
system of rules and codes. Our major argument in this chapter is that the adoption of these 
mechanisms erodes the specific identity of local systems, which do not sustain anymore 
the development of small and medium enterprises. 
In order to characterize this model, we refer to the case of Fiat system. Fiat is the 
largest car manufacturer in Italy and one of the largest in Europe. Our starting point for this 
analysis is the transition from mass production, which is based on vertical integration, to 
lean production, which is based on horizontal cooperation. This transition in Fiat took 
place between the beginning of the seventies and the middle of the nineties.  
                                                           
30 This case studies is based on Bonazzi (1993), Volpato (1996), Camuffo and Volpato (1998) and Ciborra and 
Patriotta (1999). It has been integrated with interviews with one of the manager of the Human Resources 
department and the responsible for e-commerce project in Fiat. Furthermore, we interviewed the technical 
responsible for the IS department of Fiat. 
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In order to define the concept of lean production we use the metaphor of the 
crystal pipe, which the Italian sociologist Bonazzi (1993) proposes at the end of his study 
about the adoption of lean production in Fiat. This metaphor, at least in our perspective, is 
extremely powerful to characterize the essence of lean production. The metaphor of the 
crystal pipe is used, in the second part of this chapter, to interpret the internal and external 
reorganization of Fiat according to the principle of lean production. The last part of this 
chapter is devoted to analysis the recent developments in the automotive industry. Our goal 
is to show that the transition toward global and codified systems of trust is in progress. 
7.1 The crystal pipe 
The transition from mass- to lean-production in the automotive industry took 
place in the last three decades. The model of lean production emerged in Japan starting 
from the sixties. The sociologist Bonazzi (1993) characterizes this model using the 
metaphor of the crystal pipe. He develops this metaphor in the last chapter of his book 
about lean production in Fiat. He argues that this is the way the management of Fiat 
perceives the lean model of production. 
The metaphor of the crystal pipe is extremely powerful to represent the essence of 
lean production. The pipe evokes the sense of passing through. The lean model is a 
continuous flow, which arrives to its final destination just-in-time. Furthermore, the pipe 
evokes the sense of leanness/essence and flexibility. Lean production aims to achieve the 
maximum level of synchronization along the value chain through the intense and 
horizontal exchange of information. The pipe is circular. The circle is the symbol of 
perfection. The metaphor of the pipe, from this perspective, symbolizes members’ 
commitment toward continuous quality improvements (total quality management). 
The pipe, however, is made of crystal. The metaphor of crystal has a double 
meaning. On the one hand, the crystal is transparent. It symbolizes members’ commitment 
to share information to improve cooperatively their performances. The crystal, on the other 
hand, is also fragile. The crystal, from this perspective, symbolizes the fragility of the lean 
model of production. The different phases along the production process are highly 
synchronized. Therefore, if there is some problem at any level of the value chain, the cost 
of this problem is going to span along the entire value chain. It follows that the 
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performance of each member of the value chain - be a firm, a group or an individual - is 
critical for the performance of the entire value chain. Therefore, the lean model of 
production critically depends on mutual trust and cooperation between all the members of 
the value chain. 
7.2 The crystal pipe in Fiat  
In the previous section we use the metaphor of the crystal pipe to define the concept 
of lean production. The objective of this section is to analyze how this metaphor has been 
interpreted and adopted in Fiat. Bonazzi argues that the crystal pipe is not constrained 
within firms’ boundaries, but spans across industrial relations. Therefore, this section is 
structured in three major parts: lean production within Fiat, lean production between Fiat 
and its suppliers, lean production between Fiat and its customers.  
7.2.1 Internal reorganization: lean production within Fiat 
The adoption of the concept of lean production in Fiat took place in three major 
phases: rigid automation (1972-1978), flexible automation (1978-1988) and Japanization 
(after 1988).31 These three phases can be interpreted as part of a learning cycle (Bonazzi, 
1993). The automation strategy, both rigid and flexible, had two major objectives. The first 
was to improve quality, flexibility and productivity by investing into the synchronization 
and automation of the production process. The second was to reduce the level of 
dependence on workers’ consensus and participation. This second goal was mainly a 
consequence of the strong conflict between Fiat and the Labor Unions in the seventies.  
The management of Fiat decided to fully convert to the principles of lean 
production as a consequence of the failure of the project Highly Automated Factory 
(HAF). This project aimed to fully automate the assembly line. Fiat had a long-term 
experience in automation. The project FIRE (Fully Integrated Robotized Engine), which 
aimed to automate the engine assembly line, has been a success. 85% of the operations 
along the engine assembly line were automated. The production costs were cut by 10%. 
The number of components was reduced by 30%. The lead-time was reduced by 50% 
                                                           
31 See Bonazzi (1993) and Volpato (1996). 
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(Camuffo and Volpato, 1998). The automation of the final assembly line, however, was 
much more complex. In fact, the number of operations and interdependence between 
operations were much higher than in the case of the engine assembly line.  
The failure of the HAF project convinced the management of Fiat that human 
resources play a central role in the lean model of production. The flexibility that can be 
codified within a technological infrastructure is only limited. Human resources, from this 
perspective, can overcome these limitations by adding flexibility and creativity to the 
assembly line. The management of Fiat, therefore, shifted its focus from the concept of 
Highly Automated Factory to the one of Integrated Factory (IF). Ciborra and Patriotta 
(1999) describe IF as the attempt to combine apparently contradictories concepts: high 
automation and rigid synchronization with human touch, creativity and intuition; 
sophisticated and computerized control and coordination systems with socialization, team-
working and face-to-face interaction. 
The IF is structured into operative units, which are responsible for a specific 
process. In the case of Melfi, which is the first plant where the concept of integrated 
factory was adopted, the organizational units were four: plating, pressing, painting and 
assembly. Operative units cooperate to define daily production plans, monitoring 
production and managing critical situations. Each operative unit is structured into two 
functions: production, which is in charge of the production process, and engineering, 
which is in charge of maintaining the technological infrastructures and assisting the 
Elementary Technological Units. Elementary Technological Units (UTE) are the basic 
elements of IF. They are composed of 80-100 workers each distributed into three shifts. 
Each UTE is responsible for managing a homogenous technological sub-system and a 
specific segment of the production process. UTEs are evaluated in terms of quality, 
productivity and costs.  
Coordination between UTEs is based on horizontal flow of information. These are 
structured as in customer-supplier relationships. This structure, therefore, tends to replicate 
internally the structure of the external organization. The IF, from this perspective, is a 
captive market, which is regulated in terms of quality and price. The costs of low quality 
performances are directly imputed to the budget of the UTE and indeed to its 
“profitability”. 
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The adoption of the lean model of production has also implied the formation of 
quality-oriented groups. In Fiat there are four types of these groups. The first are the 
Omega groups, which focus on critical problems. This Omega groups are not quality 
groups in the Japanese sense. In Japan quality groups form spontaneously. The Omega 
groups, instead, are institutionalized. The second are the Torquato groups, which are 
created by the Omega groups to solve specific problems. The third and the fourth are 
respectively Cedac and suggestion systems. These are quality groups in the Japanese sense. 
They form spontaneously and on temporary-basis. The aim of these groups is to provide 
suggestions to solve specific quality problems. The suggestions proposed are evaluated by 
a commission, which grant a monetary award proportional to the value of the 
contributions/suggestions. The number of participants to these groups in Fiat is lower than 
in most of Japanese companies. However, it is high compared to European standards 
(Volpato, 1996). 
The adoption of the concept of IF has stimulated the formation of a new culture. 
The relationship between management and workers is more cooperative than before. 
Bonazzi, however, argues that, like in many other cases in Europe, the basis of workers’ 
consensus and participation is not dependent on job-enrichment, but on automation of 
risky activities. Furthermore, Ciborra and Patriotta (1999) show that the introduction of 
lean production has changed the practices and routines within the organization. Workers do 
not perceive the production process as a combination or a sequence of independent phases, 
but as an integrated assembling/disassembling system. This mental representation of the 
process facilitates cooperation between workers both within and across UTEs.  
7.2.2 Supply chain reorganization 
In the previous section we focus on the reorganization of the internal value chain 
according to the principles of lean production. However, the adoption of lean production 
requires expending the same philosophy also to the external value chain. This is required in 
order to achieve the maximum level of coordination and synchronization between all the 
parties involved into the value chain. This section focuses on the reorganization of the 
supply chain according to the principles of lean production. Next section, instead, will 
focus on the reorganization of the commercial chain.  
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In Fiat the reorganization of the supply chain took place in two major phases. In 
the first phase Fiat attempted to reduce its internal costs by externalizing part of the 
production to local network of suppliers. In the second phase, instead, Fiat introduced the 
concepts of partnership and cooperation with suppliers and, therefore, stimulated suppliers’ 
participation. 
In the first phase the supply chain was restructured into three levels: captive, 
prime contracting and subcontracting. Producers of components, previously belonging to 
the Fiat group, formed the captive level. There were three producers, each of whom were 
entrusted with coordinating the activities of prime contractors within a specific market of 
supply: electronics, plastics and metallurgic. The prime contractors were entrusted with 
coordinating the activities of subcontractors within their specific phase of the supply chain, 
such as the supply of transmission systems. Fiat selected the prime contractors on the basis 
of a competition between subcontractors in order to be able to compare their quality and 
trustworthiness. The reorganization of the supply chain also meant the transition from 
short-term contacts to long-term partnerships. In the period between 1980 and 1989 the 
number of long-term contracts increased from zero to 1,750 with a total value of about 50 
billion Euros. 
In the second phase Fiat entered into the logic of partnership. The number of 
prime contractors has been further reduced. The new logic of partnership is based on a 
program of “guided growth”. This is a program of apprenticeship for prime contractors. 
During this program, prime contractors are initiated in the art of total quality management 
and co-designing. Fiat plays the role of the consultant for the management of quality. The 
scope of this program is to develop a base of suppliers ISO-certified for their quality and 
trustworthiness (Volpato, 1996; Camuffo and Volpato, 1998).  
Having a certified network of suppliers has two major advantages. The first is that 
each supplier certifies itself for its quality and, therefore, it is legally responsible for it. Let 
us suppose that a driver crashes his or her car because the brakes fail. The blame no longer 
lies with Fiat, but with the brake system’s supplier. The second advantage is that Fiat does 
not need to perform any quality control. This activity is entrusted to suppliers.  
The efficiency of this system of certification depends on the possibility of keeping 
track of the flow of materials. Information and communication technologies, from this 
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perspective, play a major role. Each car component, in fact, is identified by a bar code, 
which univocally identifies its supplier.  
Furthermore, the adoption of EDI has improved the flexibility of the supply chain. 
The idea behind “just in time”, which is one of the innovations that characterize the lean 
model of production, is that cars are produced only when they have already been sold. 
Therefore, in order to reduce the lead-time between order and delivery of cars it is 
necessary to maximize the coordination between firms in the value chain. The use of EDI, 
from this perspective, has reduced the time needed to share information and coordinate 
activities.32 
Tables 7.1 and 7.2 are useful in understanding the impact of the reorganization of 
the supply chain. The first table shows the relative distribution in percentage terms of the 
components produced internally, those bought from suppliers of the group (captive-
buying) and those bought from partners (non-captive buying). In the period between 1987 
and 1997, the percentage of the value of components produced internally decreased from 
38% to 30%. This value was redistributed between captive (+ 3%) and non-captive (+ %5) 
suppliers. The second table has even more relevance to the argument. It shows how the 
activities of designing new products were distributed between Fiat and its suppliers. In 
1991, 76% of a new product was designed internally. In 1997, this percentage had fallen to 
only 30%. Therefore, suppliers have changed from being simple subcontractors of 
production capacity to real partners of Fiat directly involved in the strategic decisions of 
the company. 
 
 1987 1992 1997 
Make 38% 35% 30% 
Buy Captive 14% 18% 17% 
Buy non-captive 48% 47% 53% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
Tab. 7.1. The distribution of production between make or buy (Adapted from Volpato, 1996) 
                                                           
32 It should be note that car manufacturers have been among the first, in 1984, to join together in order to develop 
a common EDI standardization committee  (Odette). Now Odette has migrated in EDIFACT, which is the 
standard sponsor by the United Nations. Odette, however, is still active in the standardization of the logistic 
process: bar code, pallets and so forth.  
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 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1997 
Internal design 76% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 
External design 24% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 
Tab. 7.2. The distribution of the design process between internal and external (Adapted from Volpato, 1996) 
7.2.3 The reorganization of the commercial chain 
The relation of dealership, in this case of Fiat, was based on an archaic contract. 
The dealer was simply an intermediary between Fiat and the final customer. The 
commercial transaction took place directly between Fiat and the customer and not between 
Fiat and its dealers. This type of contract was diffused when the automotive industry was 
still in its infancy and there was the need to stimulate the diffusion of dealers. Therefore, 
the historical conditions behind this type of contract were overcome. This type of contract 
had the negative effect of inhibiting the entrepreneurship and, indeed, the competitiveness 
of the dealers (Volpato, 1996). The reorganization of the commercial chain took place also 
in two phases.    
The strategy of dealership, in the first phase, aimed to achieve two major 
purposes. The first was to transform the dealer from being a simple intermediary to being a 
franchisee. The second was to improve the competitiveness of its dealers by stimulating 
competition between them. The project was a failure. The intra-brand competition had two 
major effects: a proliferation of the number of dealers and a proliferation of free-riding. 
The majority of new dealers entered the market only for a short period and applied an 
aggressive price policy. The result was a fall in the quality of the service provided. 
In the second phase, therefore, Fiat drastically reduced the number of dealerships 
and introduced a number of criteria, both technical and financial, that a dealer should 
satisfy in order to become a Fiat dealer. In this second phase, information and 
communication technologies have also played a strategic role in the reorganization of the 
retail chain. We highlight two major applications: Sirio and Focus. Sirio is an integrated 
ordering system, which is integrated with the internal “just-in-time system”. Through Sirio 
it is not only possible to verify the status of the order, but also to customize the product, 
even if its production has already started. The introduction of Sirio has reduced the lead-
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time from 45 to 15 days. Focus, instead, enables car dealers to share and exchange orders, 
thus enabling them to rely on a shared and virtual car warehouse. 
7.3 Toward a global supply chain? 
The development of information and communication technologies and common 
quality standards has had a major impact on the structure of the automotive industry. The 
automotive industry has been traditionally strongly geographically clustered. Car 
manufacturers have tried to avoid sharing suppliers. The motivation was that suppliers had 
to be involved in the development of new models many years in advance. Therefore, there 
was a high risk of information leaks. In the 1990s, car manufacturers bought less than 20% 
of their components from outside their country of origin (Volpato, 1996).  
The development of common standards of quality and communication, however, 
is gradually changing this practice. The introduction of EDI, for instance, has facilitated 
the possibility of sharing suppliers and subcontractors between car manufacturers. Many 
suppliers of German car manufacturers, for instance, are located in Italy and also work for 
Fiat. Furthermore, the introduction of common standards of quality has drastically reduced 
the cost of assessing the relative quality and trustworthiness of a specific supplier. It is no 
longer necessary to develop a long-term relationship in order to know the level of quality 
and trustworthiness of the counterpart. The counterpart is directly responsible for its 
quality and trustworthiness. Therefore, it is in its own interest to behave correctly and 
trustworthily. 
The development of the Internet has opened up a completely new range of 
opportunities. It is possible, for instance, to drastically reduce switching costs. From this 
perspective, the main car manufacturers have recently signed a joint venture together with 
Commerce One, as a technical partner, to develop a global electronic market for the supply 
of components. The access to this market will be regulated. Therefore, only suppliers that 
conform to the standards negotiated between the car manufacturers can enter the market. 
However, the question is whether or not this solution is sustainable. In this perspective, 
Japanese manufacturers have shown some concerns. The development of an electronic 
market is incompatible with the development of long-term partnerships. Therefore, 
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suppliers will not be stimulated to invest in quality and reputation in order to reciprocate 
trust and further stimulate transactions (Volpato, 1996). 
The automotive industry, as consequence of the development of open and global 
digital infrastructure, seems to move toward the concept of global supply chain and global 
communities (see fig.7.1). This community is organized as following. On one side, there 
are the major car manufacturers. These car manufacturers cooperate on the definition of 
common and codified standards of trust. On the other side, there are the suppliers of 
components. The development of common standard enable car manufacturers, on the one 
hand, to share information about quality and trustworthiness of their suppliers and, on the 
other hand, to dynamically integrate these suppliers into temporary supply chain.  
7.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have analyzed the case of Fiat as an example of coupling model 
of trust creation. We argued that this model of trust creation is based on the codification 
and standardization of trust along the value chain. Fiat, from this perspective, has strongly 
invested on the automation of the internal and external value chain. Furthermore, internal 
and external relations are organized according to a common logic, which is the one of 
customer-supplier relation. The development of open and global digital infrastructures 
seems to drive the transition toward the formation of a global supply chain, which is shared 
between car manufacturers. From this perspective car manufacturers are working on the 
definition of common standard procedures to coordinate and control suppliers. We argue 
that this will lead to the formation of a global community of suppliers. Car manufacturers 
will regulate the accessibility to this community according to common standard of trust 
and trustworthiness. In this context, therefore, it becomes difficult to distinguish what is 
local from what is global. 
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Fig. 7.1. The Coupling model of trust creation 
 
 
  
8 THE LOOSELY COUPLING MODEL OF TRUST CREATION 
In the previous two chapters we analyze two alternative models of trust creation 
between local and global systems. The first, de-coupling, is based on the separation 
between these two dimensions of trust creation. In the second, coupling, these two 
dimensions of trust creation are integrated on the basis of common codified standards of 
trust. The aim of this third chapter is to show the existence of a third alternative, which is 
based on the moderate integration between local and global mechanisms of trust creation. 
In order to characterize this third model we refer to two case studies. The first is 
the case of the industrial district of packaging machines, which is located in Emilia (central 
part of Italy). The second is the industrial district of footwear, located along the river 
Brenta close to Venice. These two districts have a completely different history. The first 
specializes on a high tech industry. The second, instead, specializes on a traditional 
industry. The first is of recent development. The second, instead, has a long-term tradition. 
Both districts, however, are facing a common problem, which is the problem of integrating 
local and global trust.  
The solution that these two districts are currently experimenting is to implement a 
local information infrastructure to strength the value of existing relationships based on 
mutual trust. In order to increase the accessibility to the local system a number local 
integrators are emerging. The function of these integrators is not, as in the case of 
decoupling system, to create a barrier between local and global, but to make the interaction 
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between these two dimensions transparent. Global standards of selection and control are 
not directly implemented into the local system, but adapted to local conditions. Local 
integrators, in fact, do not take responsibility only for the quality and trustworthiness of 
their performances, but for the quality and trustworthiness of the entire system of local 
relationships. The competition between local integrators is the guarantor for the quality and 
trustworthiness of the connection between local and global systems.  
8.1 The industrial district of packaging
33
 
The district of packaging is distributed between the provinces of Bologna and 
Modena in Emilia. It is part of a large regional system specializing in the mechanical 
sector. The origin of this regional system can be traced back to the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. The area initially specialized in the production of agricultural 
machinery. The development of the automotive industry stimulated the development of 
small-sized car manufacturers and producers of car components. The most important 
producers of luxury cars, such as Ferrari and Lamborghini, are situated within the area. 
Over the years this regional system has developed other specializations, such as the 
production of machinery for the ceramic industry. This process of diversification has 
mainly been stimulated by the proximity to other industrial clusters, such as those of 
ceramics (Modena), textiles (Carpi) and so forth The regional system, therefore, has 
become specialized in the processes rather than in specific products.  
The firms specializing in packaging machinery are mainly clustered in the 
northern part of the province of Bologna and partly in the province of Modena. The district 
produces one third of the automatic packaging machinery operating worldwide. The major 
export markets are Germany, the USA and Japan. The initial development of the district 
was a consequence of the localization of a few large packaging companies in the area, such 
as Tetra Pack. These companies initially outsourced the production of components to 
networks of small- and medium- sized enterprises. This process has stimulated the 
formation of a number of small- and medium-sized companies specializing in the 
engineering and designing of special purpose packaging machines. The continuous spin-off 
of engineers and designers from this original group of firms has supported the further 
                                                                                                                                                   
33 This case studies on interviews to the local artisan associations and the entrepreneurs of COXANET. 
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consolidation of the district. Large packaging companies do not currently develop their 
machines inside, but instead contract out the design to local suppliers, who provide the 
complete packaging machines. 
Recent developments in the district have been characterized by the growing 
demand for integration of the supply chain. Packaging machines are complex and have a 
long life cycle. Their design and production require the ability to coordinate and integrate 
the activities of a large number of actors specializing in single phases of the supply chain. 
This problem is not limited to the phase of design, but also incorporates the phase of after 
sale. Customers of these machines, therefore, prefer to rely on a single source of supply, 
which provides an integrated service, rather than having to coordinate the contribution of a 
large number of actors. The packaging district embeds all the resources necessary for 
designing and producing special purpose packaging machines. However, these resources 
are highly dispersed and they are brought together in order to respond to specific orders 
and requirements. The problem with this business model is that there is no formal 
relationship between firms involved in a specific project. The question is: who can 
guarantee that a small firm, which has designed a specific component, will exist in five 
years time?  
In order to solve this problem a number of firms are beginning to specialize in the 
integration of local supply chains. The function of these companies is to organize and 
structure the interaction between customers and local networks of specialized firms. These 
companies take full responsibility for the quality and trustworthiness of the service 
provided. Therefore, they internalize the risks of adverse selection and free riding. 
Furthermore, in order to improve the capacity of their customers to monitor the local 
supply chain they provide full accounts of the parties involved, their curriculum and their 
respective responsibility. They also integrate the information relative to the status of the 
project itself. Their function, therefore, is to multiply the transferability of the local basis 
of trust by converting their experiences of interaction and cooperation within the local 
system into a format appropriable by final customers, who are located outside the system. 
An example of a company that has developed this role is IMA. This company was 
founded in 1961. It mainly specializes in the engineering of packaging machinery for the 
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food and pharmaceutical sectors. It is a leading producer of packaging machines for filter 
tea bags holding a market share of 70%. The company is structured in three divisions: 
pharmaceutical and cosmetics; tea, coffee and drinks; and food. In order to respond to the 
market request for integration of the supply chain, in 1994, IMA promoted the formation 
of a local and integrated network of specialized firms. In this network, IMA plays the role 
of project leader and prime contractor in the supply and maintenance of special purpose 
packaging machinery. The role of project leader comprises of the following functions: the 
definition of functional specifications of the machinery; the costs and time scheduling of 
the project; the process of coordination and control of the project; the selection of partners; 
and the testing of the final product. It should be noted, however, that the participation in a 
project is not restricted to the parties affiliated to the network. If there are more 
competitive and innovative firms available in the market these may be included in the 
project. This condition is required in order to stimulate the competitiveness and 
innovativeness of the affiliates. 
Once the functional specifications of the project have been completed, the phase of 
coordination and implementation of the project is outsourced to DI.CO, which plays the 
role of the center for operational coordination of the supply chain. DI.CO is a group of 
firms that vertically integrates part of the competencies required for the fulfillment of a 
specific project. The coordination center is responsible for coordinating the production 
process according to the requirements of quality, cost and delivery time defined in 
cooperation with IMA. It is also responsible for the development of procedures and 
timeframes for the coordination and control of the supply chain. The selection of DI.CO as 
a center for operational coordination has commonly been agreed between the members of 
the network. Within IMA the management of the project is entrusted to a team of 
managers, who integrate competences from different departments (design, assembly, 
purchasing, planning and times and methods). The aim of this team is to support DI.CO 
and the network of suppliers in solving specific technical problems, which may emerge in 
the implementation phase. 
In order to develop this network, IMA has used the value of existing relationships 
of mutual trust. The members of the network are all located within the same district. They 
have had previous experience of working and cooperating together. Its function as a 
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strategic center has increased the capacity for its customers to gain access to an established 
network of mutual trust. IMA, in fact, is directly responsible for the quality of the project 
and, indeed, for the quality of the partner chosen to develop the project. The development 
of a coordination center facilitates the process of socialization of trust and its 
internalization. The establishment of a coordination center also has two other major 
effects. The first is to reduce the cost of collecting information about the state of the 
project and, indeed, the possibility of giving punctual information to the final customer. 
The second is to improve the capacity of IMA to monitor the relative performance of 
suppliers and, indeed, its capacity to select partners. 
Another example is Coxanet. This is a temporary association between enterprises 
specializing in the production of a specific module of packaging machines for drinkable 
liquid, such as fruit juice. Tetrapak, a Swedish based multinational industry leader, is the 
main client of Coxanet. Tetrapak has one of its main production plants in Modena. 
Tetrapak internally design the concept of the machine. The engineering of the single 
modules is contracted out to a number of local companies. Tetrapak recently launched a 
program of reorganization, which aimed to modularize the supply chain and drastically 
reduce the source of supply. Furthermore, this project also intended to develop an EDI 
system to improve the capacity of Tetrapak to monitor the supply chain. In order to select 
its partners, Tetrapak defined a set of parameters to qualify the trustworthiness and quality 
of their partners, such as the financial and organizational structure, and the dependence of 
suppliers on Tetrapak34.  
COXA, which is the prime contractor of the network, did not comply with these 
parameters. The firm was too small and, furthermore, it did not have the financial capacity 
to vertically integrate the entire process as required by Tetrapak. However, it could rely on 
a network of specialized suppliers to perform the complete process. Tetrapak, however, 
argued that they did not have enough guarantees for the stability of the cooperation 
between these firms. The local artisan association, therefore, proposed the formation of a 
temporary association between these firms in order to strengthen the value and 
transparency of the relationships between these firms. In this temporary association, 
                                                                                                                                                   
34 The partner of Tetrapak for instance should not depend on Tetrapak for more than 30% of their annual 
turnover. This parameter has been defined in order to stimulate the competitiveness and innovation of the 
partners. 
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COXA, is the prime contractor responsible for the entire project. Within the network, 
however, each member is responsible for the fulfillment of its own tasks. 
This project has not been completed yet. Therefore, it is not possible to pass a 
definitive judgment on the success of the project. However, the results, up to now, have 
been positive. The four companies involved are developing a common integrated 
production plant. They are also developing a common computerized system to improve 
their level of integration and their capacity to provide reports to their customers. They are 
involved in the development of a project of quality certification, which aims to quantify 
not only the quality of the single firms, but also the quality of the network as a whole. 
According to the entrepreneur of COXA, the major advantage of this form of cooperation 
is the increase in visibility and transparency of the relationships between members, both 
inside and outside the network, without the need to bear the costs associated with the 
vertical integration of the project. 
8.2 The case of the footwear district of the Riviera del Brenta
35
 
The district of the Riviera del Brenta is situated between the cities of Venice and 
Padova, along the banks of the River Brenta. This district specializes in the production of 
high quality footwear, mainly for the women’s sector. The number of firms belonging to 
the district is almost 800. The number of employees is 9000 with an average size of 11 per 
firm. The number of shoes produced annually is around nine to ten million, of which three 
quarters are exported. In 1996, the district produced revenues of 719 billion Lire (about 
326 billion US$) with an average of 3 billion Lire (about 1.5 billion US$) per firm.  
The origin of the district can be traced back to the medieval tradition of the 
Venetian guild of the callegheri (shoemakers). The initial development, however, can be 
traced back to the foundation, in 1898, of the first industrial company for the production of 
shoes by a local entrepreneur (Luigi Voltan), who imported to the Riviera methodologies 
and technologies learned in the USA. He played a central role in stimulating the 
development of that specific social tissue, solidarity and cooperative practices, which still 
                                                                                                                                                   
35 This case studies is an interpretation of Belussi (2000) and Fontana (1998) 
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characterize the district. For instance, as vice mayor of Stra’ (one of the small 
municipalities of the Riviera), he founded the construction of public houses, the creation of 
a consumers’ cooperative, and the foundation of a school to train unemployed people in 
shoe-manufacturing. Furthermore, the local Catholic associations also contributed to 
strengthening the local social tissue by sponsoring the formation of collective funds for the 
industrialization of the area. 
The process of development of the district can be characterized by distinguishing 
between three major phases: start-up, take-off and consolidation. The phase of start-up 
lasted from the end of the eighteenth century to the end of the Second World War. It was 
characterized by the presence of one large and vertically integrated firm, Voltan, and a few 
small local laboratories. The second phase lasted from the end of the Second World War to 
the 1970s. There are four major aspects characterizing this phase: the explosion of national 
demand, the development of a few large and vertically integrated companies, the 
emergence of a large number of small- and medium-sized laboratories and the initial 
internationalization of the district. In 1955, the district produced 5.5 million pairs of shoes, 
30% of which were exported. In the following years, the percentage of pairs of shoes 
exported grew from 39% of 6.8 million in 1956 to 60% of 12 million in 1969.  
The period of consolidation started at the beginning of the 1970s. This phase was 
characterized by the intensification of national and international competition. In this phase, 
the Brenta district began to suffer from the competitiveness, on the one hand, of other 
Italian industrial districts and, on the other, of emerging countries, such as China, Brazil 
and ex-Yugoslavia. The disintegration of the production process characterizes the 
evolution of the district in this phase. There are two major motivations behind this 
development. The first is that large- and medium-sized firms in the district began to 
contract out a large part of their internal production in order to cut down their internal 
costs.36 The second is that most of the local firms decided to position themselves in the 
sector of high quality women’s shoes. This choice has limited the degree of automation 
applicable to the production process. Therefore, it has restricted the economic convenience 
of vertically integrating the production process. 
                                                                                                                                                   
36 The efficiency of this strategy is strongly tied to the specific character of the social context of the district, which 
is based on dense networks of social relationships based on mutual trust. The prevalence of mutual trust, in fact, 
enables to cut down on the cost of coordination and integration between firms. 
THE LOOSELY COUPLING MODEL OF TRUST CREATION 
 140
The district is now facing major problems. Local firms work mainly as 
subcontractors for large companies in the fashion industry, such as Prada, Valentino and so 
forth. Therefore, they do not sell their own branded products. It follows that they are 
highly exposed to the competition of emerging countries. Furthermore, a large part of their 
production is still produced locally. Local entrepreneurs do not contract out their 
production to emerging countries because they do not trust their counterparts. Therefore, 
the district is in the dangerous position of potentially becoming completely isolated. It has 
not developed any form of relationship with the final market nor with the market of 
suppliers.  
The relevance of this case study, however, is linked to the fact that this district is 
one of the few in Italy that has been able to establish a community portal to support 
“virtual integration”, through information and communication technologies, both within 
the district and between itself and the external market. The development of this community 
portal has been strongly sponsored by the local association between firms in the footwear 
sector (ACRiB). It is too early to express any evaluation about the success of the project. 
The experience of Sprintel in Prato has shown that technological-failure and -rejection may 
take place with a long delete. This initial success, however, seems to be explained, at least 
in our perspective, as consequence of one major factor: the lack of local powerful 
coalitions, which are able to obstruct the diffusion of this technology.  
It is useful to highlight, from this perspective, the major differences between this 
case and the one of eyewear. Also in the case of eyewear, in fact, local associations are 
making the attempt to sponsor the introduction of new electronic media to stimulate the 
integration between local firms and between the local system and the global one. However, 
the results, until now, have not been as positive as in this case. Our argument, from this 
perspective, is that the presence of a strong leadership within the local system inhibits the 
role of local associations as major driver of the process of innovation. In the case footwear, 
which is characterized by the lack of local leadership, the local association, instead, is still 
able to use its influence to make the interests of local firms converge into common 
CREATING TRUST BETWEEN LOCAL AND GLOBAL SYSTEMS 
 141
projects, which are considered relevant for the competitiveness of the local system as 
whole. 
The district of the Riviera del Brenta seems to be moving toward a loosely 
coupling model of trust creation between local and global systems. The introduction of 
codified procedures of trust does not aim to replace the value of local relationships. On the 
contrary, these systems of trust are constructed on top of existing relationships of mutual 
trust between local companies. From this perspective, it should be noted the key role of the 
local association as sponsor for the diffusion of codified standards of trust. 
Global system
Local trust creation Global trust creation
Socialization
Externalization
Combination
Internalization
Competition 
between a large 
number of local 
integrators
Combination 
between 
codified and 
tacit standards 
of trust
 
Fig. 8.1. The loosely coupling model of trust creation 
8.3 Conclusion  
In this chapter we explore a third alternative to integrate local and global creations 
of trust. In this model, differently from the previous two, the creation of trust is entrusted 
to a number of local integrators, which compete on their ability to provide connectivity to 
local parties and integrate their competencies (see fig. 8.1). Information and 
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communication technologies, from this perspective, are not used as media to impose a 
common standard practice, as in the case of coupling system, but as media to strength the 
value of local relationships and face-to-face interaction. The major advantage of this 
model, in our perspective, is that it facilitates the combination between local experiences 
and global knowledge. Local integrators, in fact, translate their experience of local 
embeddedness into global codes, which are appropriable into the global system, and vice 
versa. The competition between local integrators guarantees the quality and trustworthiness 
of the translation. 
 9 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS  
This thesis has focused on the problem of sustaining the creation of trust between 
local and global systems. Trust has been characterized as distinguishing between three 
perspectives: under-socialized, over-socialized and embedded. The under-socialized 
perspective is based on the assumption of self-interest seeking rationality. Trust is based on 
information and the calculation of self-interest and those of counterparts. The over-
socialized perspective is based on the assumption of behavioral rationality. Individuals 
behave according to a system of norms and values, which have previously been 
internalized. Trust is defined as a cultural norm, which prevails within communities of 
honorable people. The embedded perspective is based on the assumption of network 
rationality. Individuals mutually influence their behavior through a system of interpersonal 
relationships. Trust is defined as an evolutionary characteristic of the relationships between 
people. Trust evolves as a consequence of the accumulation of interpersonal experience 
within a network. The structure of the network influences the way trust develops within a 
relationship. 
We have argued that the differences between these three perspectives could be 
overcome using knowledge as a common denominator. From this perspective, we have 
focused on the distinction proposed by Polanyi between tacit and codified knowledge. 
Tacit knowledge is based on the accumulation of experiences within a specific social 
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context. Codified knowledge is based on the formalization of a set of rules. The value of 
codified knowledge has been abstracted or virtualized. It has been separated from its 
original context on the basis of a number of assumptions about its specific nature and 
structure (virtualization of the context). This context is virtual because it contains only part 
of the complexity that is embedded in reality. On the basis of this categorization we have 
introduced the distinction between tacit and codified trust. Tacit trust is based on tacit 
knowledge. Therefore, tacit trust is based on the knowledge of the context. Codified trust is 
based on codified knowledge. It is based on the knowledge of the rules. 
Tacit and codified knowledge are characterized by different degrees of 
transferability. The value of tacit knowledge is tied to the knowledge/experience of a 
specific social and cultural context. Its value can not be exported. It can only be shared 
between its members. Therefore, tacit knowledge is local. Codified knowledge, on the 
other hand, is independent from the characteristic of a specific context. Its value is 
contained within the language that has been used to codify a given set of rules. Therefore, 
codified knowledge is transferable to anyone knowing the language used to express or 
codify that knowledge. The more the language used is commonly known, the more that 
knowledge is globally accessible Therefore, the distinction between local and global 
depends on the degree of codification and the diffusion of the language used to codify 
knowledge. 
We have argued that there is a gap between codified and tacit knowledge and, 
indeed, between global and local systems. Codified knowledge can not be directly applied 
to a specific context. The reason is that there is a gap between the context of codified 
knowledge, which is virtual, and the context of tacit knowledge, which is real. Therefore, 
the value of codified knowledge, in order to be transferred to a specific (local) context, has 
to be adapted to the characteristics and nature of the local context itself. It is necessary to 
develop an analysis of the gaps that exist between the assumptions embedded within the 
context of codified knowledge and the assumptions embedded within the local context. 
Local knowledge, on the other hand, can not be directly appropriated within a global 
system. The value of local knowledge has to be translated into a language accessible and 
appropriable in the global system. The capacity to create knowledge is tied to the local 
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system’s ability to translate the value of local experiences into languages that can be 
appropriated in the global system and, vice versa.  
Therefore, the problem of sustaining the creation of trust between local and global 
systems has been defined as the problem of translating the value of local experiences of 
mutual trust into a language appropriable in the global system and, vice versa. We have 
used the term sustainable in order to highlight the necessity of maintaining a balance 
between those two dimensions. The global system can not simply replace the local one. On 
the other hand, the local system can not simply be disconnected from the global one. The 
competitiveness of local systems is tied to their capacity to reinterpret their specificity 
within a global context of rules and languages.  
In order to investigate the problem of trust creation between local and global we 
have developed a model of the process of trust creation. This model has been developed 
from the model of knowledge creation proposed by Nonaka and his group. The process of 
knowledge creation can be structured into four major phases: socialization, externalization, 
combination and internalization. Socialization is the process through which knowledge is 
socialized within an organization. Externalization is the process through which knowledge 
is converted into codified knowledge, which can be transferred outside the organization. 
Combination is the process through which knowledge is transferred to other systems and 
combined with the knowledge embedded within those systems. Finally, internalization is 
the process through which knowledge created outside of the organization is converted into 
local practices and experiences.  
Our contribution has been to develop a model of the process of trust creation 
based on Nonaka’s theory. We have shown that trust can also be categorized into tacit and 
codified. We have also shown that the process of trust creation is structured in four phases: 
socialization, externalization, combination and internalization. In the phase of 
socialization, trust is socialized within a community or organization. In the phase of 
externalization, trust is negotiated between communities or organizations in order to be 
converted into a transferable format. In the phase of combination, different trust systems 
are combined and integrated. In the phase of internalization, external sources of trust are 
integrated within the local community. Trust at the local level is based on the socialization 
and internalization of common norms and values. Trust at the global level is mainly the 
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product of the externalization and combination of codified sources of trust. The 
sustainability of the process of trust creation between local and global depends on the level 
of coupling between these two processes.  
In the second part of the thesis we explore alternative ways of constructing trust 
between local and global systems through a number of case studies of Italian industrial 
districts. The model of trust creation, which we have developed in the first part of the 
thesis, has guided our exploration.  
Chapter 5, from this perspective, has focused on the local process of trust 
creation. We show that trust is a critical factor for the development of industrial districts. 
The creation of trust within industrial districts is based on the combination between two 
factors. The first is culture. We showed that the origin of the culture of mutual trust, which 
characterizes these communities, traces back to the tradition of civic community in Middle 
Ages. We argued, however, that a common culture of trust is not sufficient to explain trust 
and cooperation within industrial districts. From this perspective, we showed that trust 
within industrial district is socialized on the basis of fair competition between local parties. 
The structure of industrial districts, in fact, stimulates their members to invest in mutual 
trust as way to gain reputation in the community. The value of this reputation, however, is 
not exportable outside the local community, because it is attached to the experience of 
interaction within the local network. 
In the following three chapters we explored alternative strategies to externalize 
and internalize trust between local and global systems: de-coupling, coupling and loosely 
coupling. We use these three terms to emphasize the different level of coupling between 
the local process of trust creation and the global one. In the de-coupling model local and 
global are two completely separated dimensions of trust creation. The majority of local 
parties do not interact with the outside. The interaction between local and global systems is 
mediated by a small group of leading companies. The aim of these companies, however, is 
not to facilitate the interaction between local and global, but to increase the distance 
between these two dimensions of trust creation. The negative consequence of this model is 
that local parties are ever more dependent on these companies to be able to export their 
productions to the outside market. 
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The coupling model, on the contrary, is based on the codification of local 
relationships according to global standard of trust. The consequence of this strategy is that 
the local dimensions may loose its capacity to sustain the development of local small and 
medium business. In other to characterize this model we use the case of Fiat. We showed 
that the development of Fiat in the last three decades has been characterized by the 
progressive codification of trust along the value chain. This process of standardization has 
produced a progressive globalization of the automotive industry, which may progressively 
exclude cluster of small and medium enterprises from global competition. 
In the previous chapter we present a possible alternative between coupling and 
de-coupling, which we call loosely coupling. This model is characterized by the 
development of a large number of local integrators or facilitators, which are responsible for 
the quality of the interaction between local and global. The major competence of these 
integrators is to externalize trust, from local to global, and internalize trust, from global to 
local. Their role, in other words, is to convert their experience of interaction within the 
local system into information and knowledge that can be appropriated outside the local 
system and vice versa. The efficiency of this solution depends on two major conditions. 
The first is the flexibility of global standards. Global standards should not be strict, but 
open to interpretation. The second is competition between local integrators/facilitators. 
Competition between local integrators should reduce the risk of opportunistic 
interpretation of the standard.  
It should be noted that information and communication technologies play a 
different role in each of these models. In the de-coupling model information and 
communication technologies do not play any relevant role in sustaining the creation of 
trust between local and global. It is only a media for improving the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the processes of information collection and exchange between local and 
global. In the coupling model information and communication technologies are the major 
media of trust creation. These technologies are mainly used to improve the capacity of 
selection, coordination and control between the firms in the global value chain. In the 
loosely coupling model information and communication technologies play a relevant role 
in sustaining the creation of trust between local and global. However, its role is interpreted 
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mainly as a media for improving the integration and value of existing relationships of 
mutual trust between firms. 
Which, among the models identified, is the most sustainable? It is difficult to give 
a definitive answer to this question from the case studies. However, we believe that the 
most sustainable is the loosely coupling model. In the de-coupling model the trust distance 
between local and global is too large and tends to increase as a consequence of the 
negative role played by the local integrator. In the coupling model, on the other hand, the 
distance between local and global is too small and tends to diminish with time as a 
consequence of the negative role played by global players. The loosely coupling model 
produces instead both convergence and divergence between local and global. The local 
adoption of global standards of trust tends to reduce the distance between local and global. 
However, the local adoption of global standards of trust tends to strengthen the value of the 
local dimension as a network of relationships between community members. Therefore, it 
also represents the basis for the renovation of local differences, which characterize the 
community as a whole. 
What are the limitations of this thesis and what future research directions can be 
pursued? The first limitation of this thesis is that we have referred to case studies coming 
from a single cultural context. Furthermore, the cultural specificity of this context has only 
been partially investigated. We have simply distinguished between tacit and codified in 
order to characterize the distinction between specific knowledge, which is embedded 
within a specific context, and ‘universal’ or global knowledge, which is commonly 
accepted. However, we have not investigated the specificities of the context itself and how 
these influence the process of trust creation and the models of intermediation between local 
and global. In order to improve our work we need to identify a set of variables to 
characterize cultural contexts. From this perspective, the literature on cross-cultural 
cooperation may be useful.  
The second limitation is that we have only focused on geographically clustered 
communities. We have not considered the recent phenomena of virtual communities. There 
are a number of interesting questions related to virtual communities. The first is how trust 
is created and established between community members. In the case of industrial districts, 
in fact, the basis of trust between members had already been established. Therefore, the 
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question is how a number of parties belonging to different cultural contexts develop a set 
of common norms and values, which regulate their interaction and sustain the development 
of their relationships. From this perspective there are a number of case studies that can be 
analyzed. 
The most famous is probably the Linux community. This is a community of 
software developers belonging to different cultural contexts and different firms who 
cooperate on the development of the Linux operative system. This community is based on 
the norm of the copy left, which claims that anyone can access for free the source code of 
this operative system and make changes that best satisfy his particular requirements. The 
only condition is that the modified sources of code are handed back to the community. 
Therefore, the Linux operative system is the property of the community itself and not of its 
members. The advantage of this organizational model is that it stimulates the 
multiplication of the number of variants of each component of the operative system. 
In our perspective, there are three main conditions that underlie the success of the 
Linux community. The first is the clever design of the operative system, which is 
extremely modular. Therefore, each member or group of members is free to modify each 
component of the operative system autonomously from the others. The only condition is 
that changes made comply with the standard of interoperability between the different 
components. The second condition is a common passion for Linux as an operative system. 
The members of the Linux community are all hackers. They do not work on a project 
because they have to. They work on a project because they believe in its goodness. They 
basically work for free. The major advantage associated with community membership is 
the possibility of using the work of others to develop customized solutions. The third 
condition characterizing the community is the commitment toward the development of 
software free-of-charge. Developing software is a mission and not a job. 
Most users of operative systems are unable to directly modify the source code 
according to their specific requirements. In order to improve the accessibility and 
transferability of the value created within the Linux community a number of ‘distributors’ 
have emerged (Afuah et.al., 2001). The most famous is Red Hat. The update of the Linux 
operative system, as a consequence of the number of new releases developed, is difficult to 
manage. Red Hat has developed a software system called Red Hat Package Manager 
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(RHPM), which is a communication protocol and a tool that supports final users, who do 
not have the necessary competences, to up-date and customize Linux. Simplifying the 
process of installation and up-date of Linux has been one of the key success factors for 
Red Hat.  
In an interview, Bob Young, the CEO of Red Hat, argued that Red Hat is in the 
business of branding. In order to explain his claim he used the metaphor of ketchup. All 
the ingredients of ketchup are usually available in any kitchen. Therefore, how on earth is 
it possible for Heinz to sell ketchup? Heinz has developed a brand that simplifies the 
process of buying ketchup within a supermarket. We know that Heinz makes good ketchup 
and we trust them to do it. Why should we do it by ourselves if it costs less to buy it in the 
supermarket? The same is true for Red Hat. All the ‘ingredients’ of Linux are available 
over the Internet for free. Red Hat only sells its reputation for being able to integrate, 
according to the specifications of the customer, at a lower cost the latest release of Linux. 
It should be noted that Red Hat is no longer the only distributor in this business. There are 
a number of other competitors, such as Caldera, Mandrake and so forth, who compete on 
their ability to simplify and increase the trustworthiness of the connectivity between local 
and global.  
In this thesis we have explored the problem of sustaining the creation of trust 
between local and global. However, we would like to develop a more formal theory about 
how to govern the interface between these two dimensions of trust. From this perspective, 
a good metaphor that we would like to pursue is between the problem we have investigated 
and the one of the “last mile” in the telecommunications industry. The “last mile” is the 
infrastructure that connects the final customer to the first telecommunication-switcher. The 
previous incumbent owns this infrastructure and it is not economically convenient to 
develop an alternative one. Therefore, the question is how to regulate the accessibility to 
the “last mile” in order to guarantee equal market opportunities to all market players, but, 
at the same time, to prevent competition eroding the quality of the infrastructure itself. 
This problem is similar to the problem of governing the connectivity between local and 
global. The question is how to open up the local market in order to guarantee equal 
opportunities of access between local and global, but, at the same time, to prevent 
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competition eroding the value of the local context as a common ground of cooperation 
between local firms. 
Furthermore, the results of this thesis could be extended in order to consider the 
process of trust creation in the risk society. The concept of risk society has been proposed 
by the German sociologist Beck. The development of modern society, according to Beck, 
has been characterized by the production of a new category of risks, which he calls global. 
Examples of this category of risks include nuclear disasters such as Chernobyl, global 
warming or so-called mad cow disease. These risks are global for two major reasons. They 
span across national boundaries. The consequences of Chernobyl, for instance, expanded 
to a large number of European countries. The second is that we, as individual, are equally 
exposed to the potential consequences of those risks independently from our social status 
and class (Beck, 1992). 
There are other two major aspects that characterize this category of risk. The first 
is that they are “invisible”. Human cannot directly perceive them. Our perception of these 
risks is dependent on experts’ and scientists’ knowledge (codified knowledge/codified 
trust). The second is that the consequences of these risks cannot be calculated. The 
expected consequences of these risks, in fact, are dependent on experts’ knowledge and 
assumptions. The combination of these two factors implies that experts disagree, on the 
one hand, about our real exposure to these risks and, on the other, about the possible 
solutions, such as in the case of the risk of global warming. According to Beck, we lack of 
adequate institutional mechanisms through which these risks can be monitored and action 
taken. In other words, we lack of mechanisms to sustain trust, both at locally and globally, 
with respect to this category risks. The study of this problem could be a possible extension 
of the results of this thesis.  
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10 SUMMARY IN ENGLISH 
This thesis focuses on the problem of trust creation between local and global 
systems. Giddens (1990) argues that the development of modern society is characterized 
by the progressive time-space distanciation between social activities. This does not simply 
mean that social interaction takes place between parties that are located into different 
places, but also that local interactions are ever more mediated by non-local institutions and 
technologies, such as in the case of a local credit card payment. The problem of trust, From 
this perspective, is defined as the problem of creating compatibility between faceless 
commitments, which are codified into global institutions and systems of trust, and face-to-
face working commitments, which are embedded within local networks of trusted 
relationships. 
Our starting point, in order to investigate the problem, has been the literature on 
trust. This literature, according to Granovetter (1992), can be organized into three 
perspectives: under-socialized, over-socialized and embedded. These three perspectives are 
grounded into three different assumptions on human rationality, which are respectively: 
self-interest seeking, behavioral and network. The assumption that scholars make on the 
nature of human rationality has major implications on the way they conceptualize trust.  
In the under-socialized perspective, trust is conceptualized as a rational choice, 
which is based on the calculation of the risks involved within a social 
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transaction/interaction. Trust, from this perspective, is based on the codification of 
trustworthy mechanisms and institutions of coordination and control. In the over-socialized 
perspective, trust is conceptualized as a positive moral norm, which prevails only within 
specific cultural settings. The basis of trust, therefore, is culture and community-
membership. In the embedded perspective, trust is a norm that evolves within social and 
economic networks. It is through their daily experience of interaction within specific 
cultural and social settings that parties, be their individuals or firms, mutually learn about 
their respective attitudes and competences. From this perspective, therefore, trust is 
constructed on a day-by-day basis.  
We argue that the distance between these perspectives can be reduced using 
knowledge as common denominator between them. Trust, like knowledge, is based on 
beliefs. The two concepts differ only for the degree of certainty that we, as society, place 
on the truthfulness of those beliefs. Therefore, trust and knowledge can be considered the 
“ingredients” of the knowledge creation process through which we develop a social 
understanding of reality. 
In order to develop our model of trust creation we refers to the model of 
knowledge creation proposed by Nonaka and his group. This model is based on the 
separation between tacit and codified knowledge. We argue that the same categorization 
applies to trust. The under-socialized perspective on trust, in fact, focuses mainly on 
codified trust and on the process of trust codification. Over-socialized and embedded 
perspectives, instead, focus mainly on tacit trust and, respectively, on the process of trust 
internalization and socialization. 
Nonaka argues that the process of knowledge creation is a spiraling process 
structured into four phases: socialization, externalization, combination and internalization. 
In the first two phases social knowledge, which is embedded within a specific network of 
interpersonal relationships, is converted into codified knowledge, which is contained into 
artifacts. This process responds mainly to the need to translate local knowledge, which is 
embedded within local networks of social and economic relationships, into global 
knowledge, which is appropriable outside the local system. In the second two phases 
global knowledge is converted into tacit knowledge/local practices. Global knowledge is 
the product of the combination between codified components of knowledge. This second 
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process, therefore, responds mainly to the need to re-interpret local practices with respect 
to innovations produced within the global system.  
The competitiveness of local systems, according to Nonaka, depends on the 
capacity to dynamically balance the combination between local experiences and 
global/codified knowledge. An excess of codification within the local system exposes it to 
global competition. An excess of de-codification, on the other hand, reduces the capacity 
of the local system to create and export knowledge. 
Nonaka’s theory is useful to conceptualize the process of trust creation between 
local and global systems. Trust, locally, is produced on the basis of socialization and 
internalization of common norms and values. Trust, globally, is produced on the basis of 
combination between codified institutions and systems of trust. The capacity of local 
systems to create trust at the global level depends on their capacity to translate the trust 
that is embedded within the local system into a code that is appropriable in the global one 
and vice versa. 
In the second part of this thesis we use the model of trust creation to explore the 
structure of this process in a number of case studies of Italian industrial districts. From this 
perspective, we show that there are, at least, three model of trust creation between local 
and global systems: de-coupling, loosely coupling and coupling. These models differ for 
the degree of coupling between local institutions and systems of trust and global ones. We 
argued that the most sustainable model is the loosely coupling one. This is based on a large 
number of local integrators, which compete on their capacity to translate trust between 
local and global systems. The competition between these local integrators better support 
the dynamic combining between local mechanisms and institutions of trust creation and 
global ones. 
  
 11 SUMMARY IN DUTCH 
Dit proefschrift richt zich op het probeem van het creëren van vertrouwen tussen 
lokale en wereldwijde systemen. Giddens(1990) betoogde dat de ontwikkeling van de van 
de moderne maatschappij wordt gekarakteriseerd door de progressive tijd-ruimte 
distantiëring tussen sociale activiteiten. Dit betekend niet alleen dat sociale interactie plaats 
vindt tussen partijen die op verschillende locaties gesitueerd zijn, maar ook dat lokale 
interacties steeds meer gemedieerd worden door niet-lokale instituten and technologieën, 
zoal in het geval van een lokale credit card betaling. Het probleem van vertrouwen is 
vanuit dit perspectief gedefinieerd als het probleem van het compatibilitie creëren tussen 
gezichtsloze verplichtingen, die zijn gecodificeerd in de wereldwijde instituten en 
systemen van vertrouwen, en face-to-face werkverplichtingen, die zijn ingebed in lokale 
netwerken van vertrouwde relaties. 
De literatuur over vertrouwen was voor ons het beginpunt om het probleem te 
onderzoeken. Deze literatuur kan volgens Granovertter (1992) verdeeld worden in drie 
perspectieven: onder-gesocializeerd (“under-socialized”), over-gesocializeerd (“over-
socialized”) en verankerd (“embedded”). Deze drie perspectieven berusten op drie 
verschillende aannames over menselijke rationaliteit, respectievelijk: zoekend naar 
eigenbelang, gedrag en netwerk. De aanname die wetenschappers maken over de natuur 
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van menselijke rationaliteit heeft  grote implicaties op de namier waarop zij het begrip 
vertrouwen conceptualizeren. 
Vanuit het onder-socialistische perspectief wordt vertrouwen geconceptualizeerd 
als een rationele keuze, die is gebaseerd op de calculatie van de risico’s die gepaard gaan 
met een sociale transactie/interactie. Vertrouwen is vanuit dit perspectief gebaseeerd op de 
codificering van vertrouwenswaardige mechanismes en op coördinerende en controlerende 
instituten. Vanuit het over-gesocializeerde perspectief wordt vertrouwen gedefinieerd als 
een positieve morele norm, die slechts binnen een specifieke culturele setting naar voren 
komt. De basis van vertrouwen is daarom cultuur- en gemeenschaplidmaatschap. Vanuit 
het verankerde perspectief is vertrouwen een norm die zich ontwikkelt binnen sociale en 
economische netwerken. Het is door de dagelijkse ervaring in interactie binnen een 
specifieke en culturele setting dat een partij, dan wel hun individu’s dan wel hun firma’s, 
geleidelijk leert over zijn respectievelijke houdingen en bekwaamheden. Vanuit dit 
perspectief wordt vertrouwen daarom opgebouwd op een dagelijkse basis. 
We betogen dat de afstand tussen deze perspectieven terug gebracht kan worden 
door het gebruik van kennis als een gemeenschappelijke noemer tussen hen. Vertrouwen is 
zoals kennis gebaseerd op opvattingen. De twee concepten verschillen alleen op de 
hoeveelheid zekerheid die wij als maatschappij plaatsen op de waarheidsgetrouwheid van 
deze opvattingen. Daarom kunnen vertrouwen en kennis worden beschouwd als de 
“ingredienten” van een kennis creërend proces door welke wij een social begrip van 
realiteit ontwikkelen.  
Om een model voor het creëren van vertrouwen te ontwikkelen verwijzen we naar 
het model van kennis creatie voorgelegd door Nonaka en zijn groep. Dit model is 
gebaseerd op de scheiding tussen stilzwijgende (“tacit”) en gecodificeerde (“codified”) 
kennis. We argumenteren dat dezelfde categorizatie toepasbaar is op vertrouwen. Het 
onder-gesocializeerde perspectief op vertrouwen richt zich in feite voornamelijk op 
gecodificeerd vertrouwen en op het proces van vertrouwens codificatie. Over-socialized en 
verankerde perspectieven richten zich daarentegen voornamelijk op stilzwijgend 
vertrouwen en respectievelijk op het proces van de internalizatie en socializatie van 
vertrouwen. 
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Nonaka beweert dat het proces van het creëren van kennis een spiralizerend 
proces is, wat gestructureerd is in vier fases: socializatie, externalizatie, combinatie en 
internalizatie. In de eerste twee fases wordt sociale kennis, die veranderd ligt in een 
specifiek netwerk van interpersoonlijke relaties, omgezet in gecodificeerde kennis, wat 
wordt behelsd in artefacten. Dit proces beantwoordt voornamelijk aan de behoefte om 
lokale kennis, die is verankerd in lokale netwerken van sociale en economische relaties, te 
vertalen naar wereldwijde kennis, die geschikt is buiten het lokale systeem. In de twee 
daarop volgende fases wordt wereldwijde kennis omgezet in stilzwijgende kennis/lokale 
praktijken. Wereldwijde kennis is het product van de combinatie tussen gecodificeerde 
componenten van kennis. Dit tweede proces beantwoordt daarom voornamelijk aan de 
behoefte om locale praktijken te her-interpreteren met respekt naar innovaties 
geproduceerd binnen het wereldwijde systeem.  
De concurrentiepositie van lokale systemen hangt volgens Nonaka af van de 
capaciteit om op een dynamische wijze de combinatie tussen lokale ervaringen en 
wereldwijde/gecodificeerde kennis te balanceren. Een overschot aan de-codificatie binnen 
het lokale systeem reduceert  aan de andere kant de capaciteit van het lokale systeem om 
kennis te creëren en te exporteren.  
Nonaka’s theorie is nuttig om het proces voor de creatie van vertrouwen tussen 
lokale en wereldwijde systemen te conceptualizeren. Lokaal vertrouwen wordt 
geproduceerd op basis van socializatie en internalizatie van gemeenschappelijke normen 
en waarden. Wereldwijd vertrouwen wordt geproduceerd op basis van een combinatie 
tussen gecodificeerde instituten en systemen van vertrouwen. De capaciteit van lokale 
systemen om vertrouwen te creëren op wereldwijd niveau hangt af van de capaciteit om 
vertrouwen in een code die bruikbaar is in het wereldwijde systeem en vice versa te 
vertalen. 
In het tweede deel van dit proefschrift gebruiken we het model voor de creatie 
van vertrouwen om de structuur van dit proces te verkennen aan de hand van een aantal 
case studies over Italiaanse industrieële districten. Vanuit dit perspectief laten we zien dat 
er in ieder geval drie modellen voor het creëren van vertrouwen tussen locale en 
wereldwijde systemen zijn.: ontkoppeling (de-coupling), losse koppeling (loosely 
coupling) en koppeling (coupling). Deze modellen verschillen wat betreft de mate van 
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koppeling tussen instituten en systemen van vertrouwen op lokaal en wereldwijd niveau. 
We betogen dat is de losse koppeling het meest ontvankelijke model is. Dit is gebaseerd op 
een groot aantal lokale integrators, die concurreren op hun capaciteit om vertrouwen te 
vertalen tussen locale en globale systemen. De concurrentie tussen deze locale integrators 
bevordert op een betere wijze de dynamische vereniging tussen locale en wereldwijde 
mechanismen en instituten voor het creëren van vertrouwen. 
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